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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the key credit risk parameter – Loss Given Default 
(LGD). We describe its general properties and determinants with respect to sen-
iority of debt, characteristics of debtors or macroeconomic conditions, and dis-
cuss its role in Basel II framework. Further, we illustrate how the LGD can be 
extracted from market observable information with help of both the structural 
and reduced-form models. Finally, by using the adjusted Mertonian approach, 
we estimate the 5-year expected LGDs for companies listed on Prague Stock 
Exchange and find out, that the average LGD for this analyzed sample is around 
20%.  
Keywords: loss given default, credit risk, structural models, reduced-form 
models 
JEL class: C02, G13, G33 
Abstrakt 
Tato práce se zabývá klíčovým parametrem kreditního rizika – ztrátou při de-
faultu (loss given default – LGD). V první části práce jsou popsány hlavní de-
terminanty ztráty následkem defaultu odvíjející se od seniority dluhu, charakte-
ristik dlužníka, nebo makroekonomických podmínek, a je probírána role LGD 
v rámci Nové basilejské dohody (Basel II). Dále jsou podrobně rozvedeny me-
tody, pomocí nichž lze extrahovat LGD z tržních dat jak s využitím strukturál-
ních, tak redukovaných modelů. Na závěr jsou pomocí upraveného Mertonova 
modelu odhadnuty pětileté LGD pro společnosti kotované na Pražské burze. 
Výpočty ukazují, že průměrné LGD analyzovaného vzorku firem se pohybuje 
kolem 20 %. 
Klíčová slova: ztráta z úpadku, kreditní riziko, strukturální modely, redukované 
modely 
JEL klas.:  C02, G13, G33 
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♦ Introduction 
The awareness of the credit risk has largely enlarged in last decades due to an in-
crease in the volatility in the underlying real economy, integration of financial markets and de-
velopment of new financial instruments. The increased uncertainty has lead to development of 
new procedures and mechanisms how to determine the causality between the attributes of the 
borrowing entity and its potential bankruptcy. The credit risk techniques have therefore experi-
enced a significant development of new refined methods concerning the estimation of risks and 
other parameters specifying possible losses. 
One of those parameters is also Loss Given Default (LGD), which has obtain a 
greater acceptance only in recent years as the New Basel Accord identified LGD as one of the 
key risk parameters.1 While estimation of probability of default (PD) has received considerable 
attention over the past 20 years, loss given default modeling is still a quite new open problem in 
the credit risk management. The estimation of LGD is not so straightforward, because it de-
pends on many driving factors, such as the seniority of the claim, quality of collateral or state of 
the economy. Moreover, the insufficient database with experienced LGDs makes it more diffi-
cult to develop accurate LGD estimates based on the historical data. Hence, the extraction of 
LGD for credit-sensitive securities based on the market observable information is an important 
issue in the current credit risk area and may bring other improvements into present credit risk 
management. 
This rigorous diploma thesis therefore discusses this key risk parameter for single 
corporate exposures and deals with the possibility of LGD’s extractions from market informa-
tion. This type of LGD modeling is denoted as implied market LGD and is also the main object 
of this work. Since the idea of LGD is relatively new and not fully understood, the thesis con-
tributes to the efforts to explain overall concept of LGD. However, the methods of estimates 
and empirical applicability deal solely with implied market type of LGD. The structure of the 
thesis is following. 
The first chapter brings an overview of the main characteristics of Loss Given De-
fault in the credit risk framework and provides a general survey of LGD properties. It character-
izes different types of LGD and the current practice in their measurement. Further, it brings the 
main determinants of LGD with respect to the seniority of debt, presence of the collateral, or 
properties of the debtor. It is also demonstrated, why debtors’ industry specificity might have 
significant importance for value of recovered debt after default and how macroeconomic condi-
tions implicate positive relationship between LGD and PD. The final subchapter is denoted to 
the role of LGD in Basel II framework. It shows how LGD enters capital calculation both in the 
standardized and in the internal rating based (IRB) approach. 
                                                          
1
 Before Basel II formalized the use of LGD, this concept was also called Severity (see Stephanou and Mendoza 
2005). 
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 Chapter 2 focuses on methods for implied market LGD estimation. We therefore 
utilize models, which use the market information for extracting credit risk parameters from spe-
cific facility or borrower and thereby evaluate its credit quality. The value of firm’s assets is the 
primary source of information for so called structural models, which are based on the initial 
Merton’s framework founded on contingent claim analysis. Those models of credit risk describe 
the default process by explicit modeling of the assets and liability structure of the company. De-
fault occurs, if the value of firm’s assets hits the particular default barrier.  
We show closed-form formula for LGD in the basic Merton’s approach and present 
the sensitivity analysis of LGD with respect to other structural parameters of the firm. Further, 
we illustrate how the option approach can be utilized for LGD estimation in the cases when the 
collateral is present, which serves as the back for the debt. After discussion of main criticism of 
initial Mertonian approach we describe a more complex structural model, which solves some of 
the Merton’s simplifications and incorporates stochastic interest rate and possible default before 
maturity time. Within this framework we provide heuristic analysis of consequences of interest 
rate’s and default barrier’s development on LGD. 
Other part focusing on LGD modeling deals with reduced-form models, which do not 
condition default and recovery like the structural model on the fundamental values of borrowers 
and use for specification of default an exogenous intensity process instead. The main source of 
information for LGD extraction within reduced framework is the price of risky debt. After dis-
cussion of main building blocks of reduced-form models and their assumptions about recovery 
rates parameterization we present a method of extraction LGD information based on the prices 
of corporate bonds of different seniority. 
Last chapter empirically implements the structural approach and so illustrates the po-
tential of structural models for LGD estimation. Since the application of structural models re-
quires a value of firm’s asset and its volatility as input parameters, which are non-observable 
variables, we also present the methods for their estimation using equity prices and balance sheet 
data. We estimate 5-year expected LGD for almost thirty companies listed on Prague Stock Ex-
change in period 2000–2008. Those are to the author’s knowledge the first estimates of LGD 
from market information in Czech Republic. 
To summarize it, the main goal of this thesis is to approach the concept of implied 
market LGD with its basic characteristics, estimation techniques and their possible empirical 
implementations. 
 
 Chapter 1 
 
6 
1. Loss given default in the Credit risk 
 “Any scientific truth is an awaiting fallacy.” 
  Karl R. Popper * 
Credit risk is hardly a new concept. The chance that owed money may not be repaid 
has always been a daily fact of economic life. There is no doubt that awareness of loss has con-
tinued to grow. This has been accompanied by an increasing perception that credit risk expo-
sures need to be more actively and effectively controlled. Not only for banks, but for all types 
of organizations, the necessity to use their capital as efficiently as possible is a key driver for a 
focus on credit risk management.  
Credit risk is usually defined as the risk that “...unexpected change in a counter-
party’s creditworthiness may generate a corresponding unexpected change in the market value 
of the associated credit exposure” (Resti, Sironi 2007, p. 277). Credit risk is not so limited only 
to counterparty’s default and loss resulting from its insolvency, but also to losses arising from 
the deterioration in credit quality, which is expressed by downgrading of its credit rating.1 
While credit risk has been traditionally mitigated through collaterals, covenants and 
selections of obligors, the development of the market for credit derivatives and securitization 
increased the quest for advanced methods to price credit risk correctly as well as to develop bet-
ter tools and techniques. That is why the quantification of credit risk has become an important 
topic in research in recent years and it has been further accelerated by the introduction of the 
Basel II Capital Adequacy Accord. With this increased vigilance on credit risk, comes a grow-
ing need to better understand its elements. 
Credit risk is usually divided into several key risk parameters. The probability of de-
fault (PD), representing the likelihood of a borrower’s defaulting within a certain period in the 
future. Exposure to default (EAD), estimating outstanding exposure at the time of default and 
finally loss given default (LGD), expressing percentage of exposure, which will be not recov-
ered after counterparty’s default. While in the past a lot of effort was put into the estimation and 
understanding of PD, the LGD received less attention and at the present leaves the most unan-
swered questions, mainly because LGD is difficult to quantify and it varies with the country, 
industry, product, or seniority of the claim. 
Accurate LGD estimation is important for lending, investing or pricing of loans, 
bonds or credit risky instruments. It is also essential for provisioning reserves for credit losses, 
                                                          
*
 Popper, K. (1934, 1959): The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934 (as Logik der Forschung, English translation 
1959), ISBN 0415278449. 
1
 Basel II classifies changes in bond prices as “specific risk” within market risk. However, if price movements 
arise from factors specific to individual issuers (idiosyncratic factors) then the associated risk should rather be 
classified as a credit risk (Resti and Sironi 2007, p. 278). 
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calculating risk capital and determining fair value for any credit risky obligation. In its ad-
vanced internal rating based approach, Basel II underlines the importance of the LGD parameter 
by allowing financial institutions to apply own estimates of LGD in the computation of regula-
tory capital. Appropriate LGD estimation therefore improves the precision of both regulatory 
and economic capital allocation. 
LGD numbers, however, will not only play a significant role in the credit risk man-
agement and future regulatory reporting, but may also be used in accounting. Considering 
IAS/IFRS, LGD may help with fair value 1 computations and impairment tests that provide fur-
ther potential for connecting accounting and credit risk management processes, e.g. IAS asks 
banks to disclose fair values for financial assets and liabilities at least in the notes of the annual 
statement (see IAS 39.8). Furthermore, incurred loss as defined by IAS/IFRS and expected loss 
used for credit risk management, are not so different, or the best LGD estimate required for 
regulatory use and specific provisions according to IAS/IFRS are both based on expected future 
cash flows from a defaulted facility (see Christian 2006).2 
As we can see, complexity of LGD parameter can be really high and despite all these 
fields of application, LGD has just recently began getting more attention. However, the general 
term LGD may express various concepts, which may differ in many features. 
1.1. Definition of Loss Given Default 
LGD is usually defined as the loss rate experienced by a lender on a credit exposure if 
the counterparty defaults.3 Thus, despite default the lender still recovered 1 – LGD percent of 
the exposure. One minus LGD is therefore called recovery rate (RR). In principle, LGD com-
prises also other costs related to default of the debtor, and the correct formula should rather be 
(1.1) LGD = 1 – RR + Costs 
 Nevertheless, costs are relevant only in a specific type of LGD and are not usually so high to 
influence losses markedly in comparison with recovery rate. Therefore we use recovery rate as 
the complement of LGD in the following text and take these two parameters as conceptually 
the same.4 
The stress should be admittedly put on distinguishing between measuring LGD ex-post 
and estimating it ex-ante; however, to gain the simple ex-post LGD, as we will see, is not so 
straightforward and unambiguous and that is why one can also speak about its “estimation”. 
                                                          
1
 For definition of fair value see IASB (2005). 
2
 Of course there have to be differences due to diverging intentions of Basel and IAS/IFRS – stability of the 
bank versus objective reporting of the bank’s assets. 
3
 In principle we should mark the loss rate given default as LGDR and LGD use for the absolute amount of loss. 
However, LGD is used to indicate the loss rate by many practitioners including the Basel II, while the absolute 
loss is indicating as LGD.EAD (see BCBS 2005). 
4
 According to Bhatia (2006, p. 281), LGD and RR may be used in different meaning. LGD could be the term 
generally used in the context of tradable assets and represents loss in the market value of the bond immedi-
ately after default, while the RR term is more used for the amount recovered after default for non-traded assets 
such as bank loans. 
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The quality of ex-post LGDs’ database is influencing development of models for ex-ante LGD 
predictions, therefore both concepts of LGD have the indispensable importance in a credit risk 
area.  
 However, any study of LGD has to exactly specify, which criterion should be used to 
define default event and which method should be used to measure recovery rate on a defaulted 
transaction because a different classification will lead to diverse results in LGD’s both ex-ante 
and ex-post estimates. 
1.1.1. Definition of default 
The criterion used for classification of credit exposure in the default category is 
critical for a study of a recovery rates. A widely chosen definition of default leads to a lower 
estimate of PD but higher estimate of LGD because fewer exposures will be classified as “in 
default”, but those will have relatively lower quality with a low recovery outlook. Con-
versely, from a narrower and more severe definition stems higher default rates and also 
higher recoveries.  
Although Basel provides a standard default definition, it varies from bank to bank 
and country to country. In the literature are usually used following classifications (see Der-
mine, Neto 2005). 
 doubtful – as soon as full payment appears to be questionable on the basis of the 
available information 
 in distress – as soon as a payment of interest or principal has been missed  
 in default – when a formal restructuring process or bankruptcy procedure has 
started. The legal definition is linked with the bankruptcy of the firm and will typi-
cally depend on legislation in different countries 
Standard & Poor’s defines default as the first occurrence of a payment default on 
any financial obligation. An exception occurs when an interest payment missed on the due 
date is made within the grace period, which typically ranges from 10 to 30 days. Distressed 
exchanges are considered defaults when the debt holders are forced to accept substitute in-
struments with lower coupons, longer maturities, or any other diminished financial terms 
(see S&P’s 2005). 
Moody’s (2005) definition of default is any missed or delayed disbursement of in-
terest or principal, including delayed payments made within a grace period, if issuer files for 
bankruptcy 1 or legal receivership occurs. Distressed exchange arises when (i) the issuer of-
fered bondholders a new security that amounts to a diminished financial obligation or (ii) the 
exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default.2 
                                                          
1
 Chapter 11, or less frequently Chapter 7, in the USA (see Moody’s 2004). 
2
 The default definition should capture events that change the relationship between the bondholder and bond is-
suer from the relationship which was originally contracted, and which subjects the bondholder to an economic 
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The reference Basel II default definition must be used by banks while estimating in-
ternal rating-based models. Even before Basel common habit was a one year time horizon for 
PD estimate. According to BCBS (2005, p. 96, §452) is default defined as 
“A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular obligor when either 
one or both of the following events have taken place.  
 The bank considers that the obligor is unlikely 1 to pay its credit obligations to the 
banking group in full, without recourse by the bank to actions such as realising se-
curity (if held). 
 The obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to the 
banking group.2 Overdrafts will be considered as being past due once the customer 
has breached an advised limit or been advised of a limit smaller than current out-
standings.” 
Obviously, different definitions of default event will lead to inconsistent PD and 
LGD estimations. There can be differences in qualitative default criteria (as applying 
“unlikely to pay” from Basel II definition to companies that are in the lowest external non-
default rating grades), number of days of delayed payments that will be considered as de-
fault, or other disparities mentioned by Erlenmaier (2006) e.g. while external agencies meas-
ure defaults without respect to the size of amount due, in Basel II delayed payments that are 
small with respect to the company’s overall exposure are not counted as default.  
Above mentioned problems raise a question of using agencies’ ratings in Basel II 
framework, because Basel’s definition is weaker and leads to lower PDs but higher LGDs, 
than would be observed under rating agencies’ definition of default. However, S&P’s (2006, 
p. 39) state, that it is relatively straightforward for agencies to produce a Basel II aligned re-
sults. Anyway, it is advisable that banks and rating agencies adopt a homogeneous definition 
of default in order to be able to pool and compare their estimates.3 Especially in the light of 
Basel’s II standardized approach, where banks rely on agencies’ rating when computing 
capital adequacy, it is important to have unified definitions across agencies (see Chapter 1.3). 
Default is not a logical consequence of a unique, well-defined process and can occur 
from many reasons.4 Occasionally the approaching default can be observed ahead, e.g. by a 
breach of overdraft limits or deteriorating balance sheet ratios; however, the bank may not 
                                                          
loss. Technical defaults (covenant violations, etc.) are not included in Moody’s definition of default (see 
Moody’s 2005, p. 39). 
1
 Definition of „unlikely“ is presented in paragraph 453 (see BCBS 2005, p. 96). 
2
 In the case of the retail and public sector entities obligations, a supervisor may modify a figure up to 180 days 
for different products, if it seems appropriate for local conditions. This applies to a transitional period of 
5 years (see BCBS 2005, p. 96). 
3
 Non-ambiguous definition of default event is especially important for credit derivatives, where a payoff is con-
ditional on default event. If it is not accepted by both counterparties, it is a source of conflicts and legal suits 
and reduces thus the usefulness of credit derivatives as an insurance product.  
4
 We could divide the reasons into (i) firm specific reasons (bad management, fraud, project failure, etc.), (ii) 
industry specific reasons (sector shocks such as overcapacity or a rise in the price of materials), (iii) general 
macroeconomic conditions such as interest rate changes, recession, etc. (see Servigny, Renault 2004, p. 168). 
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always be in position to observe a state of distress and default can occur directly without any 
intermediate phase. 
A firm can default on the debt obligations and still not declare bankruptcy. It de-
pends on the negotiations with its creditors. Thus, not all losses are the result of bankruptcy 
after the default event. Therefore we should examine after-default performance more closely 
because the state of default may not lead to a simple and straightforward recovery process. 
1.1.2. After default scenarios 
Default event itself is a significant point to the possible recovery estimation, e.g. 
from the amount of the exposure at the time of default, but more crucial is a facility’s after-
default performance, which substantially determines a future recovery rate. One can observe 
a certain pattern of typical developments, which we call after default scenarios. Their num-
bers and exact definitions can slightly differ, depending on the bank’s portfolio and also its 
workout strategy; however, Christian (2006) states three typical after-default developments 
 Cure – the defaulted subject recovers itself of its financial difficulties after a short 
time and continues to fulfill its contractual obligations. This scenario means minimal 
losses and usually does not cause any changes in the initial structure or conditions. 
 Restructuring – the defaulted subject recovers after a restructuring of its facilities. 
Restructuring 1 can be implemented through: (i) reduction in the principal amount of 
the facility or the amount payable at the maturity, (ii) lower interest rate than it is 
usual for other similar facilities, (iii) reduction of accrued interest, including full for-
giveness of interest, and (iv) extension of the maturity date. Loss amount may vary 
but customer relationship is maintained. 
 Liquidation – all facilities of the defaulted subject are liquidated. Loss amount is 
generally higher than the one by the restructuring process and customer relationship 
is ended.  
When firm goes to the bankruptcy 2 and there is no other possibility than liquidation, 
the capital structure of the firm and absolute priority rule (APR)3 is an important determinant 
of recovery rate. This states that the value of the bankrupted firm must be distributed to sup-
pliers of capital so that “...senior creditors are fully satisfied before any distributions are 
made to more junior creditors, and paid in full before common shareholders” (Schuermann 
2004, p. 11). The resulting cascade of payments is often referred to as the debt waterfall. The 
capital structure can be generally divided as it is shown in Figure 1. 
                                                          
1
 Restructuring is done only for some facilities that fulfill conditions of minimal age and a reassessment of the 
borrower’s capacity to repay (see Bhatia 2006, p. 321). 
2
 The bankruptcy has a form of reorganization or liquidation.  
3
 Eberhart and Weiss (1998) are confirming that APR is routinely violated because of speed of resolution. 
Creditors agree to violate APR to resolve bankruptcies faster. 
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Figure 1 
The capital structure of a firm 
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Source: adopted and changed from Schuermann (2004) 
The rate of recovery of the defaulted bond depends on where the claims in the firm’s 
capital structure are. Bonds are frequently classified in terms of seniority and allocated col-
lateral. Seniority is capturing the order mentioned above of the claimants‘priority over the 
assets of the defaulted company and collateralization (called secured versus unsecured) 
measures the allocation of specific assets as guaranties for the facility in the case of default. 
The bank loans are on the top of the debt waterfall and are often highly collateralized. What 
are the RRs of the corresponding debts class in capital structure is analyzed in chapter 1.2.  
Having outlined main definitions influencing LGD measures, we can now take a 
closer look at its different concepts.  
1.1.3. Types of LGD 
Usually two basic measures of recovery for defaulted facilities are used. The first 
one is the ultimate recovery which is the amount that the debt holder recovers after default. 
The second measure is represented by post-default market prices of defaulted security (see 
Servigny, Renault 2004, p. 123).1 Both methodologies have their drawbacks. For example, 
ultimate recoveries are gradually traced in long-running work-out process, while post-default 
prices for defaulted facilities are observable soon after default. However, post-default prices 
are available only for debt, for which distressed market exists. Ultimate recoveries are there-
fore the only way to measure RR for illiquid bank loans.  
From ultimate recoveries could be measured so called accounting and workout LGD, 
post-default prices category comes under market LGD. A different approach is already men-
tioned implied market LGD which is estimated from market information of non-defaulted se-
curities. All types of LGD will be examined in a little more detailed way. 
                                                          
1
 Ultimate recovery belongs to the internal data-based approach whereas post-default prices fall into market-
based approach of RR measure. 
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 Market LGD 
As it follows from the title, this methodology considers the price of bond after de-
fault as a proxy of the recovered amount. “The market value is the best estimate for the ex-
pected recovery and the market price reflects the expected recovery suitably discounted” 
(Bhatia 2006, p. 285). Nevertheless, market prices are impacted by a supply and demand and 
therefore a question about market’s ability to price defaulted debt efficiently comes up. On 
the basis of several studies it has been confirmed that market prices are efficiently stated and 
are predictive of future recoveries (see Gupton, Stein 2005).1  
A variation of this approach could be the estimation of the RR based on the market 
value of a new financial instrument (price of a new bond) that issues a defaulted company af-
ter reorganization and restructuring the initial debt which the company emerges from default. 
New bond’s price must then be discounted back to the moment of default using adequate dis-
count rate. This approach is called emergence LGD. 
Market data are an objective and updated source of information for LGD observa-
tions. However, as it was mentioned, post-default price is available only for the fraction of 
the debt that is traded and for which after-default market exists – very often they are avail-
able only for corporate bonds issued by large companies.2 Market LGD is therefore highly 
limited for defaulted bank loans that are traditionally not traded. For them one must turn to 
the “ultimate” approach.  
 Accounting LGD 
Accounting LGD is based on charge-off amounts – the amount of non-performing 
facilities that an institution writes off its books. The charge-offs are determined by product 
types, past due days, collateral and by accounting standards which focus on prudence what 
may not be consistent with risk management policies. Also, the problem of charge-offs is 
that they can occur before the final resolution. All mentioned above indicates a limited use of 
accounting charge-off for LGD measurement and accounting data are just a starting point for 
collecting “true losses”. 
 Workout LGD 
This method is rather analyzed from an “economic” perspective, than based on mere 
accounting data.3 When measuring it, all relevant facts that may reduce the final economic 
value of the recovered part of the exposure must be considered. LGD is then determined by 
(i) loss of principal, (ii) carrying costs of non-performing assets, e.g. interest income lost or 
foregone, and (iii) recovery and workout expenses for example direct and indirect adminis-
trative costs. 
                                                          
1
 Mentioned efficiency definitely does not mean that supply and demand would not influence the price of de-
faulted bonds. The higher volume of defaulted bonds leads to a higher supply and to lower price, i.e. to lower 
RR (see Altman et al. 2005a for closer relationship between the LGD and the volume of defaulted bonds). 
2
 What’s more, outside the USA the market for defaulted bonds either non-exist or does not have the required 
depth and liquidity.  
3
 Because of this economic perspective Workout LGD is sometimes called Economic LGD. 
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The simple definition of Workout LGD for facility j at time of default could be 
(1.2) 
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Where NPV is the net present value and Rj(t), Cj(t) represents all recoveries and 
costs observed from the time of default tDF to the end of workout process tE . However, bank-
ruptcy claims are often not settled in cash but with securities (equity, options, warrants, etc.) 
with no secondary market, which means that their value will be unclear for years. Another 
problem is that appropriate discount rate is not known, but should reflect the risk of holding 
defaulted asset. “Worse still, as default is being resolved, risk changes at time passes and ex-
pectations become more definite” (Frye 2005, p. 2) and therefore these “ultimate cash-flow” 
methods depend on an unknown and variable discount rate which is difficult to estimate for 
particular situation.1 Therefore we must speak only about estimate of LGD even if we are 
trying to measure it from ex-post data. 
Despite the ultimate recovery is hard to measure, the main interest of a bank is to es-
timate just workout LGDs, because these best reflect its losses. Market LGDs include com-
ponents as a risk premium for unexpected loses, which may not be considered in workout 
LGDs. Moreover, workout specific costs of institution are not part of these market loss quo-
tas. Ex-post observations of market LGDs can be used for model development, but it is nec-
essary to make some adjustments, which take into account those differences. 
 Implied market LGD 
The basis of the implied market LGD is to derive LGD estimates from market prices 
of non-defaulted loans, bonds, or credit default instruments by structural or reduced-form 
models.2 The idea is that prices of risky instruments reflect market’s expectation of the loss 
and may be broken down into PD and LGD. Implied market LGD estimation does not rely 
on historical data and can be especially used for low default facilities, however, “if default 
experience is rare for all market participants, one should not expect implied market LGD to 
provide more than an expert judgment of the market”(Christian 2006, p. 150). Calculation of 
implied market LGD is based on asset pricing models that are usually working with risk-
neutral measure. Therefore probabilities of default as well as recovery rates extracted from 
these models are usually also in risk-neutral measure.3 What is the coherence between risk-
neutral and observed (physical) measures will be further dealt throughout the following 
chapters.  
                                                          
1
 Sometimes the discount rate based on historical values is used. For example, on average market rates observed 
between the default and the end of workout process, this would lead according to Resti and Sironi (2007, p. 
349) to backward-looking measure, because in estimation of LGD on future bad loans we are interested in in-
terest rate that might be on the market after a new default. The use of past interest rate is not appropriate for 
the present and future market conditions. What discount factor should be used is dealt in e.g. Maclachlan 
(2005). 
2
 See Chapter 2. 
3
 Risk-neutral measures are adjusted for the risk premium. Risk-neutral means that investors are indifferent be-
tween the same expected value of the risky cash flow and risk-free cash flow. 
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Apparently, when classifying LGD we can use different approaches that are signifi-
cantly influencing its estimate. Nevertheless, these LGDs have some characteristics in com-
mon regardless what methodology was used.  
1.2. Properties of Loss Given Default 
In most empirical analyses LGD is implied to be a constant. However, LGD is better 
represented by a distribution than by a single figure. If we take a look at the distribution of re-
coveries regardless of any factors or characteristics, it is with two distinct humps (Figure 2). 
Recovery is either quite high or very low. This happens because some exposures (e.g. leasing) 
tend to have high RR close to 100 %, while others (e.g. unsecured overdrafts) have RR close to 
zero. This bimodality makes parametric modeling of recoveries arduous and therefore it is con-
venient to use beta kernel method (see Servigny, Renault 2004). Evidently, observed mean as 
appraisal of future LGDs is really poor indicator, as most values tend to cluster near 0 or 1. In 
such U-shaped distribution, the probability of observing values which are close to the mean is 
dramatically low.  
Figure 2 
U-shaped (bimodal) distribution of recovery rates 
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Source: adopted from Resti, Sironi (2007) and Schuermann (2004) 
A better information capability than a simple overall average value would have the con-
ditional means. It is therefore convenient to break down dataset of ex-post LGDs to some clus-
ters with similar characteristics for which is the “within” variance of RR relatively low. The 
division into groups should be based on the factors that are significant in explaining empirical 
differences among recovery rates such as the level of seniority of underlying instrument, avail-
ability of collateral or presence of any guarantees. These cluster-conditional means would then 
offer a more reliable approximation of the expected loss rates for different types of debts.  
The objective of this part is therefore to review some empirical findings that have been 
reported on various datasets and to highlight the impact of the different factors on recovery 
rates. One of the most persistent results is that seniority and presence of collateral are the most 
significant determinants of debt recovery (see e.g. Izvorski 1997).  
Chapter 1 Loss given default in the Credit risk 
 15 
15 
1.2.1. Seniority and Collateral 
Empirical evidence on recovery rates is usually based on defaulted bonds because 
the LGDs data is simply available through after-default market information. Loans are usu-
ally expected (ceteris paribus) to perform better because they are typically more senior in 
capital structure, have tighter covenants and banks can more actively monitor the evolving 
financial health of the obligor (see Amihud et al. 2000, p. 6).1 This fact also confirms follow-
ing figure that presents the dispersion of recoveries for facilities based on debt type and sen-
iority for 1981–2004, global.2 
Figure 3 
Recovery rates by debt type and seniority class 
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Source: Moody’s (2005), Gupton, Stein (2005), adjustments  
The shaded boxes cover the quartile range with grey extending 25th percentile to 
median and dark from median to the 75th percentile and vertical lines show the maximum and 
minimum recovered rates. This box-and-whisker illustrates the variability in each category. 
For example, even thought the median of recovery rate for “senior secured loans” is about 
67%, in half of the cases the experienced RR was in the range of 47–84%. Evidently from 
other bars in different classes, grouping instruments by debt class and seniority show a pat-
tern, but still leaves a wide variability in recovery values.  
The results of several empirical studies have confirmed that the RR increases with 
the seniority and security of the defaulted bonds and decrease with its degree of subordina-
                                                          
1
 Banks are sometimes able to change their lending relationship to better position in capital structure of the firm 
with anticipation of forthcoming debtor’s bankruptcy and thereby raise expected recovery. The dispersed na-
ture of bond ownership makes it impractical for bondholders to renegotiate the terms of contract as debtor’s 
conditions changes (see Schuermann 2004). 
2
 Moody’s (2005) estimates defaulted debt recovery rates using market bid prices observed roughly 30 days af-
ter the date of default. Recovery rates are measured as the ratio of price to face value. 
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tion. Results tend to be also rather similar in term of average recovery rates – for bank loans 
(70–84%), for bonds: senior secured (53–66%), senior unsecured (48–50%), senior subordi-
nated (34–38%), and subordinated (26–33%). All studies also reported high standard devia-
tion that characterizes recovery rate across all bond debt-classes, regularly overrunning 
20%.1 This implies a high degree of uncertainty concerning the expected RR and observed 
ex-post results may significantly differ from ex-ante estimates (see Altman, Kishore 1996, 
Castle, Keisman 1999, Keenan et al. 2000 or Hu, Perraudin 2002). 
Except the seniority of the debt also the presence of the collateral determines sig-
nificantly the recovery. Collateral consists of assets serving as a guarantee in case of debtor’s 
default. There is a general understanding that collateral can help to reduce LGD radically, 
which is also empirically confirmed, but usage of collateral should not lead to non-vigilance. 
Firstly, value of collateral can fluctuate and falls in recession (see following chapter), sec-
ondly, it may have an adverse impact on bank monitoring, as bank does not feel a need to 
monitor heavily collateralized loans. Collateralized facilities sometimes experience higher 
default rate. According to Dermine and Neto (2005, p. 110) it is caused by a fact that guaran-
tee or collateral may not be requested from reliable clients, so that the existence of guarantee 
could be an indicator of greater risk and higher probability of default. 
From above mentioned follows, that average RR’s values confirm the intuitive rela-
tionship between RR and debt-types showed in Figure 3. Together with loans, senior secured 
bonds have the highest RR whereas subordinated and junior subordinated ones have with 
preferred stocks the highest LGD. However, it is necessary to take into account not only the 
“absolute” but also the “relative” seniority.2 Preferred stock in the lowest seniority class 
might hold the higher seniority rank in a firm that has no funding from loans or bonds. In ad-
dition, if firm issues debt sequentially in order of seniority, senior debt might mature earlier 
leaving junior debt outstanding. Castle and Keisman (2000) affirmed that the greater the pro-
portion of junior securities in firm’s liabilities is, the greater is the RR on the senior securi-
ties, because there is bigger “equity cushion” for them in liquidation process. Nevertheless, 
relative seniority tested in Hamerle (2006) did not show a significant influence on LGD.  
 By sorting the debt by the seniority and presence of the collateral we get better no-
tion about recoveries across particular types of debts, however, their dispersion was still high 
because RR is still influenced by other factors, such as firm and industry specific ones.  
                                                          
1
 It is interesting to note that if the recovery rate probability distribution were uniform, which means that the 
probability of occurrence of values from 0 to 100% is the same, then its standard deviation would be approxi-
mately equal 29%. This clearly shows the big variance in RRs.   
2
 If issuer A has two bonds, one in the category subordinated and the other junior subordinated and issuer B has 
three bonds with seniority senior secured, senior subordinated and subordinated, then the subordinated bond 
from issuer A will be served first and therefore has possibly lower LGD than the subordinated bond from B, 
which is served after the two other bonds (see Hamerle 2006, p. 7). 
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1.2.2. Firm and Industry Characteristics 
Recovery rates are ultimately determined by the value of assets that can be seized in 
case of default. Because many asset types differ between industries,1 it is therefore intuitive 
to assume that the debtor’s industry characteristics can influence LGD. Also firm-specific 
characteristics, mostly financial, which contribute towards reducing leverage help to improve 
RR. Leverage indicates the extent of claimants for assets in case of default; therefore its 
lower value improves the enforcement of claim.2 Empirically it was found that the leverage 
impacts recovery to the size of 5–15 % (see Bhatia 2006, p. 299). The firm-specific quality 
of assets has also its importance, as their values are the source of repayment after default. 
Assets, whose quality have lower likelihood to deteriorate over time and are less likely to 
“disappear”, provide better guarantee. 
Although industry-type seems like a straightforward determinant of RR, the litera-
ture does not give wholly unified answers. Altman and Kishore (1996) have broken out LGD 
of corporate bonds by industry and have found evidence that some industries such as public 
utilities and chemicals 3 do evidently better than the others. Nonetheless, they also showed 
that the standard deviation of RR per industry and within a given industry is still very large 
(see following figure). 
Figure 4 
Average recoveries per industries 
1971-1996 1982-1999 1982-2003
Industry Description
Mean
(%)
Std. Dev.
(%) Industry Description
Mean
(%)
Std. Dev.
(%) Industry Description
Mean
(%)
Public Utilities 70,5 19,5 Utilities 74 18,8 Utility-Gas 51,5
Chemicals* 62,7 27,1 Energy, Resources* 60 31,0 Oil and Oil Service 44,5
Machinery* 48,7 20,1 Financial Institutions 59 44,3 Hospitality 42,5
Services* 46,2 25,0 Healthcare, Chemicals 56 40,8 Utility-Electric 41,4
Food* 45,3 21,7 Building Products 54 42,1 Media and Broadc.* 38,2
Wholesale and retail 44,0 22,1 Telecommunications 53 38,1 Finance and Banking 36,3
Divers. manufacturing 42,3 25,0 Aerospace, Auto* 52 38,1 Industrial 35,4
Casino, hotel* 40,2 25,7 Leisure Time, Media 52 37,2 Retail 34,4
Building material* 38,8 22,9 High Technology* 47 32,4 Automotive 33,4
Transportation* 38,4 27,9 Consumer, Service 47 35,6 Healthcare 32,7
Communication* 37,1 20,8 Transportation 39 36,1 Consumer Goods 32,5
Financial institutions 35,7 25,7 Insurance and Real Es. 37 35,4 Construction 31,9
* Industry description is reduced
Altman and Kishore Acharya et al. Moody's
 
Source: Altman, Kishore (1996), Acharya et al. (2003), Moody’s (2004)  
Likewise Izvorski (1997) tabulated average RR for seemingly similar groups and 
confirmed their results. He found out that industries with higher growth tend to have signifi-
                                                          
1
 Firm in some sectors have a large amount of asset that can be easily sold on the market in case of default, 
while other sectors can be more e.g. labor-intensive.  
2
 Even for the secured debt holders can higher leverage influences the collateral enforcement and recovery 
“...since concessions are often extended to the junior and unsecured debt holders for obtaining their consent 
to various settlement schemes” (Bhatia 2006, p. 299). 
3
 The exact name of the group is “Chemicals, petroleum, rubber, and plastic products” (see Altman, Kishore 
(1996). 
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cantly higher recoveries and more competitive industries (measured by Herfindahl index) are 
also associated with higher RR, as assets can be readily reused by another party which in-
crease the liquidation value and thereby RR. A more recent study, Grossman et al. (2001) 
corroborated industry’s influence on RR as well as Acharya et al. (2003). Their results of 
variations of RR across industries are even higher than in the older Altman, Kishore study, 
which is also reported in Figure 4 together with average RR per industry from Moody’s da-
tabase. However, across the board comparisons are not possible since the industry classifica-
tions are not identical, but utilities remain the industries with highest RR.1  
An opposite view of the industry influence is presented by a study on bank loans by 
Gupton et al. (2000) which has on the contrary found no evidence of different LGDs across 
industries. Although industry’s means of LGD were different, they were not statistically dis-
tinguishable. Also Araten et al. (2004) could not find significant impact of industry on LGDs 
observed for loans. Gupton and Stein (2005) state, that the use of recovery averages broken 
out by industry does not capture the industry variability in recovery rates across time. Some 
sectors may enjoy periods of high recoveries, but can fall later below average recoveries at 
other times, it means that industry recovery distributions change over time and therefore 
cannot be expected to hold in the future. “Thus, recoveries in one industry may be higher 
than those in another during one phase of the economy, but lower than the other industry in 
a different economic environment” (Gupton and Stein 2005, p. 20). As a result they con-
cluded that industry type is not so appropriate factor for future RR predictions. 
These unambiguous results of different studies might be attributed to a number of 
reasons. Firstly, studies focus on different facilities and use diverse sample sizes. Secondly, 
there are differences in industry grouping definitions among studies and finally, the authors 
are focusing on different periods what can puzzle the comparability because of above men-
tioned LGD cyclicality in relation with economic environment. The result is that the use of 
industry factors can bring some new outlook on LGD variations, but it has to be taken into 
account with macroeconomic conditions.  
1.2.3. Macroeconomic conditions 
Every industry has specific traits and can be in different stage of economic cycle, 
which can more influence LGD than the industry-type itself. In the following figure it can be 
clearly seen that LGD is not stable in time and obviously is underlying cyclical variability, 
which can be taken in relation with macroeconomic conditions. Acharya et al. (2003) showed 
that when the industry is in distress, mean LGD is on average 10–20% higher than otherwise.  
Behind the cyclical variation is the fact that as the economy enters into recession, 
default rates increase. Recoveries from collateral will depend on the possibility of selling the 
respective assets. We can generally suppose that greater supply of collateral-assets will lead 
                                                          
1
 In Acharya et al. (2003) study recovery numbers seem consistently higher than in Altman, Kishore (1996), this 
can be resulted by differences in discounting methodology.  
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to their lower prices, of course, depending on the market size and structure observed for a 
certain asset.1 Also banks have to accept discounts for distressed sale. Moreover, the demand 
for these assets declines because non-defaulted companies are not able to invest the same 
amount of money in recession as during an expansion. The result is that macroeconomic 
situation can significantly influence the recovery rate,2 which was as well demonstrated by 
several authors (see Araten et al. 2004 or Altman et al. 2005a). 
Figure 5 
The development of LGD in 1986–2006 
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Source: computed from Moody’s (2007a) 
From aforementioned fact that RRs tend to go down when default rates increase in 
economic downturn follows the relationship between LGD and PD. This joint dependence on 
macroeconomic conditions indicates positive correlation between them and implies that LGD 
and PD can not be treated as independent. On the contrary, LGD was traditionally assumed 
to be dependent on individual features that do not respond to systematic factors and hence as 
independent on default rates.3 Nonetheless, as it was said, the firm’s asset value after default 
influencing RR might be dependent on macroeconomic factors. 
Frye (2000) used for modeling of the recovery process the assumption that the same 
economic conditions causing increase in default rates might also increase LGDs. In this 
model both PD and LGD are dependent on the systematic factor. Empirical tests on US cor-
porate bond data show a strong positive correlation between default rates and LGD. He also 
found out that bond RR in economic downturn might decline 20–25% from normal year av-
erage. The same conclusion with inverse relationship between PD and RR presents Madan et 
al. (2006), Hu, Perraudin (2002) or Jokivuolle, Peura (2003). Frye (2005) also distinguishes 
                                                          
1
 For instance, a substantial number of defaulted firms in the telecom industry in 2001 in US. The very large in-
flow of specific telecom assets being liquidated increased the imbalance between supply and demand and de-
pressed the value of these assets in the market. Similarly, the subprime-mortgage crises in the US in 2007 
caused deterioration in values of real estate, which served as collateral for mortgages. 
2
 Also interest rate should impact recovery rates. Higher interest rate leads ceteris paribus to lower discounted 
values of future recovered values and should therefore lead to higher LGD. 
3
 The recovery rates are treated as independent on default rates for instance in Gupton, Finger, Bhatia (1997) or 
Jarrow, Lando, Turnbull (1997). 
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sensitivity of LGD’s change in economic downturn for different types of debt instruments. 
His conclusion is, that debt type with average low LGDs in “good” years (e.g. senior secured 
bonds) are more sensitive to the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions than “high-
LGD” instruments, whose LGD is not increasing so substantially in economic downturn. As 
a result, security on debt instrument does not protect lender against systematic risk.  
The Figure 6 presents relationship between bond recovery and default rates and also 
displays the results of linear, logarithmic and power univariate regression carried out using 
these fundamental variables. 
Figure 6 
The link between default and recovery rates, 1982–2006 
1983
1985
1984
1993
1995
1998
1988
1992
2003
1997
1999
1989
2005
2006
2004
2001
1990
2002
1991
2000
1986
1987
1982
1996
1994
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
0,4 0,8 1,2 1,6 2 2,4 2,8 3,2 3,6 4
x : default rate (%)
y 
: 
re
co
v
er
y 
ra
te
 
(%
)
 y = 53,891 - 7,6559x
 R2 = 0,6196
 y = 45,136 - 12,157ln(x)
 R2 = 0,5865
 y = 44,334x-0,3173
 R2 = 0,6155
 
Source: computed from Moody’s (2007a) 
 We can find that simple linear regression can explain about 62% of the variation in 
the annual RR with the level of default rate. The dependence is significantly negative, which 
is consistent with previous discussion about the inverse PD, LGD link. Although linear re-
gression measures only partial connection between variables and is therefore a weaker con-
cept than dependency that includes more complex affects such as the co-movement with time 
lag or causality effects, it results in a signal that recovery rates show a considerable share of 
systematic risk. The correlation between bond’s recovery and default rates falls with de-
crease of seniority and security of bonds which is coincident with Frye’s result of different 
LGD sensitivity with respect to economic downturn.1  
Merton (1974) suggests that PD and RR may be also correlated because the bor-
rower’s leverage affects both the default probability and the amount of company assets per 
unit of debts (see Chapter 2). These firm specific causes should be also considered in PD, 
                                                          
1
 Sen. Secured = –0,79; Sen. Unsecured = –0,76; Sen. Subordinated = –0,5. 
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LGD correlation; however, asset value, the main determinant of PD and LGD in structural 
Merton type models is still dependent on the macroeconomic conditions. Therefore we can 
conclude that important property of LGD is its dependence on systematic factors.  
Another question rises with the size of the debt and its influence on LGD. Study by 
Carty and Lieberman (1996), who used Moody’s data on syndicated lending, did not confirm 
the size of exposure to have any significant impact on LGD. In contrast with this finding is a 
work by Eales and Bosworth (1998) that presents increase in RRs with the size of exposure, 
but for exposures exceeding $2 mill. are RRs again falling. Similarly Dermine and Neto 
(2005) state, that the size of loans has a significant negative effect on RRs. 
Possible impact on LGD could be given also by the maturity of the debt. While 
Hamerle (2006) admits that a longer maturity leads to higher LGDs because more future pay-
ments are insecure and more uncertain, Gupton and Stein (2005) negate this influence and in 
their opinion, the maturity does not play a role for defaulted bonds. 
Also the geographic variance in LGD should be noted. Default and recovery rates 
will naturally differ over time from country to country because of possible diverse stages of 
the economic cycle. Additionally, different legal insolvency procedures exist among coun-
tries and specific legal procedure surely influences the level of recovery rates too.1 For in-
stance, average bond’s recovery rates in Europe between years 1985–2006 are lower than in 
North America (see Moody’s 2007b, p. 16).2 
As it was shown, LGD is influenced by many factors as facility’s seniority and pres-
ence of collateral, borrower’s industry characteristics or more general factors as macroeco-
nomic conditions. However, previous research gives ambiguous results concerning some 
LGD’s properties. The relatively rare occurrence of default events for some facilities could 
cause that the research was based on relatively small empirical samples. Also a non-
homogenous methodology was used (e.g. for extracting LGD in workout process), which 
could also influence some conclusions. It is clear that further research is needed and hope-
fully with the acceptance of Basel II accord, setting rules for LGD’s data gathering and its 
estimates, this research will be based on better data sample offering more exact outcomes. 
1.3. Loss Given Default in Basel II 
The Basel I Capital Accord represented a major breakthrough in the bank convergence 
of supervisory regulations regarding capital adequacy. The imposition of minimum capital re-
quirements for credit risk by setting minimum ratio of regulatory capital to total risk-weighted 
assets helped to stabilize the international banking system and promoted its soundness (see 
                                                          
1
 Differences in bonds and loans insolvency regimes across USA, UK, Germany and France are described in 
Servigny, Renault (2004), Appendix 4A. 
2
 Bonds type (RR (%) in Europe; RR (%) in North America): Sr. Secured (44,5; 53,8), Sr. Unsecured (27; 
37,96), Sr. Subordinated (36,7; 32,5), Subordinated (30,8; 31,2). 
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BCBS 1988). However, this framework showed several problems that became more and more 
evident over time, e.g.1 
 Insufficient risk differentiation – the weights did not differentiate enough the credit risk 
by counterparty characteristics as collateral, covenants, maturity or actual borrower’s 
rating. The definition of risk buckets did not reflect the true level of risk of obligors and 
consequently the banks with the same capital adequacy ratio (CAR) could have very 
different risk profiles. 
 No recognition of benefits from diversification – capital treatment did not take into ac-
count risk reduction attained by diversification that is why there was no distinction be-
tween a well diversified and less risky portfolio and one that was correlated and hence 
riskier.  
 Unsuitable treatment of sovereign risk – for instance, lending to all OECD governments 
with substantially different credit ratings (Mexico, Turkey) incurred no regulatory capi-
tal charge. 
Furthermore, by the time a variety of products in banks was developed primarily to 
overcome regulatory capital rules. Arbitrage between the banking and trading books has in-
creased significantly especially with development of credit derivatives. All above-mentioned 
facts reduced meaning of regulatory capital ratios as measures of true capital adequacy. Also, 
the risk measurement extensively evolved in the last decade and many banks developed their 
own internal economic capital models to guide their decisions and bank practice became more 
distant from Basel I required rules. The main motivation for a revised capital adequacy frame-
work known as Basel II was therefore to bring regulatory capital requirements more in line 
with good bank practice, escape from “one-size-fits-all” setting of Basel I and further 
strengthen the stability and security of the banking system via better risk management.2 The 
New Accord started to be implemented by banks at the end of 2006.3  
Basel II identifies three types of approaches dealing with credit risk: (i) standardized, 
(ii) an internal rating based (IRB) foundation, and (iii) IRB advanced approach. The main 
break with the previous Basel is the fact, that facilities will require different capital coverage 
depending on their intrinsic riskiness, as evaluated by some external rating agency – standard-
ized approach, or by the bank itself – IRB approach.  
                                                          
1
 For other problems in Basel I framework see Stephanou and Mendoza (2005). 
History of banking regulation can be found in Servigny and Renault (2004), Chapter 10. 
2
 Basel II was agreed by Basel Committee members in mid-2004 after round of proposals between 1999–2003 
and consists of a set of supervisory standards which are structured along three pillars: 
 Pillar 1 – Capital Requirements; concerns minimum requirements for credit and operational risk. 
 Pillar 2 – Supervisory Review; provides guidance on the supervisory oversight.  
 Pillar 3 – Disclosure; requires banks to publicly disclose information on their risk profile. 
 (see BCBS 2005). 
3
 Basel II applies at a consolidated level to internationally operating banks and banking groups. Some national 
supervisors choose to apply it also to domestic banks – this is the approach followed by the EU Directives 
2006/48 and 2006/49, whereby Basel II was introduced in the EU legislation. 
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1.3.1. The Standardized Approach 
The attitude of this “new standardized approach” to credit risk is similar to Basel I, 
but has higher risk sensitivity due to employing the credit rating of external credit assessment 
institutions (ECAI) to define the weights for calculating RWA.1 Yet, ratings from various 
agencies do not carry the same information. Whereas S&P’s perceive their rating primarily 
from the likelihood of default of an issuer, Moody’s rating reflects its opinion on the ex-
pected loss (PD.LGD) on a facility.2 It is therefore important that ECAIs provide roughly 
similar ratings because wide discrepancies across institutions would incite banks to use the 
most moderate and favorable rating provider to deliberately reduce total capital require-
ments. In order to prevent such “agency arbitrage”, the national supervisors have to ensure 
that there is no obvious risk underestimation by using certain institutions ratings. 
LGD is not explicitly quoted in the standardized approach, but we can observe its 
presence indirectly, because the portfolios comprise exposures secured by residential prop-
erty and by commercial real estate have lower risk weights. For instance, loans collateralized 
by mortgages on residential property that will be occupied or rented by borrower, is risk-
weighted at 35% compared with 75% weight for other exposures to individual in the retail 
portfolio.3 Basel II also states that loans secured by commercial real estate may receive a 
lower capital requirement than unsecured corporate exposure; risk weights may be reduced 
from 100% to 50%. Because no other specific limitations are imposed on the exposure type 
or the borrower’s PD, “...the presence of a lower risk weight seem to be motivated mainly by 
LGD consideration” (Resti, Sironi 2005, p. 27). 
Banks which follow the standardized approach can adjust the exposure of each asset 
by taking into account the positive impact of guarantees, collateral and other hedging tools 
such as credit derivatives. This can be done in two different ways, the so-called simple and 
comprehensive. Under the simple approach there are defined rules for changes in the risk 
weights considering the quality of the collateral, while leaving the exposure unchanged. The 
exposure portion covered with valid collateral receives the risk weight applicable to the col-
lateral itself instead of using debtor’s coefficient,4 subject to a floor usually of 20%.  
                                                          
1
 Such institutions may be rating agencies or other institutions recognized by the national supervisors. In order 
to be admitted as ECAI agencies, they must meet requirements in terms of independence, transparency and 
consistency of rating criteria. For more details see Resti and Sironi (2007).   
2
 Beattie and Searle (1992) provided a comprehensive study of the assessment of eight rating agencies and they 
find that large players (Moody’s, S&P) despite different methodology exhibit similar assessments. Some large 
differences were found by more specialized and regional agencies (MCM, JBRI). This study is nevertheless 
quite old and agencies have recently put a lot of emphasis on ratings homogeneity. 
3
 Such loans are usually highly fractioned with good risk diversification; hence weights are reduced. Also, as in 
1988 Accord, loans backed by a mortgage on the borrower’s home were weigh-reduced to 50%.  
4
 It works similarly with the guarantees. The debtor’s risk weight is replaced by the guarantor’s one, which usu-
ally means a lower capital requirement due to better guarantor’s rating. Furthermore, the losses can occur only 
with simultaneous default of debtor and guarantor – an event that is more rare than a default of the guarantor 
only. Nonetheless, this low probability of double default must not be considered. Neither in the IRB approach 
can be taken into account in the case of risk mitigation by guarantees or credit derivatives (see BCBS 2005, 
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 In the comprehensive method, no capital requirement is applied on the exposure 
portion backed by valid collateral. However, its current value C must be reduced by a haircut 
HC, reflecting the risk which the market value of the financial instrument may decrease. 
Banks can use standard supervisory haircuts or their own estimates. Once the appropriate 
haircut is chosen, the current value of the collateral is trimmed down by multiplying it by a 
haircut factor, defined as 1 − HC, obtaining the adjusted collateral value. The value of the 
credit exposure covered by the adjusted collateral EC is not subjected to any capital require-
ment. The remaining part of exposure after risk mitigation E* is subjected to a “full-risk 
weight” and can be easily calculated as follows 
(1.3) ( ){ }* max 0, 1 CE E C H= − −    
where E is the original exposure and holds E =  E*
 
+ EC. 
When the loan is not issued in cash, e.g. in the case of securities lending, its value 
can increase over time and cause that the collateral becomes insufficient for the exposure to 
be fully secured. For this case the current value of the exposure E must be adjusted by hair-
cut HE. Further, when currency mismatch is present between collateral and exposure, another 
haircut HFX has to be used to account for foreign exchange risk. The remaining exposure may 
be expressed as shown in BCBS (2005, §147) 
(1.4) ( ) ( ){ }* max 0, 1 1E C FXE E H C H H= + − − −     
The exposure amount after risk mitigation E*  will be multiplied by the risk weight of 
the counterparty to obtain the risk-weight asset amount. 
The appeal for banks to leave standardized approach and pass to IRB is that it may 
allow them to obtain a lower level of capital requirements.  
1.3.2. The Foundation IRB Approach 
The IRB approach is more sophisticated, because it relies on banks’ own internal es-
timates of certain risk parameters for determining credit capital requirements. Nonetheless, 
both in the foundation and in advanced IBR approach there must be used a risk-weight func-
tion provided by Basel Committee for deriving regulatory capital to ensure that overall capi-
tal levels across countries remain homogenous. 
The IRB is based on measures of expected and unexpected losses (EL, UL).1 In both 
regulatory and economic capital determination plays those factors an important role because 
the risk-weight functions produce capital requirements for the UL portion (see BCBS 2005, 
                                                          
§301). However, for some hedged exposures is in the IRB double default effect deliberated (see BCBS 2005, 
§284).  
1
 The distinction between EL and UL was introduced only in final version Basel II in 2004. Before that, banks 
were simply required to cover both types of losses.   
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§212). EL can be generally expressed as product of PD, EAD, LGD and f(M), where f(M) 
presents the effective maturity.1 
 Expected loss stands for the anticipated average loss rate that a bank should expect 
over time for particular facility or portfolio. It is the mean value of the probability distribu-
tion of future losses and because it is estimated by lender ex-ante, it should be reflected in 
the price of risky product. From this point of view, as Bhatia (2006, p. 10) refers, EL does 
not represent risk but a cost of providing credit, which must be recovered as a part of pricing.  
The real credit risk is associated with unexpected loss that is usually defined as the 
volatility of the EL. In order to compute it, it is necessary to know standard deviations of all 
above mentioned variables, which occur in the formula for EL. The accuracy of EL and UL 
computation therefore depends on estimates of those risk parameters. However, some of 
them may be stochastic and considering them as deterministic leads to underestimating UL‘s 
values. This is also the case of LGD. 
It is good to note that in Basel II framework, UL corresponds to value at risk, rather 
than to standard deviation of losses. UL is defined as a difference between LGD (multiplied 
by the factor taking into account correlation 2 between assets in portfolio and maximal loss on 
given confidence level) and the bank’s best estimate of EL, which are all adjusted by matur-
ity factor (see BCBS 2005, §272). UL then represents the capital requirements, the amount, 
that must be covered by capital, while EL may be covered by provisions.3 
We can see that LGD enters capital calculation in IRB approach in a direct and ex-
plicit way. However, a foundation approach allows banks to use own estimate only of the 
debtor’s PD, while all other variables are set by regulators, LGD makes no exception.4 Ac-
cordingly to BCBS (2005, §287), LGD is fixed 45% for all senior, unsecured exposures. This 
value must be increased to 75% for subordinated exposures, but can be reduced again when 
some adequate collateral is pledged. Such a reduction cannot be based on banks’ internal 
models or past experience but has to come out from rules that quantify the effect of financial 
and non-financial collaterals. The similar haircut system as in standardized approach is used; 
however, in this case the haircuts are applied directly to LGDs and not to the value of expo-
sure. LGD applicable to a collateralized transaction is called effective loss given default, 
LGD*. 
Concerning the financial instruments as collateral,5  the formula for the adjusted 
LGD is the following 
                                                          
1
 The effective maturity f(M) must be computed for a given exposure only in some cases. In BCBS (2005) in 
paragraphs 318 to 324 the circumstances in which the maturity adjustment applies are discussed. 
2
 Unlike EL, UL for portfolio is not equal to the sum of individual ULs, because variance is not additive pa-
rameter and depends on the loss correlation among portfolio’s assets. 
3
 This rule is not absolutely rigid; a limited percentage of UL can also be covered with provisions (see Resti, Si-
roni 2007, p. 610). 
4
 For retail exposures, banks are allowed to provide own estimates not only for PD, but also for LGD and EAD 
(see BCBS, 2005, §252). 
5
 Eligible financial collaterals are the same as in the standardized approach and include cash and deposits issued 
by the lending bank, gold, bonds with a rating of at least BB, and others (see more in BCBS 2005, p. 31). 
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(1.5) ( )* *LGD LGD E E=   
taking the “basis” 45% LGD and substituting into equation (3) we get 
(1.6) ( ){ }* 45% max 0, 1 1E C FXLGD H C E H H= + − − −    
where all of the symbols have the same meaning as above. LGD is increasing (i) when the 
loan is not issued in cash, (ii) when HE is greater than zero, and (iii) the coverage ratio C/E 
(current value of collateral to original value of exposure) is reduced according to the size of 
collateral and currency mismatch haircut.  
As far as non-financial assets are concerned, three different categories of collateral 
are defined. Receivables, real estate and other collateral,1 for which haircuts are replaced by 
a system of minimum and maximum thresholds that are used for adjusted LGD’s computa-
tion as follows 
(1.7) [ ]( )( )max max min45% - min C/E, T / T  45% - LGDLGD* =
45%



 
min
min< 
if C/E T
if C/E T
≥
 
where LGDmin is the minimum value that can be attained by the adjusted LGD, when 
C/E ≥ Tmax. The threshold values together with LGDmin are for particular collateral types re-
ported in footnote.2 
As we presented, in the foundation IRB approach LGD levels are predetermined and 
adjusted in case, that collateral is present according to given rules. Own estimate of LGD is 
required only for retail exposure and LGD is estimated at a pool level. The use of banks’ 
own estimate of LGD for corporate, sovereign and bank exposure is allowed in the advanced 
IRB methodology (see BCBS 2005, §297). 
1.3.3. The Advanced IRB Approach 
When using the advanced IRB approach, banks are authorized 3 to provide more of 
their own estimate of risk parameters (PD, LGD and EAD) and their own calculation of ef-
fective maturity. BCBS (2005, §468–§505) sets several requirements on LGD estimates con-
cerning data collection, types of LGD’s estimates, adjustment reflecting effect of guarantee 
or validation process. Those rules are shortly summarized below. 
 Banks must collect and store a complete history of data on the LGD associated with 
each facility and also, the data on the estimated and realized LGDs that should be measured 
in an economic and not merely in an accounting manner.4 Data set, on which estimates must 
                                                          
1
 Other collateral, including physical capital but excluding any assets which are acquired by the bank as a result 
of a loan default (see Resti, Sironi 2005, p. 30). 
2
 Collateral type (Tmin (%); Tmax (%); LGDmin (%)): Receivables (0, 125, 35), Commercial and residential real es-
tate (30; 140; 35) and other collateral (30; 140; 40). 
3
 Banks’ internal models for credit risk parameters estimation has to be approved by Regulator. 
4
 See Chapter 1.1.3 for difficulties with ex-post LGD measurement.  
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be consequently based, should ideally cover an entire economic cycle, but no shorter than 
seven years or five for retail exposure.1 
“A bank must estimate an LGD for each facility that aims to reflect economic down-
turn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant risks”.2 This estimated LGD cannot 
be less than “the long-run default-weighted average loss rate given default calculated based 
on the average economic loss of all observed defaults” for that type of facility. In addition, a 
bank must take into account the LGD’s cyclical variation of some facility and possibility of 
higher LGDs during a period with higher credit losses than the default-weighted average 
(§468). The extent of relation between the risk of the borrower and risk of the collateral or its 
provider must be considered and in case of significant degree of dependence it must be by 
loss estimate treated conservatively. Similarly, any currency mismatch between obligation 
and the collateral must be addressed in a conservative manner (§469). 
“LGD estimates must be grounded in historical recovery rates and when applicable, 
must not solely be based on the collateral’s estimated market value”. This requirement is set, 
because banks are usually unable to expeditiously gain control of their collateral and liqui-
date it (§470). Bank must determine the best estimate of LGD for each defaulted exposure, 
based “...on the current economic circumstances and facility status”. Since realized losses 
can exceed expected values, banks must also estimate conservative projection reflect-
ing“...the possibility that the bank would have to recognize additional, unexpected losses 
during the recovery period” (§471). 
Banks may reflect the risk mitigation effect due to presence of guarantees by an ad-
justment of PD or LGD.3 The adjustment criteria must be plausible, intuitive and consistent 
over time and across types of guarantees. “In no case can the bank assign the guaranteed 
exposure an adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted risk weight would be lower than that 
of a comparable, direct exposure to the guarantor”. Advantageous effects of borrower’s and 
guarantor’s imperfect expected correlation of default is permitted to influence capital re-
quirements. “As such, the adjusted risk weight must not reflect the risk mitigation of double 
default” (§482). However, for some hedged exposures is the double default effect deliber-
ated (§284). No restrictions are put on the types of eligible guarantors. 
The validation of internal estimates is also considered. “Banks must have a robust 
system in place to validate the accuracy and consistency of rating systems, processes, and 
the estimation of all relevant risk components” (§500). Comparisons between estimated and 
realized LGDs should be at lease annually performed to demonstrate that realized recoveries 
                                                          
1
 According to EU Directive 2006/49, EU banks may be granted up to three years’ discount when the New Ac-
cord is implemented for the first time.  
2
 For estimation of downturn LGD demanded by Basel II, “point in time” approach presented by Hamerle 
(2006) can be used. 
3
 Also credit derivatives can be used for the credit risk mitigation. ”The criteria used for assigning adjusted 
borrower grades or LGD estimates (or pools) for exposures hedged with credit derivatives must require that 
the asset, on which the protection is based (the reference asset), cannot be different from the underlying asset, 
unless the conditions outlined in the foundation approach are met” (§488). 
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are within the expected range. “Banks must also use other quantitative validation tools and 
comparisons with relevant external data sources” (§503) and must also demonstrate that 
used methods do not systematically vary with the economic cycle (§504). For the case when 
significant deviations between estimated and realized LGDs are found and validity of the 
bank’s estimates is queried, banks must have prepared well-articulated internal standards 
dealing with such a situation (§504).  
The Basel II framework represents a significant improvement in the risk sensitivity of 
capital regulation and corresponds to a clear progress in credit risk management compared to 
Basel I. However, there are still a lot of gaps and limitations that should be considered.1 In the 
credit risk area, treatment of correlations is still inadequate. Advantage of diversification of re-
tail portfolios with exposure to individuals and small enterprises is recognized, but there is un-
realistic way in which IRB system measures the concentration and correlation among borrow-
ers. Furthermore, a correlation of losses is modeled only as a function of PD and thereby ig-
nores possible portfolio characteristics such as geographic or industry diversification.  
Another possible problematic issue is the impact of Basel II regulation on the macro-
economic level. Indeed, if capital adequacy depends on internal or external ratings of the coun-
terparts, recession will lead to higher default rates and to following increase in the minimum 
required capital. The consequence is a procyclical effect leading to overlending in the time of 
strong economic growth and credit crunch in the recession, which exacerbates economic down-
turn. Furthermore, Altman et al. (2005b) used the Monte Carlo simulation to assess the impact 
of not considering LGD and PD as correlated in the IRB credit risk models. They found that 
EL and UL are in this case importantly understated.2 Taking into account the link between PD 
and LGD in IRB estimation, it is likely to even increase the procyclicality effects of Basel II. 
However, neglecting this correlation might lead to insufficient bank reserves. 
The first chapter provided the range of information about LGDs with respect to the 
types of borrowers, seniority of debt, or development of macroeconomic conditions. Although 
we could notice different relations among those variables, a major difficulty of such informa-
tion is their complete dependence on historical data. The LGD predictions based on their past 
data are not thus necessarily coherent with the evolution of fundamentals across time and can 
result in inaccurate estimates being not able to capture the real trend in economy. 
 
                                                          
1
 As the general shortcomings of Basel II is usually mentioned gap between industry best practices and 1st Pillar, 
non-capability to offer equal treatment to banks operating in different environment, bad coherence with new 
accounting rules, high implementation costs, etc. For more criticism see Servigny and Renault (2004), Stepha-
nou and Mendoza (2005) or Das (2007). 
2
 Taking LGD as stochastic and correlated with PD increases EL and UL approximately about 30% (see Altman 
et al. 2005b). 
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2. Loss Given Default modeling 
 “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
  George E. Box * 
This chapter focuses on analytical tools which enable forward-looking estimates of 
LGD from market observable information. Those implied market LGDs incorporate specific 
conditions in economy and therefore should bring additional piece of knowledge to already pre-
sented properties of ex-post historical LGDs. 
Modern credit analysis is more and more in line with integration of uncertainty into 
new theories with inclusion of sophisticated mathematical tools such as stochastic calculus. Its 
contribution to modern finance is the ability to give a deterministic solution out of an uncer-
tainty which is modeled as a random process. Furthermore, stochastic calculus allows the fining 
of the time into infinitesimal points as a limit of the discrete time approach. Despite the discrete 
approach it is still practical to visualize the development through time (e.g. binominal trees); the 
continuous-time framework is very useful, since it enables more easily to obtain closed-form 
solution. 
This also enabled the dynamics approach to asset pricing models which are aiming at 
determining the equilibrium arbitrage-free price of risky assets. Each risky asset should offer an 
expected return corresponding to its degree of risk; therefore all risky parameters must be 
evaluated by market in order to get the equilibrium price. This assumption, that prices include 
all information is then used by credit risk pricing models which utilize market information (e.g. 
share or bond price) to measure credit risk and with help of asset pricing models are trying to 
extract the key risk parameters such as PD or LGD from the prices. Those models are forward-
looking, estimating the risk parameters which are expected by the market in the future and not 
those that occurred in the past. From the nature of this method such estimate of LGD is called 
implied market LGD. 
 The market information based models can be further classified as structural and re-
duced-form models. Many theoretical developments have appeared in this field only during the 
last few years. The goal of this chapter is to give a summary of different approaches to credit 
risk pricing and how it can be further used for extracting credit risk parameters, especially 
LGD. The analysis begins with older structural models, whose imperfections gave rise two dec-
ades later to new reduced-form approach. However, both types of models have their limitations 
and stand on many assumptions, which hinder their practical usage. 
                                                          
*
 Box, G. (1979): Robustness in the strategy of scientific model building, In Launer, R., Wilkinson, G. (eds): 
Robustness in Statistics, 1979, p. 202. 
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2.1. Structural Models 
The category of structural-form models of credit risk are based on the framework devel-
oped by Merton in 1974 using the theory of option pricing presented by Black and Scholes 
(1973).1 The intuition behind is quite straightforward, a company defaults, when the value of 
its assets becomes lower at the time of debt’s maturity than that of its liabilities. For that rea-
son, the default process is driven by the value of the company’s assets and the risk of default is 
explicitly related to the assets variability. 
The term structural comes from the fact, that these models focus on the structural char-
acteristics of the company such as asset volatility or leverage that determine relevant credit risk 
elements. Default and RR are a function of those variables. In contrast, reduced-form models 
generally ignore the structural parameters as the cause of the default and simply assume, that 
default is possible and is driven by some exogenous random variable. The result is, that default 
and recovery is modeled independently from the firm’s structural features, which lacks the 
clear economic intuition behind the default event. 
Although the original Merton’s model introducing contingent claim approach brought a 
whole new perspective for credit pricing analysis, it was based on some simplifying assump-
tions, for example, that default can occur only at maturity of the debt, company’s liabilities are 
represented only by one zero-coupon bond,2 or interest rate is taken as constant. In response to 
such problems there have been developed alternative approaches, which try to remove one or 
more of those problematic drawbacks of the model. Black and Cox (1976) introduced the pos-
sibility of more complex capital structure of the company’s liabilities, Geske (1977) presented 
the interest paying debt, or Vasicek (1984) established the distinction between the short and 
long-term debt. All previous authors also enhanced the model by treating default as an event 
that can occur any time before debt’s maturity. More recent improvements such as works by 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Hull and White (1995), or Collin and Goldstein (2001), reject 
the constant risk-free interest rate and considered interest rate as stochastic variable instead of 
that.3 
 All of mentioned structural models deal primarily with PD of specific company. What 
were the initial assumptions, how they developed with models’ improvements, and foremost, 
how LGD and RR can be modeled are the main objects of the following text. Since all later 
structural models are more or less based on this original Merton’s framework, its derivation is 
described in this chapter in more details and further there will be presented its expansions in 
form of presence for collateral, which pledges the debt, or stochastic interest rate.  
                                                          
1
 Therefore are structural models also called Merton type models. In the original option pricing paper, Black and 
Scholes (1973) suggested that their technique could be used to price corporate securities. 
2
 In reality companies have complex financial structure with claims of different maturities, interest payments, or 
levels of security and seniority.  
3
 For detailed development of later structural models see e.g. Altman et al. (2005a) or Jarrow and Protter (2004) 
and the references therein.  
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2.1.1. PD and Recovery Rate in Merton’s model 
The seminal structural Merton’s (1974) model relies on many hypotheses which are 
mostly coming from the Black–Scholes option pricing theory. Some of them became source 
of criticism and have been later relaxed. The original framework in which is the valuing 
process of firm’s assets embedded requires for the application of standard corporate credit 
risk pricing many assumptions, which are following 
(A. 1) Markets are frictionless. There are no transactions costs, taxes, short-selling 
restrictions, bid-ask spreads and assets are perfectly divisible. 
(A. 2) There is a sufficient number of investors with comparable level of wealth 
such that they can buy or sell as much of an asset as they want. 
(A. 3) The term structure of risk-free interest rate is flat and known with certainty. 
The price of riskless bond paying $1 at time T is hence [ ]0( ) expB T rT= − , 
where r is the instantaneous riskless interest rate. 
(A. 4) Total value of firm V is financed by equity E and one zero-coupon non-
callable debt contract D, maturing at time T with face value F. Also holds 
t t tV D E= + , with (A.1) this implies that the value of the firm and the values 
of assets are identical and do not depend on the capital structure itself. This 
corresponds with Modigliani–Miller theorem. 
(A. 5) There is neither cash flow payout, nor issues of any type of security during 
the life of the debt, nor bankruptcy costs. Default can only happen at the ma-
turity. 
(A. 6) There is no possibility of the absolute priority rule violation. Shareholders are 
paid off after firm’s default only after full compensation of the debtholders. 
(A. 7) The dynamics of the firm’s value through time can be described by the sto-
chastic differential equation called geometric Brownian motion 
 (2.1) Vt V t V t tdV V dt V dWµ σ= + , 
 where Vµ is the assets drift (i.e. the instantaneous expected rate of return on 
the firm’s value V per unit time), Vσ  is the standard deviation of its return, 
and VtdW  is a standard Gauss–Wiener process.
1
 In case of cash outflow per 
unit time in form of dividends or coupons (δV), the equation is adapted to 2 
 (2.2) ( ) Vt V V t V t tdV V dt V dWµ δ σ= − +  
In such framework based on those assumptions, credit risk concerns the possibility 
that the value of the company evolves stochastically, will be on the maturity day T less than 
the repayment value of the loan F. The debtholders receive at T neither the value F (if 
VT > F ), or they receive the entire value of the firm and the owners of the firm receive noth-
ing (if VT  < F ). The risk of default is therefore explicitly linked to the volatility on the firm’s 
asset value. The Merton’s contingent claim analysis shows, how this risk should be priced. 
                                                          
1
 Definition of Wiener process and other stochastic concepts is given in Appendix A.  
2
 In the seminal Merton’s model is the drift in the form of µvV−δ, not like in (2.2) in form (µv − δ)V. The later is 
more often used in newer models; however, there is no difference for model derivation.    
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Dynamics of debt security, whose market value is at any time t a function of the 
value of the firm and time, i.e. ( , )t tD f V t= , can be expressed by stochastic equation as 
(2.3) ( ) Dt D t D D t tdD D dt D dWµ δ σ= − +  
where the symbols are the same as in (2.2). By using Itô’s Lemma,1 it is possible to derive 
(see Appendix B) the fundamental differential equation, which determines the value of the 
debt and which is the basis cornerstone of Merton’s model. The equation is in the form 
(2.10)  
2
2 2
2
1 0
2
t t t
t V t t
t t
D D D
rV V rD
t V V
σ
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+ + − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
and it must be satisfied by each security, whose value is a function of the value of the firm 
and time. In addition to those variables, Dt depends also on the volatility of the firm’s value 
and on the interest rate.2 As we can see, the value is independent of the expected rate of re-
turn of the firm and therefore independent of the risk preference of investors. From this result 
comes out a principle of risk-neutral valuation, which allows assuming the risk-neutral world 
when pricing a corporate debt. This concept will be used also later to get risk-neutral prob-
abilities of default and recovery rates. 
To solve this equation for the value of the debt D, there is necessary to get two 
boundary and initial conditions. By (A.4), ( , ) ( , )V D V E Vτ τ= + , where τ = T − t is the length 
of time until maturity. The boundary conditions are then given by 
(2.11a) (0, ) (0, ) 0D Eτ τ= =  and ( , )D V Vτ ≤  
The initial condition is given by fact that debtholders at maturity day receive the 
face value of debt F or remaining value of the firm, what can be expressed as 
(2.11b)  [ ]( ,0) min ;D V V F=  
The equation (2.10) can be using (2.11) solved by standard methods of separation of 
variables or Fourier transforms. However, as noticed Merton, it is possible to easily deter-
mine the value of equity ( , )E V τ  if we substitute for D in (2.10) and (2.11) the expression 
( , ) ( , )D V V E Vτ τ= − and deduce the partial differential equation for E. This is 
(2.12)  
2
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subjected to the boundary conditions (2.11a) and the initial condition 
(2.13) [ ]( ,0) max 0;E V V F= −  
                                                          
1
 See Appendix A 
2
 The value of Dt depends also on the payouts of the firm and the security, however, the initial Merton’s model 
assumes no payout policy (Merton 1974). The incorporation of dividends’ payouts will be developed in Chap-
ter 3, which utilizes Merton’s model for estimation of LGD for the sample of companies in the Czech Repub-
lic. 
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This is identical to Black and Scholes (1973) formula for pricing “...an European 
call option on a non-dividend paying common stock where firm value corresponds to a stock 
price and F corresponds to the exercise price” (Merton 1974, p. 10). Indeed, at maturity time 
T, the equity holders will exercise option and pay to debtholders face value of liabilities if 
VT ≥ F, otherwise they let this option expire. By applying the Black–Scholes option pricing 
formula it is straightforward to get solution for equations (2.12), (2.13) as 
(2.14) ( ) ( )1 2( , ) rE V V d Fe dττ −= Φ − Φ   
where 
2 2
1 2 1
1 1ln ln
2 2
,  
V V
V
V V
V V
r r
F Fd d d
σ τ σ τ
σ τ
σ τ σ τ
   
+ + + −   
   
= = − =  and Φ (.) is cumula-
tive standard normal distribution. If we use again ( , ) ( , )D V V E Vτ τ= − in which we appoint 
the expression for E from equation (2.14), we can express the value of debt at time τ as 
(2.15) ( ) ( )1 2( , ) rD V V d Fe dττ −= Φ − + Φ  
where d1 and d2 are defined above. This equation could be later adjusted to express risk pre-
mium of corporate debt or its yield to maturity.  
Armed with the aforementioned logic of the model we can already look how credit 
risk parameters as PD and RR can be extracted. The default occurs, when firm’s value drops 
below some default barrier (DB), that is in the seminal Merton’s model represented by face 
value of debt F at its maturity. The probability of default is therefore the likelihood that the 
value of the firm will be at the maturity day T lower than the value of debt F. Simply ex-
pressed as 
(2.16) Pr( )TPD V F= ≤  
To get this probability, the more information about probability distribution of V has to be 
known. However, we can use the assumption that the value of the firm V is log-normally dis-
tributed, what is according to Crouhy et al. (2000) quite robust hypothesis confirmed by ac-
tual data, and we can get information about probability distribution of lnVT,1 what is  
(2.17) ln TV ~ ( )2 20ln 0,5 ,V V VV T Tµ σ σ Φ + −   
from properties of natural logarithm can be the probability (2.16) expressed as 
(2.18) Pr(ln ln )TPD V F= ≤  
and from that by using (2.17) we can get 
                                                          
1
 The Itô’s Lemma can be again used to get dynamics for dlnVt and from that can be determined parameters of 
normal distribution for lnVt (see Hull 2002 p. 227). 
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(2.19) 
20
*
2
1ln
2 ( )
V V
V
V T
FPD d
T
µ σ
σ
  
+ −  
  = Φ − = Φ −
 
 
 
 
which is the PD of a company at the time of maturity T expected at time 0,  ( )t Tτ= = , when 
the value of the firm V0 is known with certainty.1 Nearer look at values *2d and 2d discloses 
that probability of default occurs also in final equation for pricing risky debt (2.15). This 
comes from the fact that Ф(d2) is the probability that the European call option will be exer-
cised by equity holders (see Hull 2002, p. 247), and company will not default. The term 
1−Ф(d2) =  Ф(-d2) then characterize default probability. However, while *2( )dΦ − in (2.19) gives 
the real-world (physical) probability of default, Ф(-d2) presents the default probability in the 
risk-neutral world. This is caused by using riskless interest rate r instead of expected rate of 
return Vµ  in the formula for d2. In the real world, investors are demanding more than risk-
free rate of return and therefore *2 2d d> what implies *2( )dΦ − < 2( )dΦ −  and the fact that risk-
neutral PD overstates its physical measure. Similarly it has to be distinguished between 
physical and risk-neutral RR.2 
The recovery rate, when assuming no liquidation costs after default, will by given by 
the ratio of firm’s value at T to the debt F, (VT/F ). More formally expressed as 
(2.20) ( )1T T T TVRR E V F E V V FF F
 
= < = < 
 
 
as was already mentioned, V is log-normal variable, therefore to get an explicit formula for 
RR we can use for the method presented in Liu et al. (1997), that derives conditional mean 
for log-normal distributed variable, what is exactly the case of equation (2.20).  
Let’s suppose that variable Y is log-normal and lnY is normally distributed with 
mean µ and variance σ2. Then variable Z =  (lnY− µ)/σ has a standard normal distribution. The 
conditional mean of Y, giving Y < c, can be then expressed as follows 
 ( ) [ ] [ ]( )exp expE Y Y c E Z Z cσ µ σ µ< = + + <  
(2.21) [ ] ( )( )exp lnE Z Z cσ µ µ σ= + < −  
to simplify following expression, let’s define  
(2.22) ( )lng c µ σ= − and ( )h g= Φ   
                                                          
1
 From (2.19) it can be seen that PD is the function of the distance between current V0 and the face value of debt 
F, adjusted by the expected growth of asset Vµ relative to its volatility 2 .Vσ The *2d is hence called distance-to-
default (DD) and the higher its value is, the lower is PD. 
2
 As e.g. Deliandes and Geske (2003) state, risk-neutral default probabilities can serve as an upper bound to 
physical default probabilities. For recoveries hold reverse relation – the risk-neutral expected recovery rate is 
less than its physical (real-world) counterpart (see Madan et al. 2006, p. 5). 
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where Φ (.) is again normal c.d.f. with these notations, the equation (2.21) becomes 
 ( ) ( ) 1/ 21 2exp[ ] 2 exp[ 2]gE Y Y c h Z z dzσ µ pi −−
−∞
< = + −∫  
 ( ) 1/ 22 1 2exp[ 2] 2 exp[ ( ) 2]gh z dzµ σ pi σ−−
−∞
= + − −∫  
(2.23) ( )( )( )( )
2 lnexp[ 2]
ln
c
c
µ σ σ
µ σ
µ σ
Φ − −
= +
Φ −
 
considering the parameters of normal distribution of lnV stated in (2.17), we can write condi-
tional mean of VT, giving VT < F as 
(2.24)  ( ) ( )( )( )( )
* * *
* * 2
* *
ln
exp[ 2]
ln
v V V
T T v V
v V
F
E V V F
F
µ σ σ
µ σ
µ σ
Φ − −
< = +
Φ −
 
where ( )* 2 * 2 20ln 0,5  and v V V V VV T Tµ µ σ σ σ= + − = , after substituting and rearranging we get  
 ( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
0
0 2
0
ln 0,5
exp ln
ln 0,5
V V
V
T T V
V V
V
V F T
T
E V V F V T
V F T
T
µ σ
σ
µ
µ σ
σ
 + +
 Φ −
 
 < = +
 + −
 Φ −
 
 
 
(2.25)  
*
1
0 *
2
( )
exp[ ] ( )V
dV T
d
µ Φ −=
Φ −
 
using this term in equation (2.20) we get final expression for the expected recovery rate at 
time t = 0 in the form 
(2.26) ( ) *0 1
*
2
( )1
exp[ ] ( )T T V
V d
RR E V V F T
F F d
µ Φ −= < =
Φ −
 
which is the physical recovery rate and the risk-neutral RR would be obtained by replace-
ment Vµ with r. RR function is homogenous of degree zero in V0 and F, which means that 
proportional change in those variables does not influence its value (ceteris paribus). More-
over, RR is dependent, as the PD, on the uncertain development of firm’s value and therefore 
is not constant through the time but stochastic.  
 As it was shown above, risk-neutral PD is direct component in the formula for pric-
ing risky debt. Similarly we can find out that RR is there embedded. To see it more clearly, 
we can rewrite eq. (2.15) at t = 0 as follows 
 ( ) ( )0 0 1 2( , ) rD V T V d Fe dτ−= Φ − + Φ  
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 ( ) ( )( )1 0 2rT rTFe d V Fe d− −= − −Φ − + Φ − 1 
(2.27) ( ) ( ) ( )2 0 1 2rT rTFe d Fe V d d− − = − Φ − − Φ − Φ −   
F-rT represents the current value of the riskless debt, using (2.26), we can call the second term 
in bracket the risk-neutral expected discounted recovery value, conditional on VT < F (see 
Crouhy and Galai 1997). The bracket is hence the present value of expected loss, if the firm 
goes bankrupt at time T. With result of (2.19) we easily get formula 
(2.28) 0 ( , ) .rT DD V T Fe PD ELGD−= −  
where ELGDD is the expected discounted LGD. Thus, PD.ELGDD can be extracted from the 
prices of particular risky and riskless bond with the same maturity. By utilizing the knowl-
edge about borrower’s PD (e.g. external estimate from rating agencies) is then possible to get 
separate value of expected discounted LGD. 
As we could see from the above derived model’s dynamics, both PD and RR are si-
multaneously given from arbitrage-free equilibrium conditions. Using the presented expres-
sion for PD and RR, the sensitivity analyses with respect to other company’s structural pa-
rameters can be made. Consider the firm with given F = 80, V0 = 100, σ2 = 30%, µ = 10% and 
T = 1. The variables will be shocked to see how PD and RR change. 
Figure 7 
The sensitivity analysis for PD and RR (LGD) – part 1 
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Source: computed from eq. (2.19) and (2.26)  
The figure presents results for RR and PD in physical measure. It could be supposed, 
that the higher is the firm’s value at the time of risk parameters prediction, the lower is the 
expected LGD and lower PD – part a), the linkage is reverse with the value of debt F. An in-
crease in firm’s leverage brings about higher both PD and LGD. The similar impact also has 
an increase in assets’ volatility (leaving leverage unchanged) which causes higher uncer-
tainty of future firm’s value at the maturity T and therefore fall in RR.  
                                                          
1
 The derivation of eq. (2.15) came from the relation D = V−European call hold by shareholders. Equivalently 
we could consider that pay-off to debt holders is analogous to the pay-off from writing European put and 
D =  F-rT − European put. This is also the form of rewriting in eq. (2.27). 
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Figure 8 
The sensitivity analysis for PD and RR (LGD) – part 2 
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Source: computed from eq. (2.19) and (2.26)  
 In summary, Merton’s approach evidently generates the negative correlation be-
tween PD and RR because both variables depend on the same firm’s structural characteris-
tics. The RR is significantly determined by the value of firm’s assets at the maturity time T. 
However, possible RR gained by debt holder must not always depend only on firm’s value 
VT because the debt might be pledged by collateral. 
2.1.2. Impact of Collateral on LGD in Merton’s model 
From the previous part it is obvious, that the „collateral” for debt holders in the 
seminal Merton’s model is the value of the firm at the maturity time.1 Firm’s value therefore 
determines not only the PD but also the RR. However, as a matter of fact, the debt is usually 
backed by collateral, and its value at the time of default determines RR. Furthermore, the 
value of collateral is not perfectly correlated with firm’s value. As a consequence, the basic 
Merton’s model is not sufficient for extracting RR from arrangement with collateral and 
hence it is necessary to make a few adjustments for more flexible LGD predictions. 
The extension, in which the asset value and the collateral are less than perfectly cor-
related, was made by Jokivuolle and Peura (2003, 2005) by adding a separate process for the 
collateral’s value. The collateral is used to back the debt with face value F and maturity T. 
However, the firm can have more than one debt F, and the default occurs if the firm’s value 
V at the maturity time is less than the overall debt value D, D ≥ F. As in Merton’s model, V 
satisfies the stochastic dynamics Vt V t V t tdV V dt V dWµ σ= + and the recovery rate for the debt 
F is determined by the value of the collateral, which follows the same geometric Brownian 
motion as follows 
(2.29) Ct C t C t tdC C dt C dWµ σ= +  
                                                          
1
 Since in the initial Merton’s model holds the assumption of Modigliani–Miller theorem, value of firm and 
value of firm’s assets are identical. 
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with instantaneous correlation between WV and WC denoted as ρ. If the debtor owns the col-
lateral, it can be considered that V = V* + C, where V* and C would be correlated log-normally 
distributed diffusion processes. The correlation parameter than would be an endogenous 
variable derived from the correlation between V* and C. However, this is not very tractable, 
since the sum of log-normal variables is not log-normal and the model would lose much of 
its applicability. Therefore is ρ assumed to be exogenous, which corresponds to the case 
when the collateral is provided by a third party.1 
Loss in the event of firm’s default can be expressed as max [0;F−CT ]. The expected 
LGD, conditional on the default is then 
(2.30) ( )1 T TELGD E C V DF= <  
considering the relation (2.17) that also holds for the collateral value, we can write VT and CT 
in terms of standard normal variables x and y as ( )20ln ln 0,5T V V VV V T T yµ σ σ= + − +  and 
( )20ln ln 0,5T C C CC C T T xµ σ σ= + − + . By applying the property of bivariate normal dis-
tribution,2 we get the distribution for conditioned 
 ln TC y  ~ ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 2 2 2 20ln 0,5 0,5 1 , 1C C C C CC T y T T Tσ ρ σ ρ µ σ ρ σ ρ Φ − + + − − −   
where the event TV D= corresponds to 
2
0ln ln 0,5V V
V
V D T T
y h
T
µ σ
σ
− + −
= = − .  
The equation (2.30) for expected LGD can be then evaluated as 
 [ ]1 max 0; T TELGD E F C V DF  = − <   
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]max 0;C C Texp T E E exp T F C y y hF
µ µ  = − − <    
(2.31)  [ ] ( ){ }2 2 2 2 { }0,5 , , , 1 ,( )C Put T C C C V y hexp T E BS C exp T y T F Th Fµ σ ρ σ ρ µ σ ρ <  = − + −   Φ 1  
where { }y h<1  is indicator function giving 1 if y h<  and 0 otherwise, BSPut is the Black–
Scholes formula for the value of put option with arguments corresponding to value of the un-
derlying asset, exercise price, risk-free interest rate, variance and maturity, respectively. The 
Ф(h) is the probability of default as was defined in (2.19). After a few rearrangements it is 
possible for ELGD to get following expression 
(2.32)  ( ){ } ( )1 2 2( ) 0,5 2 20 0,11 , , , 1 ,C C CT PD T T yPut C VeELGD BS C e F T y dyF PD
µ
σ ρ σ ρ µ σ ρ ϕ
−Φ
− +
−∞
= −∫  
                                                          
1
 A common example is an entrepreneur whose company is the debtor but who provides the collateral as a pri-
vate person. 
2
 See Appendix A for detailed properties of the bivariate normal distribution. 
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where φ0,1 is the density function of the standardized normal distribution. Equation is integral 
over Black–Scholes put option formula, where the upper integration boundary is a function 
of the firm’s probability of default, which does not depend on the collateral value parame-
ters. ELGD is a function of the dynamics of firm’s value only through PD. However, if the C 
and V are uncorrelated (ρ =  0) then ELGD does not depend on firm’s PD at all. 
To present ELGD sensitivity to model parameters, it is convenient to define loan-to-
collateral value ratio (F/CT) because ELGD is homogenous of degree zero in C and F, this 
can be seen after rewriting (2.32) as 
(2.33) ( ) ( )1 2 2( ) 0,5 2 20 0,11 , , , 1 ,C C C CPD T T T y TPut C VCELGD BS e e T y dyPD F µ σ ρ σ ρ µ µ σ ρ ϕ
−Φ
− +
−∞
 
= − 
 
∫  
and therefore it is more useful to analyze the changes of F/CT ratio than value of F and C it-
self. Following figure shows that ELGD is always increasing function of F/CT which is the 
expected result, since with lower value of collateral with respect to the loan, the possible loss 
given by default rises. Also ELGD gets larger with collateral’s value volatility σV as the un-
certainty about future value of collateral increases. The highest ELGD’s sensitivity to volatil-
ity measured by its partial derivative is for loan-to-value ratio around 100%. 
Figure 9 
ELGD for different levels of volatility as a function of F/CT ratio and correlation 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
40 80 120 160 200 240
Loan-to-Value ratio (%)
EL
G
D 
(%
)
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
a)       PD
 
=1%, T=1, µc=10%, ρ = 40%
Volatility of collateral
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
-50 -25 0 25 50 75 100
Correlation (%)
EL
G
D
 
(%
)
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
b)       PD =1%, T=1, µc=10%, loan-to-value ratio (b) = 100%
Volatility of collateral
 
Source: computed from eq. (2.32) 
Part b) of the figure illustrates the relationship between ELGD and correlation be-
tween dynamics of collateral’s and firm’s value. ELGD rises with higher correlation because 
the default event occurs, if the firm’s value drops under default barrier D; higher mutual dy-
namics implies that in the case of default it also declines the collateral value. 
The stochastic variables C and V are treated separately, which can be useful in the 
application of the model because external estimates for borrower’s PD can be used for get-
ting ELGD for specific debt contract F. The most difficult parameter to estimate is then the 
correlation between firm’s and collateral’s value. However, this can be estimated from his-
Chapter 2  Loss Given Default modeling 
 40 
40 
torical implied asset values, if they are available.1 The model can be used in the Advanced 
IRB since the banks estimating internal LGD has to consider the degree of dependency be-
tween borrower’s risk and collateral, as it was mentioned in previous chapter. Despite that 
the Basel requires estimate of economic loss including all costs arising in workout process, 
the ELGD in this model consists only of interest and principal loss, however; the calibration 
on historical data can be used to incorporate other collection costs to ELGD. The result is 
that the model may be useful as a quantitative tool for estimation of expected LGD in ad-
vanced IRB approach, although it comes out from the basic Mertonian approach that is as-
sumed to be oversimplifying the reality. The subsequent chapter therefore deals with later 
adaptations, which release some of the seminal assumptions.  
2.1.3. First-Passage-time approach  
In the former approach, the default event could occur only at maturity time. This as-
sumption was firstly relaxed by Black and Cox (1976) who come with the idea of default 
barrier (DB) that causes the default anytime during life of contract, if borrower’s assets touch 
barrier level. The economic interpretation of DB is a safety covenant, which is “...contrac-
tual provision which gives the bondholder the right to bankrupt or force a reorganization of 
the firm if it is doing poorly according to some standard” (Black, Cox 1976, p. 5). Safety 
covenants hedge debt holders against the big losses in case that the borrower’s asset would 
deeply drop under the value of debt.  
Default barrier can be treated in models as a constant as e.g. in Leland (1994), Long-
staff and Schwartz (1995), deterministically as in Black and Cox (1976), Leland and Toft 
(1996), or stochastically as in Briys and de Varenne (1997) or Collin and Goldstein (2001). 
Also it can be distinguished whether the barrier is set exogenously as a percentage share of 
debt value or it is endogenously determined in the model as the output from an optimization 
task. If the DB is touched and default occurs, the recovered amount is simply equal to the 
DB, however, it must be considered, that default time is an uncertain event, which makes it 
difficult to determine time value of RR.2  
Briys and de Varenne (1997) also relaxed the fixed default threshold and allowed it 
to be itself dependent on the term structure of interest rate. The integration of interest rate 
dynamics in the credit pricing framework is an appropriate step, partly it is hard to analyze 
bond’s value assuming constant interest rate, and also dynamics of interest rate and its spread 
is indirectly linked to the incorporation of business cycle effects, since the RR is related to 
macroeconomic variables, as it was shown in first chapter.  
                                                          
1
 The second option according to Jokivuolle and Peura (2005) would be to use stock market industry index re-
turns to proxy for firm’s value returns. 
2
 One could use for determining the time of hitting the barrier a cumulative distribution function for the first 
passage time of the Wiener process (see Karatzas, Shreve 1991). The value of equity is in the first-passage 
time models determined by using the formula for the barrier (down-and-out) call option instead of stan-
dard European call option, which was used in the seminal Merton’s model (see Hull 2002).  
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In the following part the pricing approach for zero-coupon bond developed in Pirotte 
(1999) is presented, where there is integrated the stochasticity of interest rate and possibility 
of before-maturity default. This framework is coherently rooted in Merton’s model from the 
previous sections and therefore it allows better comparison of changes in estimated LGDs 
coming from above mentioned modifications. 
The asset value follows again the log-normal diffusion process with constant instan-
taneous drift and volatility. Equity holders receive a continuous dividend rate δV that are im-
plicitly financed by asset sales. This means 
(3.1) ( ) Vt V V t V t tdV V dt V dWµ δ σ= − +  
The assumption that all assets can be traded continuously without any restriction in a 
liquid and frictionless market still holds as well as that the firm is financed from equity and 
single non-callable zero coupon bond of finite maturity.1 
The term structure of interest rate is assumed to be given by a two-factor model fol-
lowing a bi-dimensional Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, a mean-reverting process with a con-
stant variance.2 This allows decomposing the interest rate into two components linked to the 
business cycle of the economy 
 ( ) s
s s s tds a b s dt dWσ= − +   
(3.2) ( ) ll l l tdl a b l dt dWσ= − +  
where s is the spread between the short-term and long-term 3 interest rate (described by proc-
ess dl), r s l= + , bs, bl are the long-run averages to which s and l revert with speeds aS, al, 
furthermore holds 
,
.
s l
t t s ldW dW ρ= . The asset value of the firm is assumed to be correlated 
with the spot interest rates. Also is assumed that a risk-free asset P0,T exists with maturity T 
whose value depends on a term structure of interest rate Rt(T ) and whose dynamics under the 
risk-neutral probability is given by 
(3.3)  
,t T
P
t t t P t tdP r Pdt PdWσ= +  
where PtW is linear combination of and 
s l
t tW dW , and also holds relation 
(3.4) 
,
, t T
P V
t t P V P VdW dW ρ σ σ=  
with 
,
2 2
,
2
t TP s l s l s l
σ η η ρ η η= + + , ,
,
1 t T
s s
t T
P
P s
η σ
∂
=
∂
and ,
,
1 t T
l l
t T
P
P l
η σ
∂
=
∂
 for formal proof 
see Cossin and Pirotte (2001). 
                                                          
1
 Both of them are assumed to be continuously traded. 
2
 For additional information involving two-variable model of the interest rates’ term structure see e.g. Schaefer 
and Schwartz (1984). 
3
 The long-term rate captures mostly the business cycle effects. 
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The default event is triggered any time between the origin of the contract and matur-
ity T if the asset value reach default barrier level, which is considered to be defined exoge-
nously as constant fraction of the face value of debt F times a risk-free discount bond Pt,T 
with maturity T. DB is therefore stochastic given as 
(3.5) 
, ,t t T t TDB HP FPφ= =  0 1φ≤ ≤  
and can be viewed as the Black and Cox’s safety covenant, however extended with stochastic 
interest rate. It results in the fact, that higher discounting rate means a lower DB but also a 
lower discounted value to recover, if the barrier is reached. 
The default time occurs when Vt  ≤ DBt and can be simply expressed as follows 
(3.6) [ ]{ }
.
inf 0, :D t tt T V DBτ = ∈ ≤  
The assumption of an absolute priority rule still holds under this framework, how-
ever, the liquidation cost are not assumed to be zero as in Merton’s model and when default 
occurs, the exogenous cost (1− φ) is taken from the value of assets at that time.1 The recovery 
value at default time is then given as 
(3.7)   
D
D D
TVRV
V DBτ τ τ
ϕ
ϕ ϕ

= 
=
 
if 
if 
D
D
T
T
τ
τ
=
<
 
where φ is exogenously given RR on the assets’ value available at Dτ .The expected value of 
RR will keep varying as it is a function of Vt and interest rate dynamics. Also the value of the 
assets of the firm V is different from the total value of the firm, which depends on the lever-
age and bankruptcy parameters. This holds because the model enables to treat the value of an 
asset V as an exogenous variable 
(3.8)  ( ) - ( )t t t t tV E D L V C V= + +  
where E is the equity value, D is debt value, L(V ) is the present expected value of bank-
ruptcy costs and C(V ) is the present expected value of dividends’ payout.2  
The formula for the value of corporate bond at maturity T is given by payoffs in the 
different states and by considering (3.5) it can be expressed as 
(3.9) { } { } { }, , .( , , , ) D T D T DT TT V F T V F TD V s l T F V Fτ τ τϕ ϕφ> > = < <= Ι + Ι + Ι  
Further there is assumed that all traded securities can be priced in terms of risk-
neutral (martingale) probability measure Q. Since the debt and equity are traded assets and if 
liquidation costs and the dividend payout rate are known, V can be observed by using (3.8) 
and the debt at time t =  0 is given  
(3.10) { } { } { }( )00 , ,( , , , )
T
t
t
D T D T D
r dtQ
TT V F T V F TD V s l T E e F V Fτ τ τϕ ϕφ> > = < <
 ∫
= Ι + Ι + Ι 
  
 
                                                          
1
 For the simplicity is assumed that the liquidation costs are the same and does not change with default time. 
2
 Total value of the firm is in model expressed as υt (V) = Vt – Lt(V) + Ct(V). 
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which can be after some computation (see Pirotte 1999) further written as 
 0 0,( , , , ) Default putTD V s l T FP= −  
 ( )2 20, 0, 2 0 0 2( ) ( ) ( )T TFP FP d DB V lγ −= − Φ − + Φ  } 0, 0,T TFP FP X−  
 ( )20 1 1 0 0 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )TV e d k DB V h lδ γϕ −  + Φ − − Φ − − Φ − Φ   } 0 TV e Yδϕ −  
(3.11) 2 20, 2 0 0 2( ) ( ) ( )THP k DB V hγϕ − + Φ − + Φ   } 0,THP Zϕ  
where 0,TFP  is the value of risk-free bond with face value F and maturity T and 
 
0 0, 0,T TDB HP FPφ= =
 
 
*0,5 T Tγ δ= −
 
 
* 2 2
0
( , ) 2 ( , )T V P P VT u T u T duσ σ ρσ σ = + + ∫
 
 
* * *
1 0 20,ln( ) 0,5T Td V e FP T T d Tδ−= + = +  
 
2 * * *
1 0 0 20,ln( ) 0,5T Th DB e V HP T T h Tδ−= + = +  
 
* * *
1 0 20,ln( ) 0,5T Tk V e HP T T k Tδ−= + = +  
 
2 * * *
1 0 0 20,ln( ) 0,5T Tl DB e V FP T T l Tδ−= + = +  
 
The better look at equation (3.11) can show, that the first parenthesis denoted as X is 
the overall probability of default and expression Y represents the probability of default at ma-
turity { }D TPD τ =  and Z stands for the probability of default before maturity { }D TPD τ < . Using the 
conditional probability, the term 0
TV e Y Xδϕ − then expresses the expected discounted recov-
ered amount in the case of default at the maturity T and 0,THP Z Xϕ in the case of default 
at .D Tτ < Dividing them by FP0,T gives us the recovery rates for different scenarios and 
(3.11) can be rewritten as 
(3.12) { } { }( )0 0,( , , , ) 1 1 D DT T TD V s l T FP PD RR RRτ τ= < = − − −   
The sum of expected discounted RRs for different scenarios of default can be denoted as ag-
gregated discounted expected recovery rate (ERRD). Similarly we can get aggregated dis-
counted LGD as the 1−ERRD and equation (3.12) express in terms of individual LGDs which 
gives 
(3.13) { } { }( )0 0,( , , , ) 1 1D DT T TD V s l T FP PD LGD LGDτ τ= < = − + −   
Finally, the aggregated discounted LGD we can therefore express as  
 { } { }, 1D DA D T TELGD LGD LGDτ τ= <= + −  
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( )21 1 0 0 1 10
2 2
0, 2 0 0 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
T
T
d k DB V h lV e
FP d DB V l
γδ
γ
ϕ −
−
Φ − − Φ − − Φ − Φ
= −
Φ − + Φ
 } { }D TLGD τ =  
 
2 2
0, 2 0 0 2
2 2
0, 2 0 0 2
( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( ) ( )
T
T
HP k DB V h
FP d DB V l
γ
γ
ϕ −
−
Φ − + Φ
+ −
Φ − + Φ
 } { }D TLGD τ <  
 1−  
On the basis of this formula is presented comparative statistics of development of 
PD, and both aggregated and individual LGDs ( { } { },D DT TLGD LGDτ τ= < ). This is presented for 
some sets of the most relevant parameters in the Figures 10 and 11. The costs of default are 
not taken into account and therefore 1ϕ = . 
The part a) shows the impact of default barrier’s level on PD and expected LGDs. 
As it was already mentioned, the higher the barrier is, the higher the level of assets is at the 
time of default which raises the recovery rate. However, the higher default barrier increases 
the probability of default, because it is more likely for assets to drop to the DB level and 
hence PD starts from some level of DB rise. 
Figure 10 
The sensitivity analysis for PD and ELGD to DB and volatility of assets 
LGD(dt=T) LGD(dt<T) ALGD PD
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Source: computed from eq. (3.14) 
For the low level of barrier (with respect to assets and debt level) is the likelihood of 
default before maturity very small, but if it occurs, the loss would be large as the value of as-
sets will be low (equal to DB). Therefore is the expected LGD in case of default before ma-
turity for the low level of DB high and stepwise falls with rise of barrier. Contrariwise it 
holds for expected LGD at maturity time conditioned by no default till maturity. Note, that 
the low level of DB represents the case when default can occur only at the maturity day 
which is the Mertonian case. The overall effect of DB on LGD is represented by aggregated 
LGD curve, which with higher level of DB goes down. Part b) illustrates the fact that the in-
crease in volatility of assets leads to higher PD and expected LGD, since it raises the prob-
(3.14)
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ability of reaching the DB.1 However, if we want to analyze individual LGDs, it is necessary 
to look closer at the ratio between individual and overall PD. For low level of volatil-
ity { }D TPD τ < is very low compared to overall PD and hence the expected { }D TRR τ < is low and ex-
pected { }D TLGD τ <  is high. Oppositely it holds for { }D TLGD τ =  that increases with volatility 
as { }D TPD τ = is falling compared to overall PD. This can be deduced from eq. (3.14). 
Figure 11 
The sensitivity analysis for PD and ELGD to r and face value of debt 
LGD(dt=T) LGD(dt<T) ALGD PD
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Source: computed from eq. (3.14) 
Another sensitivity analysis displays the effects of different interest rates. We know 
that DB is function of interest rate through the value of riskless bond, see eq. (3.5). With rise 
of interest rate the value of riskless bond falls and hence also DB drops. This causes a lower 
RR in case of default before maturity. Also, higher discounting rate means a lower dis-
counted value of recovered amount, if the barrier is touched. The { }D TLGD τ < is therefore in-
creasing in the interest rate. However, in the martingale measure the riskless interest rate is 
also the drift of borrower’s assets, which induces decrease of { }D TLGD τ = . Those two effects 
are against each other, which leads to almost constant aggregated LGD. 
In the d) part the DB is determined as a proportion of face value of the debt. The 
figure presents behavior of LGD depending on leverage of the borrower. As it can be ex-
pected, the PD and aggregated LGD rise with leverage.2 The highest increase in PD meas-
ured by marginal changes is about 1 for values of leverage. 
The presented expansion of seminal Merton’s model by two factor term structure of 
interest rate causing the stochasticity of DB is more in line with presented evidence of the 
business cycle effects on recovery rates. Thus, negative correlation between PD and RRs is 
not only caused by dependency on the same fundamentals of the borrower, but also because 
of decrease of DB’s value in the time of recession. The impact of volatility of assets or lever-
                                                          
1
 The volatility of assets has the same effect on LGD as in the seminal Merton’s model (Figure 8).  
2
 We assume all other things being equal, also the volatility of assets. 
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age on LGDs is consistent with previous simpler models; nevertheless, the presence of DB 
causes (ceteris paribus) overall decrease of LGD. 
The benefit of structural models is their economic intuition, since they explicitly 
state, which parameters trigger off the default event and how is their influence on LGD. 
However, this has also the drawbacks, because many of those parameters are not directly ob-
servable and have to be estimated (e.g. the volatility and value of assets). This represents the 
main difficulty in terms of models’ application, although the wide range of methods was de-
veloped to extract those input parameters from other market data.1 The attempt to overcome 
those shortcomings gave rise to reduced-form models, which do not rely on the structural pa-
rameters of borrowers and hence they do not have to be estimated. 
2.2. Reduced-form Models 
As should become apparent from the previous part, the probability of default and recov-
ery rates in structural models are mainly determined by the value of assets of the borrower, 
which also determines the fair value of borrower’s debt. Contrary to this fact, reduced form 
models do not condition default and recovery on the fundamental values of borrowers and lack 
the link and intuition between credit risk and firm’s financial situation.2 These models take a 
purely probabilistic approach and simply assume that the default event is possible, modeled by 
exogenous default process, without any attempt to explain it economically. Assuming no arbi-
trage opportunity, defaultable instruments’ prices are driven by the market’s expectation about 
default and recovery rate. Our effort will be therefore to use pricing mechanism of reduced 
model for extracting the credit risk parameters from market prices.3 Therefore we need to look 
closer, what assumptions the models have about PD and LGD. 
2.2.1. Assumptions about RR and PD in reduced models 
It was already said that in the reduced-form model’s framework is default unpre-
dictably driven by a default process. This process is usually modeled by a different type of 
Poisson jump processes and if the jump occurs, default is triggered. PD of this event in re-
duced models is described in terms of intensity parameter. This means, the conditional prob-
ability at time t that default occurs between t and t + ∆ (if survived till t), is given approxi-
mately as λt∆. Parameter λ is called the intensity or hazard rate.4 At the basic level, the inten-
sity parameter is constant, what correspond to homogenous Poisson process. However, λ can 
                                                          
1
 Those methods and their limitations are described closer in Chapter 3, which is dealing with empirical applica-
tion of structural approach in the Czech Republic. 
2
 Therefore they are termed as „reduced-form“ models, because they rely on reduced information and do not 
consider firm’s fundamental parameters.  
3
 Examples of reduced-form models include Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), 
Duffie (1998),  Madan and Unal (1998), Duffie and Singleton (1999) or Madan et al. (2006). 
4
 For example, a constant hazard rate of 0,04 for time interval of 1 year represents a mean arrival rate of 4 times 
per a 100 years, what means that probability of default during one year is 1 – exp(–0,04) = 3,92% (for details 
see Appendix A).   
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be also deterministic and can change over time, in this case the default time is modeled by so 
called homogeneous Poisson process. Furthermore, if the intensity rate itself is stochastic, we 
speak about Cox process, where not only time of jump is stochastic, but also is the condi-
tional probability of the jump over a given time interval (see Appendix A). 
Using the hazard rate setting presented above, we can now specify the pricing of de-
faultable bond. Let’s assume constant λ and possibility of multiple defaults. This means that 
every default causes fractional constant percentage loss L of the bond’s price. If we denote Dt 
as the price at time t of a defaultable zero coupon bond with maturity T, then using the Itô’s 
lemma, we can express the dynamics of the risky bond’s price according to Servigny and 
Renault (2004) as follows 
(4.1) 
2
2
2
1 ( )
2
D D DdD dt dr dr LDdN
t r r
∂ ∂ ∂
= + + −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
where the first three terms represent the dependence of the bond price on time and riskless 
interest rate r. The last term shows that when the jump occurs (dN = 1), the price drops by a 
fraction L. If we assume that risk-free interest rate follows dynamics described as 
(4.2) t r r tdr dt dWµ σ= +  
then under a risk-neutral measure Q, it must hold EQ[dP] = rPdt and since expected default 
probability is represented by λdt and EQ[dr] = µrdt, equation (4.1) can be rewritten as  
(4.3) 
2
2
2
10 ( )
2r r
D D D
r L D
t r r
µ σ λ∂ ∂ ∂= + + − +
∂ ∂ ∂
 
and comparing this equation with the one that holds for default free bond B with same matur-
ity 
(4.4) 
2
2
2
10
2r r
B B B
rB
t r r
µ σ∂ ∂ ∂= + + −
∂ ∂ ∂
 
we see that only one difference is in the last term λL. If we solve those equations we can then 
express the price of risky bond at time t as Dt(T) = Bt(T)exp[- λL(T-t)]. The term λL therefore 
represents the spread and is the only difference between price of risk-free and risky bond.  
Even if this example with zero coupon bonds and constant intensity parameter is 
simplified, it shows us the basic intuition behind reduced-form models. This is, that on the 
arbitrage-free setting where all securities may be priced in risk-neutral measure Q, it is pos-
sible to price defaultable bond as if it was default-free by using default adjusted short-rate 
Rt = rt +  λtLt, where r is a riskless rate. In this case, as Duffie and Singleton (1999) state, the 
price of risky bond Dt promising payment F at maturity T can be expressed as 
(4.5) ( )exp TQt t ttD E R dt F = −  ∫  
Similar formula can be easily derived for defaultable securities with more general 
payoffs (see Servigny and Renault 2004). We can see that the adjusted R is composed from 
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riskless r and λL what is actually a product of PD and LGD representing the risk-neutral ex-
pected loss. We see that the risk-neutral spread therefore reflects information about both PD 
and LGD. An important feature for valuation of equation (4.5) is taking λt , Lt as exogenous. 
The assumption, that default intensity rate and fractional loss L does not depend on the value 
of Dt , is typical for reduced-form models.1 
Further using of eq. (4.5) depends on parameterization of default adjusted rate. One 
can either parameterize by some single or multi factor model directly Rt or each of its com-
ponent rt, λt and Lt. The later approach enables to consider better the possible dependencies 
among λt, Lt and rt , or model those variables as the function of the state of the economy, 
what better fits the evidence that λt, Lt vary with the business cycle. Thus, allowing for corre-
lation between λt and riskless rt seems desirable. Intensity rate can be also modeled on the 
base of rating migration matrices as Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) did, who used for 
migration process Markov chain dynamics with default as an absorbing state. All methods 
are trying to obtain reliable estimate for risk-adjusted Rt and for credit parameters λt , Lt . 
 The spread of a corporate bond reflects the risk of default, however, its magnitude 
for given borrower depends also on the bond’s maturity, coupon degree of subordination or 
expected future interest rate (see Litterman and Iben 1991). Nevertheless, market observed 
spreads are not containing information about credit quality of the defaultable security only, 
but also the market risk, the liquidity premium and the tax impact (see Fisher 1959 or Elton 
et al. 2001). Moreover, the influence of each of these segments keeps changing over time 
what makes difficult to segregate them. Therefore, it is not so straightforward to analyze, to 
what extent the change in price is linked to the change in PD or LGD expectations. To cap-
ture other effects influencing spread, Duffie and Singleton (1999) introduced a stochastic 
process l that adjusts short rate as Rt = rt +  λtLt+lt. Thus, reduced-form models can be distin-
guished by the manner in which λ, L and dependencies between r and value of debt D are pa-
rameterized. 
 Presented part considered LGD or RR as an exogenous fraction of debt’s value just 
before default time (see variable L in eq. 4.1). This approach to RR parameterization is in the 
literature denoted as RMV – Recovery of Market Value; it represents the loss given by de-
fault, which is measured as the difference between price before and after default date (see 
Madan et al. 2006 or Bhatia 2006). Another assumption about recovery used Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) who took RR at default as an exogenous fraction of the market value of de-
fault-free bond with the same maturity and face value as the defaulted bond have. This stipu-
lation of RR is therefore referred as Recovery of Treasury (RT) and it tries to consider the 
fact that “...amounts of principal with long maturity should be discounted more than princi-
pal payments with short maturity” (Lando 2004, p. 121). However, sometimes it would be 
more suitable if the bond of the same issuer, seniority, and face value has the same RR, re-
                                                          
1
 However, this assumption is for some cases (e.g. swap contract with asymmetric credit quality of counterpar-
ty) counterfactual and hence is later in Duffie and Singleton’s (1999) work released.  
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gardless of remaining time to maturity or coupon rate. This can be measured as the fraction 
of face value (RFV model). This concept of RR can have legal interpretation based, for ex-
ample, on the assumption of absolute priority or liquidation at default.1 This is also the meas-
ure typically used by rating agencies. RR modeling based on exogenous recovery of face 
value was used e.g. by Duffie (1998) who parameterized RR on the base of those statistics.  
Which of above mentioned assumptions is more appropriate is still investigated. For 
example, study by Madan et al. (2006) tested on a sample of tripple B-rated corporate bonds, 
what assumption has better empirical support and they found out that recovery as a fraction 
of discounted face value (recovery of Treasury) demonstrates lower average error and there-
fore is more empirically supported. Contrary to that, Guha (2002) claims that defaulted 
bonds of equal seniority are traded at identical price, independent of their maturity time or 
coupon rate. This corresponds to framework of RFV. Also, Duffie and Singleton (1999) sug-
gest that calculation with assumption of RFV or RMV generates rather similar results and 
therefore, even in the cases when “recovery-of-face” is the more appropriate assumption, one 
can exploit the more analytically tractable RMV framework. Indeed, recovery concept is of-
ten driven by practical requirements rather than by the quest for accuracy as the appropriate 
choice of recovery function enables to obtain closed-form solution for debt’s price. Thus, 
RMV is easier to use, since standard default free term structure modeling techniques can be 
used, as we presented above.  
Nevertheless, if we want to separately identify RR from market prices, the assump-
tion of RMV is not appropriate, since it allows the estimation of the expected loss only. It 
means that knowledge of defaultable bond prices alone is not sufficient to separately identify 
hazard and loss rate, because they enter the pricing relation (4.5) only through the mean-loss 
rate λL (see Duffie and Singleton 1999). Contrariwise, as it can be seen in Karoui (2005), the 
RT and RFV approach allows for identification of the separate impact of the hazard rate and 
the recovery rate on bond prices. This results in the fact that although the RMV has become a 
standard assumption in credit risk modeling due to its mathematical tractability, however, its 
limitation has lead also to application of RT and RFV assumptions for RR modeling. 
For example, Madan et al. (2006) developed a reduced-form model under RT and 
RFV assumption in which it is possible to extract a term structure of recovery rates. They de-
rived the general pricing solution when the RR is stochastic. Unfortunately, closed-form ex-
pression for price of risky bonds is still difficult to obtain and computational costs of numeri-
cal techniques are high even for one single factor model, by which RR is parameterized. 
Therefore this model has only one factor – interest rate, explaining both default and recovery 
risk. This is according to Christensen (2007) the model’s main weakness. 
 To learn more about the hazard and recovery rates implicit in market prices within 
RMV framework, it is necessary to utilize other additional information relating to particular 
                                                          
1
 It is understood in the sense that debt with the same priority is assigned to a recovery rate depending only on 
the outstanding amount of debt but not on maturity or coupon. 
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security. Das and Hanouna (2007) developed a technique for bootstrapping implied risk-
neutral forward recovery rates exploiting additional information from credit default swap 
(CDS) spread curve. Also Christensen (2007) provided evidence that separation of default 
and recovery risk is in reduced-form credit setting possible using actual data about CDS rates 
for particular issuer.1 Further, Jarrow (2001) proposed a methodology for extracting RRs and 
PDs by using not only the debt prices but also extra information from equity prices. Another 
possibility is to examine bonds prices that share some but not all of the same default charac-
teristics. This quite intuitive and not so technically demanded approach we will examine in 
detail in the following part. 
2.2.2. Extracting expected RR from different bonds’ seniority 
It was already stated that the recovery rate differs by seniority of the debt. This is 
used in the following approach that exploits the prices of bonds of different seniority of the 
same issuer to extract information about possible recovery rate and to get its risk-neutral den-
sity. The following framework comes from Unal et al. (2003) who also state that “...relative 
prices of securities facing identical arrival risks but differing in their default conditional re-
covery rates are an important source of information”. Within this approach there is a new 
general statistics termed as adjusted relative spread (ARS) presented, that may be derived 
from market prices and yields other pieces of knowledge for recovery rate expectation. 
Let’s consider a frictionless economy where two classes of zero coupon bonds are 
traded: (i) default-free bond with price P(τ), time until maturity τ = T – t, and unit face value 
and (ii) defaultable bond with price Di(τ), i ={S: senior bond, J: junior bond}, where its hold-
ers receive the promised unit face value if the firm survives till maturity or reduced value of 
face, if default occurs. As it is shown in Madan and Unal (1998), the price of defaultable 
bond then can be expressed in terms of default-free bond as 
(5.1) [ ]( ) ( ).(1 ( )) ( ) ( )i iD P PD P PD E RRτ τ τ τ τ= − +  i = {S,J} 
where PD(τ) is the probability of default of the issuer and E  [RRi] denotes expected recovery 
for the bond of given seniority in the case of default. The both of those bonds have identical 
risk of default but they have different recovery arising from their seniority.  
If we denote ps as the ratio of the promised face value of the senior debt to the value 
of all promised face values (senior plus junior), then the aggregated recovery rate of the is-
suer after default can be expressed as 
(5.2)  (1 )
s S s JRR p RR p RR= + −  
assuming that RR for senior and junior debt is the same regardless of time to maturity.  
                                                          
1
 Houweling and Vorst (2005) state that default swaps are relatively insensitive to changes in the recovery rate 
as long as the hazard function is scaled accordingly. This would mean that as long as the recovery rates take a 
reasonable value, there is no need to determine the recovery rate for CDS very accurately. 
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By using the equation (5.1), we can get the relative spread of the prices of senior and 
junior debt over the spread of default-free bond and junior debt as 
(5.3) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
S J
J
D D
RS
P D
τ τ
τ τ
−
=
−
 
what is after substitution of (5.1) possible to express without probability of default simply as 
(5.4) [ ] [ ][ ]1
S J
J
E RR E RR
RS
E RR
−
=
−
 
We can see that RS gives the information independently on the PD and therefore this 
approach based on the RS is the pure recovery framework as the equation for RS is free of 
default timing risk. The attractiveness of RS is hence in the fact that it gives the information 
about expected recoveries from observed market prices. Using the relation (5.2), it is possi-
ble to get relative spread in terms of expected overall RR. This is 
(5.5a) [ ] [ ][ ]. 1
J
s
J
E RR E RR
ARS p RS
E RR
−
= =
−
 
denoted as adjusted relative spread that may also be computed from market prices and in-
formation about senior debt’s proportion. The ARS, however, can be also rearranged in 
terms of expected LGD. 
(5.5b) [ ][ ]1 J
E LGD
ARS
E LGD
= −  
As Unal et al. (2001) state, to be able to better analyze the dynamics of RS or ARS, 
it is necessary to obtain the risk-neutral recovery density for variables in equation (5.5a) or 
(5.4). Let’s suppose that RRJ is the function of aggregated RR. It means that RRJ = J(RR). If 
we have a density function for default conditional aggregate recovery f(RR), we may write 
E  [RRJ] as 
(5.6) [ ] 1
0
( ) ( )JE RR J RR f RR dRR= ∫  
and yield the expected value of recovery for junior debt. 
The form of function J(RR) depends on the fact, whether the absolute priority rule is 
violated or not. Under strict APR, holders of junior debt are paid only after senior debt’s 
holders receive full satisfaction of their claims, RR = ps1 If the APR is violated, the proportion 
of the junior debt is paid after default even if senior debt claims are not wholly settled. 
Breaking the APR is captured by parameter λ (0 ≤  λ ≤ 1) which reflects the amount of overall 
RR, from which APR is violated. It means, as long RR ≤ λps, the junior debt holders receive 
nothing. They start receiving payoff and sharing the aggregated RR with senior debt when 
                                                          
1
 This amount of RR satisfies fully all claims of senior bonds. For RR > ps the recovery payments to junior bond 
holders begin.   
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RR ≥ λps. No APR violation is captured by λ = 1. If APR is broken, it still has to be deter-
mined which proportion of recovered amount is paid to junior and which to senior debt. This 
is described by parameter θ (0 ≤ θ < 1). The lower its value is, the more the recovery rate of 
senior claimant in favour of the junior ones is reduced. Armed with all described parameters, 
we can now closely specify the function J(RR) for different scenarios as 
(5.7) 
0
(1 )( )( )         
1
( )
1
s
J
s
s
s
RR p
RR J RR
p
RR p
p
θ λ




− −
= = 
−

−

−
*
* 1
s
s
RR p
p RR RR
RR RR
λ
λ
≤
< ≤
< ≤
 
where RR* is the rate of recovery that fully satisfied senior claims (and other increase in RR 
increases directly junior debt’s RRJ) what is given as * (1 )s sRR p pλ λ θ= + −  
As it was shown already by Black and Cox (1976), the function J(RR) under APR 
represents the payoff to a long position on a call option written on the default conditional re-
covery rate with exercise price equal to the proportion of senior debt ps.1 The violation of 
APR increases the value of the call option by reducing its exercise price (this makes the jun-
ior debt holders better off and oppositely worse off to senior ones). The equation (5.7) can be 
rewritten alternatively as 
(5.8) [ ] *1( ) max ;0 max ;0
1 1J s
s s
RR J RR RR p RR RR
p p
θ θλ−  = = − + − 
− −
  
what can be interpreted, that junior debt holders’ function J(RR) is given as a sum of two call 
options. More accurately, (1 − θ)/(1 − ps) units of call written on the debtor’s expected default 
conditional aggregate RR with exercise prices λps, and θ/(1 − ps) units of call written also on 
RR with exercise price RR*.  
To evaluate eq. (5.6), a second component, f(RR), has to be known. It is assumed 
that RR is normally distributed.2 Nevertheless, it is necessary to make some adjustments in 
order to have RRs between 0 and 1. Therefore there is made a suggestion that RR is related to 
a normal random variable x by the logit transformation RR = ex / (1 + ex) and x is normally dis-
tributed x ~ N(µ, σ2). From the property of normal distribution, using x = ln(RR/1−RR), it is 
straightforward to get the conditional density for overall recovery rate as 
(5.9) 
2
2
1 1( ) exp ln
12(1 ) 2
yf y
yy
µ
σσ pi
   
 = − −  
−
−     
 0 < y  <1 
                                                          
1
 The function of recovery payoff for senior debt S(RR) is represented in the same manner by payoff of default-
free bond and a short position on a put option written on the defaulter’s conditional payout.  
2
 In this case we speak about RR distribution of one specific company. Assumption of normality therefore does 
not contradict aforementioned fact about bimodal distribution of RRs observed across economy.  
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and by using this density function it is possible to express expected value and variance of RR 
for given µ, σ2 as follows 1 
(5.10) 1
0
ln( /1 )( ) 1 y yE y N dyµ
σ
− − 
= −  
 
∫  
(5.11) 
2
1 1
0 0
ln( /1 ) ln( /1 )( ) 2(1 ) y y y yVar y y N dy N dyµ µ
σ σ
− −  − −    
= − −     
    
∫ ∫  
where y denotes the overall RR. With the help of density function one can also determine the 
probability that call options, given in eq. (5.8), are in the money once default occurs. And 
because the price of a call option written on the underlying asset z with strike price k is 
(5.12) 1( ) ( ) ( )
k
C k z k f z dz= −∫   
we can express after rearrangements the price of call written on the overall defaulter’s RR 
with strike k as follows 
(5.13) 1 ln( /1 )( ) 1
k
y yC k k N dyµ
σ
− − 
= − −  
 
∫  
where z is again substitution for RR.  
Using this formula for pricing conditional RR call option, one can get the expression 
for E  [RRJ] from equation (5.8) as 
(5.14) [ ] *1 ( ) ( )
1 1J s
s s
E RR C p C RR
p p
θ θλ−= +
− −
 
and considering the fact resulting from (5.10) and (5.13) that E  [RR] is actually equal to C(0), 
we have all necessary expressions to get formula for ARS from eq. (5.5) which is 
(5.15) [ ] [ ][ ]
*
*
1(0) ( ) ( )
1 1
11 1 ( ) ( )
1 1
s
J s s
J
s
s s
C C p C RR
E RR E RR p pARS
E RR C p C RR
p p
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−
− −
−
− −
= =
−
−
− −
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 where value of call option with corresponding exercise price is given in (5.13).  
To be able to describe the dynamics of ARS with respect to parameters on which it 
depends, following figures present sensitivity analysis for some set of parameters’ values. 
Figure 12 displays relation between ARS and overall RR’s expected value and standard de-
viation. As it can be seen, ARS increase with expectation about future RR. This is obvious 
from definition of ARS. The RRJ of junior debt is an increasing function of overall RR, de-
nominator in eq. (5.5a) has to therefore drop with increase of E  [RR]. Conversely, the nu-
merator will rise, because RR of the junior debt is increasing “more slowly” than aggregated 
                                                          
1
 The derivation is based on integration of eq. (5.6) by parts and then using standard properties of normal distri-
bution. For formal proof see appendix in Unal et al. (2003). 
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RR, since senior claimants are still favored in repayments.1 Alternatively we can look at ARS 
as the development of LGDJ/LGD ratio which comes from eq. (5.5b). Higher expected RR 
lowers expected LGD, but junior debt’s LGDJ will fall to a lesser extent as the recovery 
payments receive more senior debt holders. 
Figure 12 
The sensitivity analysis of ARS to expected value and volatility of RR 
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Source: computed from eq. (5.10),  (5.11)  and  (5.15) 
Higher volatility brings more uncertainty into recovery process. This concerns 
mainly senior debt holders, because their RRS is more sensitive to RR changes. ARS is there-
fore decreasing with volatility of RR. Note that the parameter σ does not represent volatility 
of RR but volatility of normally distributed variable x used in logit transformation. Volatility 
of RR is dependent due to property of transformation on mean of RR, see equation (5.11). 
With E  [RR] approaching to 0 and 100%, volatility of RR becomes zero. Mean and volatility 
are therefore related and it is obvious from the figure, that the highest values have for mean 
equal to 50% and from that point the volatility is decreasing in both directions. 
The dependence of ARS on other parameters is presented in Figure 13. Part a) de-
scribes impact of λ (APR violation parameter). Higher values of λ mean that APR becomes 
violated after a higher portion of senior debt is repaid. Hence, expected RR for senior debt 
increases as well as LGD for junior debt. Therefore ARS is increasing with λ. The similar 
impact on ARS has the parameter ps describing proportion of senior debt among borrower’s 
claims. From eq. (5.15) one can see that higher ps increases the exercise price of call option 
written on the overall defaulter’s RR what decreases its value. Thus, E  [RRJ] falls and since 
C(0) = E  [RR] is assumed to be lower than 100%, the numerator in (5.5a) grows larger than 
denominator and ARS hence rises. 
                                                          
1
 APR violation is taking into account, however, not such a extreme case where would be junior debt holders 
paid before senior ones.   
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In the last part of the figure the relationship between ARS and parameter θ can be 
seen. The higher values of θ indicate that less of recovered value is shared with junior debt 
holders; the junior debt’s expected LGDJ rises. It also causes rise in ARS, see eq. (5.5b). 
Figure 13 
The sensitivity analysis of ARS to parameter λ, ps and θ 
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Source: computed from eq. (5.10)  and  (5.15) 
 As it follows from the presented results, the ARS statistic is related to the expected 
overall LGD of borrower and other parameters describing APR violation. However, these pa-
rameters should be stable for specific debt as they depend on the particular borrower and 
bankruptcy procedures in given country. The dynamics of ARS in the time hence should 
bring an insight also on the dynamics of market expectation about borrowers LGD. Further-
more, this can be acquired on the base of observable information like the prices of debt for 
different seniority and their mutual share and can serve as early warning model for given 
borrower. 
As it was demonstrated, both structural and reduced models are commonly used to 
price credit-sensitive securities and might be utilized for extracting LGD parameter from 
market observable information. While structural approach focuses on company’s develop-
ment of asset value using option-pricing techniques, reduced-form models extend to take into 
account those inter-firm dependencies and default event specify poorly in probabilistic view 
by some type of jump process. Both types of models have evolved over last decade and are 
still developing. The initial restrictive assumptions were in many cases relaxed and the mod-
els became more sophisticated and complex. 
Thus, this part attempted to identify main building blocks, assumptions and restric-
tions of structural and reduced-form models and to present how it can by utilized for extract-
ing LGD. This knowledge is later used in the following chapter, where the structural ap-
proach to identify LGD for particular sample of companies in the Czech Republic is used.  
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3. Estimate of LGD in the Czech Republic 
 "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it is about the future.” 
  Nils D. Bohr * 
The previous chapter presented different ways of extracting LGD parameter from 
market-observable information. The added value of any model comes also from its imple-
mentability, therefore this section is devoted to empirical computation of LGD in the Czech 
Republic based on the market data. 
The basic input parameters for extracting LGD in reduced-form approach are the 
prices of risky corporate bonds. However, the companies in the Czech Republic are still us-
ing more traditional bank loans as the source of finance than issuing bonds (see Dvořáková 
2003). It results in the fact that the domestic market with corporate debt is rather illiquid and 
incomplete and can hence barely reflect market expectations about default and recovery risk 
of particular company or its security. Also reduced-form models are based on the risk-neutral 
measure that is defined as a unique equivalent martingale measure only when the markets are 
complete. The result is that the reduced-form models are nowadays hardly applicable for 
LGD estimation in the Czech Republic. 
The stock market provides an alternative source of information assuming that the 
share prices incorporate all available information including future prospects of the company 
as well as its creditworthiness.1 Structural models for extracting company’s default risk typi-
cally utilize the observed stock prices, stock volatility and specifics about the company’s 
capital structure. Even if the number of quoted companies in the Czech Republic is also lim-
ited, for some of them seems to be sufficiently liquid to apply structural models and estimate 
demanded credit risk parameters. 
As the result, we will implement the Merton’s structural approach on a sample of 
firms, which are listed on Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) and present dynamics of expected 
LGD for each company between 2000 and 2008. We restrict our sample to non-financial 
firms, so that the leverage ratios could be comparable across them. In addition, we exclude 
enterprises that become listed after 2007 to obtain at least one year time series of share prices 
necessary to estimate asset volatility. The list of 27 analyzed companies can be found in Ap-
pendix C, Table1. 
                                                          
*
 Danish physicist, the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1922. 
1
 This is true only if an efficiency hypothesis holds, which was doubted by some studies (see e.g. Sloan 1996). 
There is also a question, whether the volatility of stock price is caused solely by incorporation of new informa-
tion about future stocks’ returns, or if it is caused largely by trading itself (see French 1980 or French and Roll 
1986).  
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On the basis of aggregated indicators (Figure 14) we can assume that the analyzed 
sample is on average less risky than other non-financial corporations in the Czech Republic.1 
The performance expressed by aggregated ROA is for the sample of companies listed on 
PSE higher in the recent years and the ratio between total liabilities and total assets (Indebt-
edness) is contrariwise lower during the whole period. This could indicate that the credit 
riskiness of our sample is lower what consequently means that the average expected LGD 
will be for those companies lower than it would be for non-financial corporate sector overall. 
However, analyzing companies with no traded equity or debt is constrained since one has to 
utilize only accounting information, which is not designed to measure directly the market 
value of the company and therefore can not provide reliable estimates of LGD.2  
Figure 14 
The comparison of analyzed sample with other non-financial corporations 
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Source: CNB (2008), CZSO (2008), Magnus (2008), author’s computations 
Income statements and the balance-sheet items for our set of PSE corporations were 
obtained from Magnus (2008) database and for some of them were completed from com-
pany’s annual reports. Share prices, dividend yields and the number of shares outstanding are 
available on the web of Prague Stock Exchange.3 We used time series of share prices from 
the beginning of 1999 to the end of 2007 and accounting information reported at the end of 
fiscal year. The series of five year risk-free interest rates comes from ARAD database of 
Czech National Bank (CNB). 
One of the difficulties with structural-models approach lies in the estimation of the 
borrowers’ fundamental parameters like the asset value or default boundary. Therefore, the 
following section describes an estimation procedure that is inevitable for empirical applica-
tion of structural model. Next, other additional extensions of initial Merton’s model are in-
troduced to better capture dynamics of company’s credit risk and provide more reliable esti-
mates of expected LGDs.  
                                                          
1
 The comparison is based on the economic results of non-financial enterprises with more than 100 employees, 
which provides Czech Statistical Office. 
2
 Especially for companies with growth opportunities book value-based valuations will yield significantly lower 
values than is the true market value (see Lockridge and Sridharan 2005). 
3
 The information is also available for the Czech companies in Magnus (2008) database. 
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3.1. Model’s implementation 
The computation of expected LGD is based on derivations presented in the previous 
chapter on the basis of the seminal Merton contingent claim approach. It was shown that ex-
pected LGD in the physical measure can be expressed as 
(6.1) 
*
0 1
*
2
( )1 exp[ ] ( )V
V d
LGD T
F d
µ Φ −= −
Φ −
 
However, the original Merton’s model does not include payouts to security holders. 
Those are usually difficult to incorporate and still to maintain the closed-form solution (see Da-
lianedis and Geske 2001).1 The payout structure during the life of the security is therefore al-
ternatively included into models as the interest and dividend payout at the debt’s maturity (see 
e.g. Vasicek 1984).  
Since the interest payouts occur over the life of the debt and they are considerably lower 
than the principal amount, they represent lower default risk. Their neglecting should not hence 
bring important bias into our analysis. However, to disregard dividend stream, as Hillegeist et 
al. (2004) state, could introduce significant errors in estimation of current market value of the 
firm and its volatility and influence resulting LGD estimate. Therefore we modify the seminal 
Merton approach and incorporate into model payout of dividends. 
3.1.1. Payout of dividends 
The original model considers company’s equity as a call option on the value of the 
company’s asset. When the value of the assets is below the face value of the debt at its ma-
turity, the option is left unexercised and bankrupt firm is turned over to its debtholders. The 
equation for value of equity at time t = 0 is then given in (2.14) as follows 
(6.2) ( ) ( )1 2( , ) rTE V T V d Fe d−= Φ − Φ  
If we denote dividend rate δ as the ratio between the sum of the prior year’s common 
and preferred dividends and the market value of the firm’s asset, then the equation for the 
equity value reflecting the dividend stream paid by the firm accrues to equity holders would 
change as proposed by Hillegeist et al. (2004) in 
(6.3) ( ) ( )1 2( , ) exp[ ] (1 exp[ ])rTE V T V T d Fe d T Vδ δ−= − Φ − Φ + − −  
where the additional exp[ ]Tδ− in the first term accounts for the reduction in the assets’ value 
due to dividends distributed before maturity T. The last expression (1 exp[ ])T Vδ− −  does not 
appear in the traditional equation for call option on a dividend paying stock since dividends 
do not accrue to option holders. This term therefore represent the fact that equity holders re-
ceives the dividend and for δ = 0 is this term equal to zero. Equation (6.3) is derived under 
                                                          
1
 Black and Cox (1976) presented a closed-form solution for debt with coupon payment assuming that the debt 
is perpetuity.  
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risk-neutral measure, therefore risk-free rate is taken as the expected rate of return on the 
firm’s value. This rate is however lowered by the dividend rate and hence the terms d1, d2 
have to be modified as 
 
( )20
1 2 1
ln( / ) 0,5
,  
V
V
V
V F r T
d d d T
T
δ σ
σ
σ
+ − +
= = − . 
The empirical use of any structural model is based on variables, which are not di-
rectly observable. Similarly in our case, the market value of assets V and also asset volatility 
σV , must be estimated in order to compute expected LGD.1 The procedure for estimation of 
those variables was firstly proposed by Jones et al. (1984) for publicly listed companies ex-
ploiting the prices of their shares. Their approach is based on simultaneous solving two equa-
tions, which are matching the value of equity E and its volatility σE with two unknown vari-
ables V and σV. The equity data is generally used since actual daily prices are observable and 
equity is the firm’s most liquid security.2 Jones et al. (1984) used as the first equation the re-
lation (6.2). Nonetheless, this equation does not consider dividends’ payout and we will 
hence utilize modified equation (6.3). The second equation linking the observable and un-
known values is in the form 
(6.4) 1exp[ ] ( )E VE T V dσ σ δ= − Φ   
and its derivation uses the Itô’s lemma and is presented in Appendix C. This system of two 
equations has to be solved to arrive at unobservable market value of firm’s asset and its vola-
tility. Due to the non-linearity of those equations it is necessary to solve the system itera-
tively.3 
The accuracy of the expected LGD estimate is therefore dependent on the estimates 
of parameters in equation (6.1). Although some of them as the debt’s face value 4 or its ma-
turity are observable, some assumptions about them must be made to be able to implement 
Merton’s simplifying approach. 
3.1.2. Estimation of parameters 
The implementation of the original Merton’s model requires reducing firm’s capital 
structure into one single liability. Since the large share of the firm’s debt is not very often 
traded, we have to use the book values as a proxy. As a result, the book value of total liabili-
ties reported in firms’ balance sheets is used as the notional face value of the zero coupon 
bond. This approach is often used because equity holders earn the residual value of the firm 
                                                          
1
 The market value of the firm is the sum of the equity and debt’s market value. However, the market value of 
the debt is not usually available since companies are not financed entirely by traded debt.     
2
 It could be also possible to match firm’s bond price and its volatility with unknown V and σV (see Delianedis, 
Geske 2001). However, as it was already mentioned, the bond market usually suffers with higher illiquidity 
than the stock market what could be reason of higher inaccuracies in calculation of unknown parameters.   
3
 To solve two non-linear equations of the form F(x,y) = 0 and G(x,y) = 0 can be minimized the function 
[F(x,y) ]2 + [G(x,y) ]2 (see Kulkarni et al. 2005). 
4
 This holds only if the debt is traded. 
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once all debt is paid off (see e.g. Helwege et al. 2004 or Hillegeist 2004).1 Further, for the 
LGD’s estimation this approach seems convenient as we are interested in the ratio between 
the value of the firm after possible default and the value of all claims that will be demanded 
by creditors. 
To determine the maturity time of zero coupon bond representing all firm’s liabili-
ties, we could compute the weighted maturity of the individual claims’ maturities. Another 
method widely used among academics is to group the short-term and long-term obligations 
and find out the maturity by weighting the maturities of those two groups. For example Da-
lianedis and Geske (2001) made assumption of 1 year maturity for short-term and 10 years 
for long-term debt. The weights would be the book values of claims. However, our intention 
is to provide LGD comparable across the sample of analyzed companies, which would be 
hardly practicable in case of different maturities. Therefore we will assume five years debt’s 
maturity for all companies, which should be an assumption considering the length of both 
short-term and long-term debt’s maturity. By setting the longer time horizon we should also 
avoid inaccuracies coming from the fact that we use for firm’s asset value dynamics poor dif-
fusion process without possible jumps.2 
From our previous discussion is obvious
 
that V and σV estimates are highly depend-
ent through the system of two equations on the value of equity and its volatility. While the 
market value of equity E is simply obtained as the shares’ closing price at the end of the fis-
cal year multiplied by outstanding number of stocks, the value of equity’s volatility depends 
on chosen method of estimation. For that reason it is desirable to use different types of esti-
mation techniques for mutual comparison. 
 The standard approaches of estimating σE can be based on the historical data of 
stock prices or can exploit bond prices for getting so called implied volatility. Bond implied 
volatility is acquired when one chooses the asset volatility such that the price generated by 
our model fits to actual bond’s market value.3 Nevertheless, since this volatility’s estimates 
incorporates all possible errors of used model and also considering our discussion about il-
liquid and insufficient bond market, we will use only historical approach using the develop-
ment of stocks’ returns. 
Let Pi denotes the day i closing price of the stock. Then the continuously com-
pounded one day return ri is defined as 
(6.5) ir = lnPi – lnPi-1 
                                                          
1
 Moody’s KMV model specifies the notional default point as the book value of short-term liabilities plus half 
of the value of long-term liabilities (see Crosbie and Bohn 2003). They put a greater weight on short-term ob-
ligations because debts due in the near term are more likely to cause a default. However, this approach is 
probably more convenient in the first-passage time models than in seminal Merton, where the default may oc-
cur only at debt’s maturity.  
2
 See the discussion in subchapter 3.2.2. 
3
 Similarly, one could get the option-implied volatility for the companies with options written on their stock by 
using standard Black–Scholes formula for pricing option (see Hull 2002). 
Chapter 3 Empirical estimation of LGD 
 61 
61 
and the unbiased estimate of the one day volatility using the m observations of the ri is  
(6.6) ( )2
1
1
1
m
E i
i
r r
m
σ
=
= −
−
∑  
where r denotes the mean of ri’s (see Hull 2003). The appropriate observation interval de-
pends on the time horizon, which we are dealing with. Since we set the maturity time to 5 
years, we should also use the long-term volatility for our predictions. From that reason we 
used volatility of 5-trading years.1 In addition, to take into account the possible changes in 
volatility in the shorter time period, we also estimate last 250 trading days’ volatility simi-
larly as did e.g. Kulkarni et al. (2005).  
The improvement over those traditional methods of volatility estimate that give 
equal weigh to each observation, is the estimate using the exponentially weighted moving 
average (EWMA), where more recent observations carry higher weights. This method, cap-
turing better the volatility dynamics, is recommended in RiskMetricsTM (1996) and for a 
given set of m observations can be exponentially weighted volatility computed as 
(6.7) ( )21
1
(1 )
m
i
E i
i
r rσ λ λ −
=
= − −∑  0 1λ< <  
where λ is referred as the decay factor that determines the relative weights for particular ob-
servation. For our sample of companies we used monthly observations over the five years 
with decay factor equal to 0,97. This value is based on the analysis relating to optimal λ that 
was provided in RiskMetricsTM (1996). 
The fourth and the last method that we used is GARCH(1,1) from class of ARCH 
models that consider the fact that variance of time series returns tends over time to revert to 
its long-run average (see Bollerslev 1986). We estimate GARCH(1,1) model for daily data 
over the five year interval in the form 
(6.8) 2 2 21 1 2 1t t tb rσ α α σ− −= + +  0, 0, 00 1 2α α α> ≥ ≥  
where 20 LRb=α σ ,
2
LRσ  represents the long-run unconditional variance of daily returns r and 
, ,0 1 2α α α  are the weights whose sum is equal to 1. Since we are concentrating on the long-
run volatility, we use only the long-run average variance σ2LR to which the process will con-
vert in the future. The long-run volatility is therefore computed from estimated parameters as 
(6.9) 
0 11
E
b
σ
α α
=
− −
 
However, for some companies was not the GARCH’s long run volatility estimated 
as their return’s time series was not weakly stationary. The GARCH is also unstable, when 
fitted parameters 1 2ˆ ˆα α+ are close to 1. This leads to integrated IGARCH(1,1) model with 
                                                          
1
 In the case of insufficient long time series, we use the longest available one. This holds also for other 5-year 
estimates computed later in this section.  
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additional constraint 1.1 2α α+ = However, the unconditional variance σ
2
LR is not in this case 
defined. Nonetheless, as it can be found in Tsay (2005), this special IGARCH(1,1) model 
can be rewritten as EWMA formula, with that we have already σE estimated.  
For the most of the companies in our sample we estimated by aforementioned meth-
ods four types of daily equity’s volatility. Those must be still scaled to obtain the annualized 
volatility used in later computations. This is simply done by using . #days
annual dailyσ σ= , 
where #days is the number of trading days that we assume to be 250.  
All estimates are enclosed in Appendix C, Table 2. Since the higher volatility of eq-
uity results in higher volatility of firm’s value and higher default risk, the choice of estimated 
σE can significantly influence further results. However, we consider it more desirable to pro-
vide as the rule of prudence rather overstated values of LGD than vice versa. Therefore we 
use the average of the two highest σE estimates, σE* as a parameter entering the system of two 
equations. 
The derived system for obtaining unobservable values of V and σV exploits as the 
firm’s expected rate of return the risk-free rate rf, for which we used the yield of 5-years gov-
ernment bond. Therefore, the last parameter that must be estimated, in order to solve the 
equations, is dividend rate δ. Nonetheless, for acquiring δ, one needs to get the market value 
of the firm V. Hence we use the approximate market value V´ as the sum of equity’s market 
value E and book value of debt.1 Since we are estimating 5-year horizon, we will use in com-
putations the adjusted rate δ* capturing dividend stream in the last five years, instead of one 
year dividend rate δ.2  
We solved the two equations simultaneously by the iterative Newton search algo-
rithm. As the starting values for V and σV the approximate value V´ and volatility of equity 
were used, respectively. In almost all of the cases, the process converges within ten itera-
tions. Note that the equation linking equity and asset volatility given by (6.4) holds only in-
stantaneously, what causes the bias in V and σV estimates when the leverage changes. Crosbie 
and Bohn (2003) assert that a quick decrease in the leverage would lead to overestimation of 
asset volatility and vice versa, if the leverage increases. The impact of the change in firm’s 
leverage on ELGD is presented later in the sensitivity analysis section. 
The Figure 15 presents the dynamics of the average equity’s volatility and estimated 
volatility of firms’ assets. The highest average σV reached almost 25% in 2004 and since then 
it is decreasing to 19% in 2007. The average spread represented by 25th and 75th percentile is 
slightly increasing in the last three years, however, across time it is quite stable in the range 
between 15 to 25%. Note that dynamics of estimated σV follows the equity’s volatility σE*, 
nevertheless, σV is always lower than σE*. This is caused by presence of leverage, since the 
debt is considered as non-traded. With the increase of leverage, the equity occupies a lower 
                                                          
1
 This approach, as Wong and Li (2004) show, overestimates the true market value of the firm. 
2
 We used exponentially weighted average with decay factor λ = 0,9. 
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share in the overall value of the firm and therefore V is less volatile than E. The difference 
between the average σE* and σV in particular years is hence given by the size of average lever-
age.1  
Figure 15 
Development of estimated volatility σV and σ*E  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Vo
la
til
ity
 
(%
)
25 - 75th
percentil
Max
Mean
Min
Mean of σE*
 
Source: computed from system of eq. (6.3)  and  (6.4) 
For estimate of expected LGD in risk-neutral measure we already know all neces-
sary parameters, however, as the risk-free rate can significantly differ from the real firm’s 
value rate of return, we estimate also the expected market return on assets, µV, as the return 
on assets during previous year. We can easily utilize estimated values of firm’s market value 
V and one-year return µV get as 
(6.10) ( ) ( ) ( 1)( ) ( 1)V
V t Div t V t
t
V t
µ + − −=
−
 
where V(t) is the firm‘s market value at the end of year t and Div(t) denotes the sum of the 
common and preferred dividends declared during this year. Since the 5-year expected return 
will not be solely based on a one year observation only, we use in our calculations adjusted 
µV
* again as the five-year weighted average, in which recent years carry more weight to react 
faster to current information. 
                                                          
1
 It is assumed that debt is not traded. Therefore the volatility of firm’s asset depends only on the volatility of 
equity. 
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3.2. Final results 
The initial Merton’s model is based on the framework of simplifying assumptions like 
the absence of transaction costs, dividends, bankruptcy costs, taxes or problems with continu-
ous time trading. The non-existence of dividends’ payouts was modified in the last section. 
Still, one should also incorporate the costs of bankruptcy which result that debt holders in the 
case of default receive less than the total firm value. Additional default costs also arise from 
deviations in APR where equity holders gain at the expense of bondholders. While Betker 
(1997) estimated the direct administration costs relating to bankruptcy around 5% of firm 
value, study by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) indicates higher costs of financial distress in the 
range of 15–20%. Based on those empirical studies we consider exogenous common bank-
ruptcy costs (1 – φ) equal to 10%.  
The final formula for 5-year expected LGD at the beginning of year t in physical meas-
ure, including both dividends payout and bankruptcy cost, is then 
(6.11) 
*
* * 1
, *
2
( )1 exp[( ) ] ( )
t
t V t t
t
V d
ELGD T
F d
ϕ µ δ Φ −= − −
Φ −
 
 
( )* * 2, ,* * *
1 2 1 ,
,
ln( / ) ( ) 0,5
,   and  t t V t t V t V t
V t
V F T
d d d T
T
µ δ σ
σ
σ
+ − +
= = −  
where time indexes represent particular values at the beginning of year t (end of the previous 
year), and µV,t*, δt* denotes adjusted rates considering 5-year historical observations. One can 
get the expected LGD in risk-neutral measure by replacing µV,t* by rf.  
The results are given in the Figure 16 which presents the expected LGD for each com-
pany estimated at the beginning of every year during the period 2000–2008 in both risk-neutral 
and physical measure. The estimates in physical measure begin from year 2001 since we lost 
one observation for acquiring firm’s growth rate. All parameter used for computations are 
given in Appendix C, Table 2. 
In the theoretical framework of second chapter the risk-neutral LGD was always an up-
per bound to its physical counterpart. Nevertheless, this holds only if assets drift µV is greater 
than the risk-free rate. In the conventional analysis the rf rate is supposed to be always lesser 
than drift µV . For example, Hillegeist et al. (2004) compute µV for PD estimates and use rf as a 
minimal bound for µV ,  since their claim that lower expected growth rates than rf are inconsis-
tent with asset pricing theory. However, this approach can result in highly underestimated val-
ues of LGD if the real growth rate is lower than rf. This can be demonstrated from given re-
sults. 
Company Paramo ended year 2000 with a loss counting more than 430 mil. CZK and 
almost 24% drop in the market firm’s value. This negative result has no impact on expected 
risk-neutral LGD at the beginning of 2001 and its value is even below-average for given year. 
However, the physical estimate captures the huge deterioration in firm’s asset value which 
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leads to more than four times higher expected LGD. Also Spolana recorded as a result of nega-
tive development in the market with plastics in 2001 looses about 700 mil. CZK. Subsequent 
year was negatively affected by floods which lead to other losses. While risk-neutral LGDs in 
these years do not incorporate any problem comparing to other years estimates, the physical 
measure counterparts indicate company’s poor performance quite well. The same situation can 
be also found in the case of Lázně Jáchymov in 2001, Slezan FM in 2001, 2002 or e.g. Papírny 
Větřní in 2002 and 2004. Contrary to that, when the growth rate of firm’s assets µV is higher 
than rf , risk-neutral estimates overstate ELGD. Considerable overestimation emerged for ex-
ample in the case of Energoaqua in 2002 and 2003, where ELGDQ is almost twice higher than 
physical ELGD because in those years there was a high dividend rate and low rf in the com-
parison with µV. 
Figure 16 
The 5-year expected LGD in the period 2000–2008. 
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CETV - - - - - - 18,0 22,5 21,4 - - - - - - 23,1 19,1
Č. NÁM. PLAVBA 28,7 26,1 23,1 24,0 22,2 34,8 16,2 13,7 12,5 23,5 28,6 24,6 22,8 34,7 16,0 12,9 12,6
ČEZ 24,1 27,7 34,4 35,7 35,3 30,7 29,3 29,2 24,1 32,7 47,1 39,3 29,6 21,2 18,1 18,7 16,7
ECM - - - - - - - 13,8 18,4 - - - - - - - 13,3
ENERGOAQUA 13,0 24,4 37,7 35,7 33,4 22,4 17,8 14,0 13,6 17,2 22,7 20,8 19,6 17,4 14,6 12,4 12,2
JČ PAPÍRNY VĚTŘNÍ 29,2 23,7 26,3 26,5 21,3 32,4 23,1 23,0 33,6 30,3 52,6 33,2 57,9 33,2 13,0 14,1 36,2
JM PLYNÁRENSKÁ 44,7 38,3 34,4 45,6 32,2 23,8 19,4 14,9 11,6 48,2 21,5 27,7 19,5 14,8 17,4 13,4 11,2
LÁZNĚ TEPLICE 17,7 16,4 16,9 15,5 17,0 17,2 16,9 15,9 14,7 49,5 12,6 11,5 12,9 13,7 14,1 14,7 14,9
LEČ. L. JÁCHYMOV 30,1 18,0 25,9 20,4 19,1 16,8 14,0 15,6 13,3 85,8 49,5 19,7 19,0 17,1 13,7 14,9 13,4
ORCO - - - - - - 21,3 22,5 29,5 - - - - - - 13,2 16,7
PARAMO 30,4 17,6 16,2 20,5 19,5 23,8 25,0 21,4 22,5 78,4 65,4 44,3 16,5 20,6 19,1 18,7 19,6
PEGAS - - - - - - - 28,4 19,0 - - - - - - - 20,4
PHILIP MORRIS - 17,0 25,4 36,9 32,1 31,1 28,9 32,5 41,2 - 15,8 21,7 18,8 20,8 21,0 29,5 41,2
PR. ENERGETIKA 51,5 40,8 42,5 44,0 35,9 28,8 25,1 22,9 20,6 52,7 53,5 40,4 28,5 22,0 18,5 17,4 16,2
PR. PLYNÁREN. 30,2 33,0 34,6 40,3 38,5 36,8 30,9 29,1 26,4 66,7 33,2 36,3 36,4 26,6 19,4 19,2 18,9
PR. SLUŽBY 18,3 25,6 22,2 22,0 20,1 14,4 12,1 11,2 10,7 17,0 22,1 21,9 17,1 13,3 11,7 11,0 10,6
RM-S HOLDING 29,2 34,6 32,7 27,1 34,5 35,4 24,6 12,5 11,4 58,8 50,4 33,4 29,1 31,2 24,5 12,6 11,5
SETUZA 30,0 30,6 28,2 28,0 28,7 29,8 29,8 28,4 27,4 13,3 14,3 17,4 21,3 23,5 31,0 30,7 22,7
SLEZAN FM 26,4 34,4 34,4 32,4 29,4 30,2 25,9 23,1 18,5 88,3 70,4 27,8 23,1 27,9 25,3 23,2 19,8
SM PLYNÁREN. 31,5 25,1 40,6 29,9 33,7 33,7 23,9 21,7 19,2 25,2 36,5 21,1 29,6 33,5 21,5 19,6 17,4
SPOL. CH.H..VÝR. 20,0 16,2 23,0 23,4 24,9 22,4 25,5 22,0 20,0 70,1 37,8 28,1 23,9 15,8 14,5 13,7 13,2
SPOLANA 33,3 33,5 36,1 34,2 35,0 34,9 27,8 27,5 26,6 42,9 76,6 58,5 44,3 45,0 28,9 27,1 30,0
TELEFÓNICA 23,9 32,5 36,7 36,0 33,4 33,3 26,3 22,9 43,4 40,2 49,5 51,7 35,4 32,7 23,0 20,9 37,1
TOMA 29,9 29,1 23,0 23,5 21,0 19,7 23,5 21,4 18,7 67,5 24,2 29,6 18,4 15,6 16,5 15,8 13,4
UNIPETROL 36,1 30,1 26,5 24,8 26,4 29,8 35,0 36,3 31,3 24,0 25,3 23,4 22,1 27,0 18,8 22,3 21,6
VČ PLYNÁRENSKÁ 42,8 34,9 48,6 63,5 56,9 55,3 48,4 49,1 30,7 33,6 33,1 41,1 39,7 42,5 39,0 41,0 28,9
ZENTIVA - - - - - 18,6 22,6 22,9 24,0 - - - - - 15,3 18,7 19,2
Mean (%) 29,6 27,7 30,4 31,4 29,6 28,5 24,5 22,9 22,4 46,0 38,3 30,6 26,6 25,0 19,8 19,2 19,5
Std. Dev. (%) 9,1 7,4 8,4 10,8 9,0 8,9 7,4 8,3 8,7 23,4 18,5 11,7 10,7 9,2 6,5 7,1 8,3
Expected LGD (%) - risk neutral measure Expected LGD (%) - physical measure
 
Source: computed from eq. (6.11) 
 The relatively high ELGD in both measures for ČEZ in 2002 might seem contradictory, 
since ČEZ ended year 2001 successfully with increase in net profit over 26% to more than 
9 bill. CZK. However, the share price drops from initial 101 CZK at the end of 2000 to 
77,5 CZK at the end of 2001 what lead to more than 23% decrease in the market value of eq-
uity. This development together with high dividend rate was reflected in almost 14% deteriora-
tion of assets value and lead to significant increase in ELGD. Similarly, high decrease in mar-
ket value of equity caused the worsening of predictions for Telefónica in 2002 and 2003. 
Nonetheless, the sharp rise of ELGD in 2008 is solely incurred by rash increase in assets vola-
tility. 
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The Figure 17 displays the average ELGD over the period from 2001 to 2008. To pro-
vide comparable estimates across time, we excluded companies which were not quoted on PSE 
during the whole period. The shaded strip covers the quartile range with extending from the 
25th to the 75th percentile, which illustrates the variability of ELGD in particular year. From the 
figure, decreasing trend both in the average physical ELGD and in its variability is also evi-
dent. The expected downswing of economic activity due to global and domestic factors (see 
CNB 2008) was not incorporated enough in the share prices at the end of 2007. Therefore the 
average ELGD at the beginning of 2008 is relatively small, still capturing good economic de-
velopment in the recent years. However, expected slowdown in economic growth resulted for 
some of the analyzed companies drop in the market prices of equity. As a result, the rough av-
erage ELGD estimate 1 at the beginning of May 2008 has raised to 24%, which indicates the in-
crease in the credit risk in non-financial corporations sector. A slight increase in the corporate 
sector’s credit risk in 2008 is also indicated by the creditworthiness indicator reported in CNB 
(2008).2  
Figure 17 
Development of average 5-year ELGD in the period 2001–2008 
* From sample were exluded: CETV, ECM, ORCO, PEGAS, ZENTIVA
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Source: computed from eq. (6.11) 
Risk-neutral estimates are based on the same company’s structural values relating to its 
credit risk, as do physical estimates, except different assumptions about expected growth of 
company’s assets. Kulkarni et al. (2005) even state that since risk-neutral estimates can be cal-
culated without estimating the firm’s expected return, they may provide more accurate infor-
mation. Nevertheless, as it was demonstrated, risk-neutral estimates are not properly character-
izing the actual company’s riskiness. The more µV differs from rf , the more inaccurate results 
they provide compared to its physical counterpart. Therefore, creditor trying to appraise its 
possible recovered amount in the case of obligor‘s default should consider the real future 
                                                          
1
 The estimate is using all other parameters constant except market value of equity. 
2
 This indicator calculates the outlook for the corporate sector’s risk at the one-year forecast horizon based on 
financial indicators of solvency, profitability, liquidity and activity. More details can be found in Jakubík and 
Teplý (2008). 
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growth rate of firm’s assets µV , as the main determinant of the future LGD,1 even if the average 
values of physical and risk-neutral measures can be almost identical (Figure 17). From this 
point hence it is more desirable to use the real physical estimates also for the credit manage-
ment in the Basel II framework. 
3.2.1. Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis relating to initial Merton’s model discussed in the theoreti-
cal section assumed that all necessary structural variables are known. However, the value of 
firm’s assets and its volatility are not directly observable and they have to be estimated 
through the system of two equations, which hold only in the given time. Therefore, the fol-
lowing analysis concentrates on sensitivity of ELGD coming out from potential changes in 
structural variables of the company influencing also the estimates of σV and V. The stress is 
put especially on the leverage, defined as the ratio between total liabilities and market value 
of all assets (F/V ), since this belongs to the mostly watched indicator affecting the com-
pany’s creditworthiness.  
Before we present the ELGD’s sensitivity for individual companies in analyzed 
sample, we provide a general theoretical discussion based on different scenarios of input pa-
rameters. The main difference between the current analysis and the previous one illustrated 
in Figure 8 is caused by the fact that the change in the leverage influences the estimate of 
firm’s assets volatility σV. This was already mentioned in context of dynamics of average as-
sets and equity volatility in the Figure 15. Thus, by leverage’s increase the weight of equity 
in the firm value declines and the volatility is decreasing. The rate of declining is for a given 
set of parameters presented in the first part of Figure 18. This figure also illustrates the im-
pact of increase in the firm’s leverage on the PD and ELGD. However, while the leverage’s 
growth has positive unambiguous effect on PD, the ELGD reaches its maximum value for a 
particular leverage ratio and then starts to decrease. 
The negative relation between ELGD and leverage may look contra-intuitive; never-
theless, this development is caused by the decreasing assets’ volatility σV.2 Although the PD 
is increasing in leverage, the expected value of firm’s assets at the maturity T, conditioned by 
default (VT  <  F ) has increased with respect to given leverage. In other words, due to lower 
volatility σV is less likely that the expected firm’s value will be excessively below the value 
of default barrier F at time T and therefore the expected recovery ratio (VT/F ) in the case of 
default has increased. 
                                                          
1
 Also the risk-neutral estimates consider changes in markets value of company’s asset through the leverage ra-
tio. Still, as we could see, it does not seem to be sufficient. 
2
 The previous analysis reported in the Figure 8 shows the strictly positive correlation between ELGD and lev-
erage. However, the σV was taken as a constant and did not change with leverage. 
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Figure 18 
The sensitivity analysis for ELGD – part 1 
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Source: computed from eq. (6.11) and system (6.3), (6.4) 
 The result is, that by leaving the initial volatility of equity as a constant,1 the in-
crease in leverage causes the decline in assets volatility, which from particular leverage ratio 
(L* – breakpoint) generates a negative correlation between PD and ELGD. Nevertheless, for 
all presented scenarios the increase in PD outweighs the LGD’s decline and expected loss for 
unit of exposure (PD.ELGD) is hence strictly increasing with leverage.  
Pursuing the issue further, we analyze the changes in breakpoints with respect to 
other parameters. The maximum ELGD points are presented for 3 different values of rf rate 
and σE . As it can be seen, the decline in the risk-free interest rate shifts the max ELGD points 
to the left, similarly as the increase in the equity’s volatility (Figure 18, b). It is evident that 
any increase in σE will lead (because of higher uncertainty) ceteris paribus to higher values of 
ELGD. However, the figure also presents the variability of potential ELGDs along the whole 
range of leverages. While for σE = 45% ELGDs vary from 22 to 33 percent, the volatility for 
σE = 30% is only 7 percentage points, and in the case of σE = 15% is the variability of possible 
ELGDs minimal. This further highlights the importance of volatility as a crucial variable for 
LGD predictions and indicates that the companies with identical leverage ratios can have 
substantially different ELGD’s sensitivity. 
The existence of dividend rate in the system of equations lowers the estimated mar-
ket value of the company V, since the part of its value is paid out to the equity holders. Sup-
posing the same value of equity, the presence of dividends increases the estimated assets 
volatility, compared to the state with zero dividends rate. Thus, dividends offset the initial 
lowering of σV given by increase in leverage, which results in higher ELGD and conse-
quently lower ELGD decrease behind the breakpoint. Moreover, the increase in assets vola-
tility given by sufficiently high dividend rate outweighs the volatility’s after breakpoint de-
cline and the overall effect with increase in leverage on ELGD is positive (see Figure 19, c). 
                                                          
1
 The change in leverage will also affect the equity’s volatility. However, since we use the long-run volatility 
σE
*
 
for computation, in which does not the sudden short-term changes take effect; the assumption of constant 
σE in the sensitivity analysis is maintainable. 
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Figure 19 
The sensitivity analysis for ELGD – part 2 
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Source: computed from eq. (6.11) and system (6.3), (6.4) 
Till now we did not consider any differences between physical and risk-neutral 
measure in the analysis of ELGD’s sensitivity to leverage. Since the real asset growth µV does 
not figure in V and σV estimation, it may seem that physical ELGD will differ for given set of 
parameters only in the absolute terms, keeping the same rate of change with respect to lever-
age. The right-hand side of the Figure 19 displays evolution of ELGD for various growth 
rates relating to the increasing ELGD’s sensitivity curve from previous figure (2% dividend 
rate). As we can see, the µV affects also the slope of ELGD’s curve, not only its parallel shift. 
Bad company’s performance represented by small and negative µV will raise the rate of 
growth of ELGD, while good development will offset the presence of the dividend payout 
and the curve will become decreasing from the breakpoint again. The result is that the ELGD 
in the physical measure has lower growth rate in the leverage for the µV > rf and for suffi-
ciently high values of µV may by even the initial growth rate from some point inverted from 
increasing to decreasing (see part d, µV = 50%). This holds also vice versa for low and nega-
tive values of µV. 
The empirical results for the analyzed sample are reported in the following table that 
shows the leverage elasticity of ELGD in both measures at the beginning of 2008. As it can 
be seen, the most of the analyzed companies have inelastic ELGD with respect to leverage. 
Only Spolek pro chem. a hut. výrobu has negative elasticity slightly exceeding 1. The lowest 
elasticity in absolute terms belongs to Pražské služby and the highest positive sensitivity of 
ELGD to 1% increase in leverage has Pražská plynárenská, both in martingale and physical 
measure. 
Based on our previous discussion we can analyze differences in risk-neutral (εQ) and 
physical (εP) elasticity with respect to other parameters. For example, CET or Pr. Služby, 
companies with zero dividend rate and low leverage at the beginning of 2008, are located on 
the increasing part of their ELGD‘s sensitivity curve. However, because µV lowers ELGD’s 
rate of growth and the expected assets’ rate µV is for both companies higher than rf , their 
“physical” elasticity is lower than εQ. On the contrary, Č. Nám. Plavba or JČ Papírny indicate 
inverse inequality between εP and εQ since their µV  < rf . Further, if the company’s position is 
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at the decreasing part of the sensitivity curve, the high values of expected µV will raise the 
rate of the curve’s decline and contrariwise for µV  < rf (ECM, Lázně Teplice, Paramo or Spo-
lana). The dividend payout causes the positive sensitivity behind the breakpoint in the case of 
JM Plynárenské or Philip Morris, however, εP for JM Plynárenská is lowered by µV > rf .1 
Figure 20 
The elasticity of ELGD with respect to Leverage 
Company Company Company
CETV 0,071 0,022 ORCO 0,344 -0,128 SLEZAN FM 0,432 0,493
Č. NÁM. PLAVBA 0,042 0,045 PARAMO -0,393 -0,498 SM PLYNÁREN. 0,308 0,228
ČEZ 0,078 -0,034 PEGAS 0,341 0,405 SPOL. CH.HUT.VÝR. -1,072 -1,095
ECM -0,607 -0,643 PHILIP MORRIS 0,403 0,403 SPOLANA -0,647 -0,477
ENERGOAQUA 0,188 0,080 PR. ENERGETIKA 0,268 0,128 TELEFÓNICA 0,175 0,150
JČ PAPÍRNY VĚTŘNÍ 0,116 0,129 PR. PLYNÁREN. 0,856 0,423 TOMA -0,093 -0,179
JM PLYNÁRENSKÁ 0,198 0,092 PR. SLUŽBY 0,011 0,004 UNIPETROL -0,025 -0,148
LÁZNĚ TEPLICE -0,055 -0,047 RM-S HOLDING 0,022 0,024 VČ PLYNÁRENSKÁ 0,271 0,244
LEČ. L. JÁCHYMOV 0,026 0,028 SETUZA -0,867 -0,890 ZENTIVA 0,012 -0,109
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Source: computed from eq. (6.11) and system (6.3), (6.4) 
The sensitivity analysis further illustrates already pointed differences between risk-
neutral and physical measure. However, the more important finding seems to be that ELGD 
is quite inelastic in leverage and its sudden changes do not incur significantly high turns in 
expected LGD. The possible inaccuracies is estimation V and σV , mentioned by Crosbie and 
Bohn (2003), caused by change in leverage might be more relevant for PD estimate, but 
should not bring important changes to predictions of ELGD. However, the discussion about 
other limits and shortcomings of presented estimates should be accomplished in more details.  
3.2.2. Criticism and limitations 
The first implementation of Merton’s model applied by Jones et al. (1984), Ogden 
(1987) or Franks and Torous (1989) suggested that the model generates lower credit spreads 
than those ones observed on the market do. Similarly more recent studies by Lyden and 
Saraniti or Helwege et al. (2004) showed that basic Mertonian contingent claim model under 
predicts actual bond’s spread especially for low-leveraged and low-volatility companies. 
Based on those findings, our ELGD estimates would be undervalued. However, considering 
the fact that bonds’ spreads reflects also market risk, tax or liquidity effects,2 the mentioned 
studies only confirmed Merton’s inability to capture other components of debt‘s spread, say-
ing nothing about model‘s ability to reveal default and recovery risk. 
This issue can further be confirmed by Longstaff (2000) who has argued that corpo-
rate bond markets are much more illiquid than government bonds and stock market and 
therefore it seems likely that credit spread is only partly attributed to default risk. In spite of 
these well known complications and imperfections, majority of the literature empirically test-
                                                          
1
 The values of leverage and expected assets’ growth are reported in the Table 2 in the Appendix C. 
2
 See our discussion about corporate spreads in section 2.1. 
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ing structural models has presumed that the credit spread is primarily attributed to default 
risk, since the other components are hardly tractable.1 Sarig and Warga (1989) did not com-
pare absolute values of theoretical corporate bond spreads, but only their rates of change with 
respect to change in actual bond’s default riskiness and approved good predictive power of 
Merton’s model. Further, Dalianedis and Geske (2001) termed the difference between ob-
served and modeled spread the residual spread and empirically confirmed that the spreads es-
timated with Merton approach correctly evaluates default risk and residual spread is driven 
by liquidity, tax and other effects.2 These conclusions move towards the correctness of our 
LGD estimates, since accuracy of ELGDs is based on the capturing the company’s default 
risk. 
If we assume that share prices reflect all relevant information considering future de-
velopment of the company as well as the expected conditions for given industry or economy, 
this expectations are also incorporated in our ELGD’s, since they are dependent on the de-
velopment of the stock market. Thus, ELGDs based on market value of equity are forward-
looking estimates which may be used to instantaneous watching company’s riskiness and 
may serve as indicator of early-warning. Nevertheless, ELGD’s stock market dependence 
can also embody excessive movements in the share prices caused by market bubbles. Also, 
the stock market may not efficiently incorporate all publicly-available information about de-
fault probability and especially in a case of a young market, such as that one of the Czech 
Republic, limitations of information given by share prices and particularly by companies, 
which shares are not so frequently traded, should be considered. 3  
For purposes of Basel II framework, the ELGD’s based on equity development are 
procyclical and due to increase in the minimum required capital in the recession would lead 
to the credit crunch and contrariwise to the overlending in the time of strong economic 
growth. The definition of default used in the model corresponds more to the state of bank-
ruptcy than to the obligor’s ninety days past due obligation defined under Basel II. Thus, 
model’s definition of default leads to overstated ELGD; however, the analyzed companies 
should have high capabilities to raise funds. So if the company is past due more than 90 days 
on its obligation, it has probably exhausted all means to raise the funds and the bankruptcy 
will follow. The different default definitions hence should not bring significant inaccuracies.  
The computations also do not consider any debt’s priority, therefore ELGDs for se-
cured and more senior claims should be lower than presented estimates and vice versa higher 
for subordinated debt, however, the distribution of the value of the bankrupted firm depends 
                                                          
1
 This idea stems from the theoretical assumption that markets for corporate bonds are perfect, complete and 
trading takes place continuously (see Dalianedis and Geske 2001). 
2
 Structural models may also understate spreads in short-run, since the pure diffusion process is not able to cap-
ture unpredicted extreme changes in firm’s asset value given by shock. Therefore is also possible to add jump 
process to Brownian motion or to model asset value as a discontinuous Lévy process (see Bhatia 2006, p. 126 
and references therein).  
3
 Č. nám. plavba, Energoaqua, Jihomoravská plynárenská, Pražské služby, RM-S HOLDING, SLEZAN FM, or 
Východočeská plynárenská. 
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also on the violation of APR, what is difficult to predict for single cases. The bankruptcy 
costs were determined by using other empirical studies, nonetheless, bankruptcy laws and 
other procedures differ substantially by country, and may therefore differ in the Czech Re-
public. The calibration on the empirical sample would be needed to obtain more accurate es-
timates, but the appropriate data sample is not available due to low number of defaults of 
comparable companies. 
The computed ELGDs suffer also by others shortcomings, like the assumption of 
constant interest rate, no tax shield, and other simplifications coming out from the seminal 
Mertonian approach. On the other side, more sophisticated models demand higher number of 
parameters, which have to be estimated. This increases the computation complexity and 
might therefore produce higher errors. Also, some introduced amendments relating e.g. to 
stochastic interest rate have unambiguous effects, and sometimes have only little impact on 
the results (Lyden and Saraniti 2000). Nevertheless, the empirical application of more com-
plex models will be the goal of the further research. 
In spite of all mentioned limitations, the presented results are the first estimates of 
expected LGD based on the market information for single companies listed on Prague Stock 
Exchange and should therefore serve as the stepping stone for their further improvement. 
The estimates should not deputize the estimated values of LGD based on historical data, as is 
requested in Basel II, however, they may serve as the early warning signal and improve 
thereby the current credit management. 
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♦ Conclusion 
Among intensively studied topics in quantitative finance currently belongs also the 
concept of Loss Given Default, which is a rather unexplored territory in credit risk area. Espe-
cially with the implementation of the New Capital Accord, LGD has obtained increased atten-
tion and became a frequent object of empirical and theoretical research. The goal of this thesis 
was to present to the most recent pieces of knowledge concerning this key input parameter of 
credit risk analysis. Moreover, the main stress was put on modeling techniques which enable es-
timation of forward-looking LGDs from market observable data, which we consequently used 
to empirical estimation of LGD for the sample of companies in the Czech Republic. 
We analyzed companies listed on Prague Stock Exchange in the 2000–2008 period 
and computed expected LGD for every single company at given year. The average LGD of the 
sample across the time was estimated in the range around 20–45%. We also described the esti-
mation procedures exploiting prices of equity and its volatility and showed, that LGD is rela-
tively inelastic in leverage of the company. We demonstrated that LGD in the physical measure 
is a more reliable indicator than its risk-neutral counterpart. 
The presented results were estimated on the basis of formula derived from asset pric-
ing models. Under structural approach, the dynamics of the value of the firm’s assets is usually 
assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion and therefore it is log-normally distributed. 
This enables us to express the likelihood of default, which occurs in the initial Merton’s model 
if the value of the asset is lower than the value of the debt principal at the time of maturity. To 
gain explicit expression for LGD, we used the formula for conditional mean of log-normally 
distributed variable, because the recovered amount in the case of default is the rest value of 
firm’s assets. This demonstrates that LGD is even in the initial Merton’s framework stochastic 
since it depends on uncertain development of assets’ value.  
Furthermore, we presented the extension of the model when the debt is pledged by 
collateral. The LGD is in this case dependent on two stochastic processes, the first one repre-
sents the value of borrower’s assets and determines the default event, and the second one is de-
scribing the value of the collateral which will be seized by creditor if default occurs. The pre-
sented sensitivity analysis revealed that expected LGD increases with correlation between dy-
namics of collateral’s and borrower’s assets. We also illustrated how LGD can be extracted in a 
more complex structural framework, which incorporates stochastic interest rate and default bar-
rier. As the default barrier is in the model determined by the value of riskless bond, the eco-
nomic recession leads to its decrease, which consequently leads to rise in LGD. Thus, besides 
dependencies on the same firm’s fundamentals, negative correlation between PD and LGD is 
caused by macroeconomic factors. 
Additionally there were also discussed the reduced-form models, which are currently 
hardly applicable for LGD estimation in the Czech Republic because the market with corporate 
debt is rather illiquid. However, we showed a sensitivity of LGD on adjusted relative spread 
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(ARS), which is a new parameter exploiting the observed prices of bonds with different senior-
ity. ARS gives information independently on the PD of issuer and represents thereby the pure 
recovery framework. The dynamics of APR can be used in LGD management for particular 
borrower as an early warning system. With the scope of reduced-form model implementation, 
we discussed the determinants of corporate spreads and based on the other empirical studies we 
concluded that market observable spreads are considerably influenced by other effects such as 
tax impacts or liquidity premium and therefore are not representing information only about 
credit quality of defaultable security. Therefore we decided to exploit information embedded in 
the more liquid stock market and utilized structural models for LGD computation. 
We also closely analyzed general characteristics of LGD and pointed out that LGD is 
significantly determined by the value of assets that can be seized in case of default. Therefore, 
since asset types vary across industries, industry-specificity of borrower is assumed to be a 
straightforward driving factor of LGD. However, the empirical studies give unambiguous re-
sults. Industry-type does not prove any evident pattern for the value of LGD, only utilities were 
among most of studies identified as the industry with lower LGD. The possible reason is that 
different stage of economic cycle can influence LGD more than industry-type itself. Besides the 
cyclical variation, the fact is, that the recession increases default rates and greater supply of 
pledged assets will lead to their lower prices. It results in positive correlation between default 
rates and LGD. We also confirmed this correlation by a linear, logarithmic and power univariate 
regression using Moody’s recovery rates from 1982–2006.  
The joint dependence implies that PD and LGD should not be in the credit risk mod-
eling treated as independent. This link between PD and LGD should be also considered in IRB 
approach because neglecting this correlation might lead to understated capital reserves. How-
ever, it will lead to even higher procyclical effect of IRB approach and cause overlending dur-
ing strong economic growth and credit crunch in the time of recession. 
Moreover, we illustrated that a significant determinant of LGD after default event is 
the position of particular claim in the defaulter’s capital structure. Obviously, LGD decreases 
with the seniority and security of the defaulted claim and increases with its degree of subordina-
tion. Bank loans have usually lower LGD than bonds since they are typically more senior and 
have tighter covenants. However, when comparing different studies of the LGD, the definition 
of default has to be considered. We elaborate default definition as given by Basel II and rating 
agencies and show that the definition under Basel framework is generally weaker and leads 
hence to higher observed LGDs. The unification of definitions is therefore desirable. 
The thesis presented a broad understanding of the key parameter of current credit risk 
area, Loss Given Default. In order to do so, we dealt with LGD’s properties, possible modeling 
techniques, and its estimates from market data, respectively. As the main value added of this 
work are the unique estimates of LGD for the Czech corporate sector. This altogether should 
bring a perspective on LGD and provide better understanding of difficulties related to this credit 
risk parameter. 
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♦ Appendix 
Appendix A 
 Wiener process 
Wiener process is a stochastic process that can be characterized by following facts 
1. W(0) = 0 
2. W(t) is almost surely 1 continuous 
3. W(t) has independent increments with distribution ( ) ( )W t W s− ~ (0, )t sΦ −  (0 ≤ s < t). 
ф(µ, σ2) denotes the normal c.d.f. with expected value µ and variance σ2. Independent incre-
ments means that for 0 ≤ s1 ≤ t1 ≤ s2 ≤ t2, W(t1) − W(s1) and W(t2) − W(s2) are independent 
random variables (see e.g. Hurt et al. 2003, Shreve 1997).  
 Poisson process 
Let Nt be a standard Poisson process initialized at 0 (Nt = 0), increasing by 1 unit at random 
times t1, t2, t3..., and durations between jump times ti–ti-1 have exponential distribution. If we 
consider discrete time intervals ∆t, then the probability of jump over ∆t is approximately 
 [ 1]t t tP N N tλ+∆ − = ≈ ∆  
where the parameter λ is intensity of the Poisson process. 
By dividing the time interval (t, s) into n subintervals of a length ∆t and letting n → ∞ and 
∆t → dt, we get the probability of the jump during time interval (t, s) as 
 [ 1] 1 exp[ ( )]
s tP N N s tλ− = = − − −  
where the intensity is such that E[dN] = λdt. 
In an inhomogeneous Poisson process λ is no longer constant and is characterized by a de-
terministic function of time λ(t). Probability of jump during (t, s) is then given as 
 [ 1] 1 exp[ ( ) ]s
s t t
P N N u duλ− = = − −∫  
If the intensity parameter λ is random process (it means that probability of observing jump 
over a given period is randomly changing), then we speak about Cox process. The probabil-
ity of observing jump during time interval (t, s) is then 
 [ 1] 1 exp[ ]s
s t ut
P N N duλ− = = − −∫  
where λu is stochastic process taking only positive values.  
(see Servigny and Renault 2004 or e.g. Hsu 1997). 
                                                          
1
 Almost surely means: Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space. An event x in A happens almost surely if P(x) = 1. 
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 Itô’s lemma (one dimensional) 
Itô’s lemma is used to find the differential of a function of another particular stochastic proc-
ess. Assuming that x is described by a stochastic differential equation of the form 
 ( ) ( , ) ( , ) tdx t A x t B x t dW= +  
where A(x, t) is the drift term, B(X, t) is the volatility function and dWt is a Wiener–Lévy 
process. The stochastic differential of process ( ( ), )f x t t  is then given as 
 
2
21( ( ), ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 t
f f f fdf x t t A x t B x t dt B x t dW
x x t x
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 
(see e.g. Hurt et al. (2003), Shreve (1997) or Hull (2002) and references therein). 
 The Bivariate Normal Distribution 
The bivariate normal distribution for two related, normally distributed variables 
x ~ 2( , )
x x
µ σΦ and y ~ 2( , )y yµ σΦ , is defined by the following probability density function 
 
2
1( , ) exp[ 0,5 ( , )]
2 1x y
f x y q x y
piσ σ ρ
= −
−
 
where  
22
2
1( , ) 2
1
y yx x
x x y y
y yx x
q x y
µ µµ µρ
σ σ σ σρ
    − −   − − = − +         
−         
 
and ρ is the correlation coefficient of x and y (x and y are independent if ρ = 0). Conditional 
probability distribution function for one of the variables, for known value of other variable, 
is normally distributed with conditional mean and variance given as 
  
0
y
x xx y y
y
y µ
µ µ ρσ
σ=
−
= +  and 
0
21
xx y yσ σ ρ= = −  
if we use mean and variance for ln TC ~ ( )2 20ln 0,5 ,C C CC T Tµ σ σ Φ + −   and y ~ (0,1)Φ we 
get the mean and variance for conditioned ln TC y . 
(see e.g. Hsu 1997). 
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Appendix B 
 The derivation of equation (2.10) – based on the initial paper by Merton (1974) 
As it was said, dynamics of debt security, whose market value is at any time t a function of 
the value of the firm and time, i.e. ( , )t tD f V t= , can be expressed by stochastic equation as 
(2.3) ( ) Dt D t D D t tdD D dt D dWµ δ σ= − +  
where the symbols are the same as in (2.2). By using Itô’s Lemma,1 it possible to rewrite dy-
namics for Dt in terms of Vt as the following equation shows 
(2.4) 
2
2 2
2
1( )
2
Vt t t t
t V V t V t V t t
t tt
D D D DdD V V dt V dW
t V VV
µ δ σ σ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − + + ∂ ∂ ∂∂ 
 
comparing corresponding variables in (2.3) and (2.4) we get, that 
(2.5a) 
2
2 2
2
1( )
2
t t t
D t D V V t V t
t t
D D D
D V V
t V V
µ δ µ δ σ∂ ∂ ∂− = + − +
∂ ∂ ∂
 
(2.5b) tD t V t
t
D
D V
V
σ σ
∂
=
∂
 
(2.5c) D Vt tdW dW=  
In the last equation, it is evident, that dynamics of Dt and Vt is perfectly correlated as both D 
and V are affected by the same source of uncertainty dWtD=V. This proves to be important in 
the following forming of the portfolio that contains x1 dollars invested in the firm V, x2 dol-
lars in the security D, and x3 dollars received by short-selling the riskless debt such that 
3 1 2x x x− = + . The instantaneous return of such portfolio is then 
(2.6a) 1 2 3t V t t Dt
t t
dV V dt dD dtd x x x rdt
V D
δ δ
pi
+ +
= + +  
where r is the riskless interest rate. By substituting (2.2) and (2.3) we get 
(2.6b) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2V Dt V D V t D td x x dt x dW x dW x x rdtpi µ µ σ σ= + + + − +  
Taking into account the equation (2.5c), we can create riskless portfolio by choosing weights 
1,2x  such that the coefficient of dWt is always zero. It must hold 
(2.7a) 1 2 0V Dx xσ σ+ = ,  (no risk condition) 
and since such a portfolio is riskless and requires zero net investment, to avoid arbitrage 
profits, the return of this portfolio must be zero. Formally 
(2.7b) ( )1 2 1 2 0V Dx x x x rµ µ+ − + = ,   (no arbitrage condition) 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix A 
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The weights fulfilling both conditions exist if and only if 
(2.8)  ( ) ( )V V D Dr rµ σ µ σ− = −  
However, from equations (2.5a, b) we can substitute for ,D Dµ σ  and after rearranging and 
simplifying, we get parabolic partial differential equation 
(2.9)  
2
2 2
2
1( ) 0
2
t t t
V t V t D t
t t
D D D
r V V rD
t V V
δ σ δ∂ ∂ ∂+ − + + − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Since it is given by assumptions, that there are no coupon payments (δV = δD = 0), the equation 
(2.9) can be then rewritten as 
(2.10)  
2
2 2
2
1 0
2
t t t
t V t t
t t
D D D
rV V rD
t V V
σ
∂ ∂ ∂
+ + − =
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Appendix C 
 Companies listed on PSE  
Table 1 
Companies listed on Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) at the beginning of June 2008 
Name of the company Abbreviation ISIN Observed years
AAA Auto Group N.V. 1) AAA NL0006033375 -
CENTRAL EUROPEAN MEDIA ENTERPRISES LTD. CETV BMG200452024 2005 - 2007
Česká námořní plavba, a.s. Č. NÁM. PLAVBA CZ0008413556 1999 - 2007
ČEZ, a.s. ČEZ CZ0005112300 1999 - 2007
ECM REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS A.G. ECM LU0259919230 2006 - 2007
Energoaqua, a.s. ENERGOAQUA CS0008419750 1999 - 2007
Erste Bank der oesterreichischen Sparkassen AG 2) ERSTE BANK AT0000652011 -
Jihočeské papírny, a.s. Větřní JČ PAPÍRNY VĚTŘNÍ CZ0005005850 1999 - 2007
Jihomoravská plynárenská, a.s. JM PLYNÁRENSKÁ CZ0005078956 1999 - 2007
Komerční banka, a.s. 2) KOMERČNÍ BANKA CZ0008019106 -
Lázně Teplice v Čechách, a.s. LÁZNĚ TEPLICE CS0008422853 1999 - 2007
Léčebné Lázně Jáchymov, a.s LEČ. L. JÁCHYMOV CS0008446753 1999 - 2007
New W orld Resources N.V. 1) NW R NL0006282204 -
ORCO PROPERTY GROUP S.A. ORCO LU0122624777 2005 - 2007
PARAMO, a.s. PARAMO CZ0005091355 1999 - 2007
PEGAS NONW OVENS SA PEGAS LU0275164910 2005 - 2007
Philip Morris ČR a.s. PHILIP MORRIS CS0008418869 2000 - 2007
Pražská energetika, a.s. PR. ENERGETIKA CZ0005078154 1999 - 2007
Pražská plynárenská, a.s. PR. PLYNÁREN. CZ0005084350 1999 - 2007
Pražské služby, a.s. PR. SLUŽBY CZ0009055158 1999 - 2007
RM-S HOLDING, a.s. RM-S HOLDING CS0008416251 1999 - 2007
SETUZA, a.s. SETUZA CZ0008460052 1999 - 2007
SLEZAN Frýdek-Místek, a.s. SLEZAN FM CZ0005018259 1999 - 2007
Severomoravská plynárenská, a.s. SM PLYNÁREN. CZ0005084459 1999 - 2007
SPOLANA, a.s. SPOLANA CS0008424958 1999 - 2007
SPOLEK PRO CHEM.A HUT.VÝR.,a.s SPOL. CH.HUT.VÝR. CZ0005092858 1999 - 2007
Telefónica O2 Czech Republic,a.s. TELEFÓNICA CZ0009093209 1999 - 2007
TOMA, a.s. TOMA CZ0005088559 1999 - 2007
UNIPETROL, a.s. UNIPETROL CZ0009091500 1999 - 2007
Východočeská plynárenská,a.s. VČ  PLYNÁRENSKÁ CZ0005092551 1999 - 2007
VGP NV 1) VGP BE0003878957 -
VIENNA INSURANCE GROUP 1) VIG AT0000908504 -
ZENTIVA N.V. ZENTIVA NL0000405173 2004 - 2007
1)
 Firm was excluded  - insufficient long time series (issud after 2. 1. 2007)
2)
 Firm was excluded -  financial institution
 
Source: Prague Stock Exchange (www.pse.cz) 
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 The derivation of equation (6.4) 
Let’s assume that the dynamics of equity value can be described by the stochastic differential 
equation ( ) Et E t E t tdE E dt E dWµ δ σ= − + , where Eµ is the equity drift, Eσ  is the standard 
deviation of equity’s return, and EtdW  is a standard Gauss–Wiener process. Dynamics of se-
curity, whose market value is at any time t a function of the value of the firm and time, 
i.e. ( , )t tE f V t= , can be expressed by using Itô’s Lemma in terms of Vt as follows 
 
2
2 2
2
1( )
2
Vt t t t
t V V t V t V t t
t tt
E E E EdE V V dt V dW
t V VV
µ δ σ σ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + − + + ∂ ∂ ∂∂ 
 
Comparing corresponding variables in two equations above, we get tE t V t
t
E
E V
V
σ σ
∂
=
∂
, 
and since 1( )t
t
E d
V
∂
= Φ
∂
1
 (see Helwege et al. 2004), then holds 1( )E t V tE d Vσ σ= Φ . After 
considering our discussion about dividend rate that lowers the value of V, we get the relation 
presented in equation (7.4) 1exp[ ] ( )E VE T V dσ σ δ= − Φ . 
 
 Estimated parameters 
Table 2 
All relevant parameters for the sample of analyzed companies 
(see the next page) 
  
                                                          
1
 This relation is also called option (equity) delta (see Hull 2002). 
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Table 2 - part 1
Company End ofyear
σE 
MA(5y)
σE 
MA(1y)
σE 
EWMA
σE  
GARCH
σ*E rf µ* δ* σV V F δ µ Leverage V´ Equity
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (bill. CZK) (bill. CZK) (%) (%) (%) (bill. CZK) (bill. CZK)
2005 22,7 22,7 21,9 22,8 22,7 3,1 - 0,0 17,5 62,94 16,99 0,0 - 27,0 65,35 48,36
2006 28,2 30,7 27,5 28,7 29,7 3,3 1,2 0,0 23,4 63,69 15,91 0,0 1,2 25,0 66,09 50,18
2007 28,4 28,6 27,5 28,7 28,7 4,0 17,6 0,0 25,0 82,73 12,74 0,0 29,9 15,4 85,02 72,28
1999 37,8 37,8 33,2 39,3 38,6 6,7 - 0,0 32,3 0,09 0,02 0,0 - 22,9 0,10 0,08
2000 35,4 32,8 28,4 38,4 36,9 6,8 20,7 0,0 34,2 0,11 0,01 0,0 20,7 10,5 0,12 0,10
2001 32,2 24,4 23,7 36,7 34,4 4,8 -19,6 0,0 33,0 0,06 0,00 0,0 -49,9 5,5 0,06 0,05
2002 29,7 20,0 19,2 36,4 33,0 3,2 0,7 0,0 29,7 0,07 0,01 0,0 27,4 11,9 0,07 0,06
2003 26,6 4,9 12,7 38,3 32,5 3,8 0,2 0,0 30,8 0,07 0,00 0,0 -0,6 6,2 0,07 0,07
2004 20,5 0,0 6,9 73,5 47,0 3,4 3,6 0,0 40,5 0,08 0,01 0,0 10,6 16,6 0,08 0,07
2005 16,4 18,0 6,8 21,5 19,7 3,1 4,4 0,0 15,4 0,09 0,02 0,0 9,9 25,9 0,09 0,07
2006 13,1 9,6 4,7 16,8 15,0 3,3 13,0 0,0 12,0 0,10 0,02 0,0 17,8 23,3 0,11 0,08
2007 10,3 9,5 4,5 16,2 13,2 4,0 2,3 0,0 12,2 0,09 0,01 0,0 -16,0 9,6 0,09 0,08
1999 35,6 35,6 31,2 39,0 37,3 6,7 - 0,0 17,9 113,76 84,34 0,0 - 74,1 136,83 52,49
2000 36,0 36,4 33,1 36,7 36,5 6,8 -0,2 0,5 21,1 112,36 81,61 0,8 -0,2 72,6 141,49 59,87
2001 38,1 41,7 35,2 41,9 41,8 4,8 -8,0 0,8 24,6 95,30 76,45 1,2 -13,9 80,2 122,37 45,92
2002 36,9 33,3 34,0 39,9 38,4 3,2 -1,3 1,3 26,2 99,83 69,54 2,1 7,5 69,7 124,30 54,76
2003 34,2 20,9 29,1 41,1 37,7 3,8 14,6 1,8 28,4 137,20 78,22 2,9 42,2 57,0 164,51 86,29
2004 32,8 27,6 28,1 38,3 35,5 3,4 41,5 2,0 30,2 264,57 79,22 1,9 96,7 29,9 280,99 201,77
2005 31,9 32,1 28,4 36,4 34,2 3,1 67,1 1,9 30,3 546,00 132,92 1,6 109,7 24,3 568,96 436,04
2006 29,0 29,6 27,4 39,6 34,6 3,3 61,5 1,9 30,8 701,40 161,00 1,6 30,6 23,0 729,52 568,52
2007 27,7 27,0 26,7 29,4 28,6 4,0 57,9 2,0 26,9 942,99 169,56 2,4 37,8 18,0 976,15 806,59
2006 16,0 16,0 16,0 15,0 16,0 3,3 - 0,0 8,7 11,16 5,98 0,0 - 53,6 12,07 6,09
2007 25,8 26,3 23,6 33,5 29,9 4,0 26,6 0,0 11,1 14,13 10,91 0,0 26,6 77,3 16,03 5,12
1999 21,5 21,5 15,1 19,6 21,5 6,7 - 0,0 4,4 0,24 0,26 0,0 - 110,9 0,31 0,05
2000 31,0 37,9 23,3 31,4 34,7 6,8 35,1 0,0 20,2 0,32 0,19 0,0 35,1 59,2 0,37 0,18
2001 27,2 17,1 16,6 26,5 26,8 4,8 39,1 14,1 26,8 0,33 0,15 32,6 42,2 43,6 0,38 0,23
2002 25,9 21,5 15,2 25,6 25,8 3,2 41,8 11,3 25,8 0,45 0,20 6,4 45,2 43,6 0,55 0,35
2003 23,9 12,9 11,9 23,4 23,6 3,8 40,5 8,2 23,6 0,61 0,32 1,8 38,2 52,6 0,76 0,45
2004 22,2 9,7 8,4 21,6 21,9 3,4 29,1 7,9 21,9 0,61 0,13 5,2 5,8 20,9 0,67 0,54
2005 15,0 10,8 5,8 20,2 17,6 3,1 29,5 7,3 17,6 0,76 0,13 4,2 31,7 17,3 0,83 0,70
2006 14,2 13,2 4,9 13,5 13,9 3,3 34,3 3,9 13,9 1,09 0,14 3,0 47,2 12,9 1,16 1,02
2007 10,8 5,6 3,3 11,7 11,2 4,0 23,3 2,4 11,1 1,12 0,29 0,0 3,5 25,5 1,27 0,98
1999 44,8 44,8 41,6 45,2 45,0 6,7 - 0,0 22,9 0,43 0,30 0,0 - 71,3 0,51 0,20
2000 41,1 37,0 35,3 40,7 40,9 6,8 -0,9 0,0 15,7 0,42 0,38 0,0 -0,9 89,1 0,53 0,15
2001 43,4 47,8 39,0 44,5 46,1 4,8 -15,6 0,0 17,7 0,31 0,25 0,0 -26,7 81,9 0,36 0,11
2002 40,0 27,2 31,4 40,9 40,4 3,2 -6,1 0,0 20,4 0,33 0,20 0,0 6,4 59,6 0,35 0,16
2003 39,8 38,6 30,2 42,0 40,9 3,8 -18,0 0,0 12,3 0,20 0,18 0,0 -38,6 86,8 0,23 0,06
2004 42,0 53,5 35,7 45,7 49,6 3,4 2,2 0,0 26,1 0,29 0,17 0,0 43,5 59,1 0,31 0,14
2005 45,6 54,2 41,7 49,3 51,8 3,1 43,0 0,0 12,5 0,65 0,61 0,0 126,1 92,5 0,74 0,13
2006 45,8 48,7 42,9 51,8 50,2 3,3 30,6 0,0 12,7 0,58 0,53 0,0 -11,5 92,2 0,66 0,12
2007 50,9 56,7 47,6 51,3 54,0 4,0 -8,0 0,0 53,1 0,04 0,00 0,0 -92,8 2,0 0,04 0,04
1999 32,9 32,9 26,2 32,2 32,9 6,7 - 1,4 25,7 5,41 7,55 1,4 - 139,7 9,78 2,23
2000 24,1 8,5 13,4 n.a. 18,8 6,8 11,0 1,3 18,8 5,29 7,78 1,2 11,0 146,9 10,43 2,65
2001 20,5 9,6 9,3 n.a. 15,0 4,8 16,5 1,9 15,0 6,68 8,69 2,8 20,7 130,1 11,90 3,21
2002 21,4 23,9 11,2 n.a. 22,7 3,2 22,0 2,6 22,7 8,14 10,58 3,6 29,2 130,0 14,52 3,94
2003 19,1 0,2 7,1 n.a. 13,1 3,8 14,1 3,0 13,1 8,19 9,60 3,9 0,3 117,2 13,53 3,93
2004 12,1 0,0 3,4 n.a. 7,8 3,4 9,6 3,8 7,8 8,05 8,41 5,0 0,3 104,6 12,35 3,93
2005 13,7 16,4 5,1 n.a. 15,0 3,1 10,7 5,5 15,0 7,08 2,74 8,4 13,5 38,7 9,79 7,05
2006 13,4 6,9 3,9 n.a. 10,1 3,3 13,4 6,9 10,1 7,77 2,92 9,1 21,2 37,5 10,69 7,77
2007 8,1 0,0 1,9 n.a. 5,0 4,0 11,3 6,8 5,0 7,77 3,55 6,0 10,8 45,7 11,33 7,77
1999 27,0 27,0 23,1 29,7 28,3 6,7 - 0,0 10,5 0,13 0,12 0,0 - 88,3 0,17 0,05
2000 24,3 21,3 18,2 24,4 24,3 6,8 -15,0 0,0 9,8 0,11 0,10 0,0 -15,0 84,0 0,14 0,05
2001 25,8 28,7 19,8 25,7 27,3 4,8 26,7 0,0 9,5 0,18 0,15 0,0 58,0 83,2 0,21 0,06
2002 23,5 14,3 15,7 23,3 23,4 3,2 36,1 0,0 8,4 0,27 0,20 0,0 48,5 75,0 0,30 0,10
2003 23,5 23,3 16,4 23,4 23,5 3,8 30,6 0,0 11,7 0,32 0,20 0,0 21,2 60,7 0,36 0,16
2004 21,6 17,8 14,1 23,4 22,5 3,4 24,7 0,0 13,0 0,36 0,18 0,0 12,5 50,0 0,39 0,21
2005 20,6 15,5 11,2 22,6 21,6 3,1 19,7 0,0 13,3 0,36 0,16 0,0 0,0 44,8 0,39 0,22
2006 17,0 11,9 8,0 21,5 19,2 3,3 10,8 0,0 13,4 0,37 0,13 0,0 1,6 35,8 0,39 0,26
2007 16,0 6,2 5,9 18,1 17,1 4,0 3,1 0,0 11,2 0,36 0,15 0,0 -3,8 41,8 0,38 0,23
1999 42,8 42,8 35,3 42,0 42,8 6,7 - 0,0 26,3 0,58 0,32 0,0 - 55,4 0,67 0,35
2000 33,9 20,5 18,7 n.a. 27,2 6,8 -41,3 0,0 11,7 0,34 0,28 0,0 -41,3 80,6 0,42 0,15
2001 30,3 21,3 17,7 48,2 39,2 4,8 -18,0 0,0 20,1 0,34 0,22 0,0 -0,5 63,7 0,38 0,17
2002 28,0 19,5 15,0 28,1 28,1 3,2 5,3 0,0 16,6 0,46 0,22 0,0 35,8 48,2 0,49 0,27
2003 25,8 13,3 12,2 25,6 25,7 3,8 4,2 0,0 15,4 0,47 0,23 0,0 2,4 48,3 0,51 0,28
2004 17,8 9,9 7,4 23,9 20,9 3,4 2,1 0,0 14,3 0,46 0,17 0,0 -2,3 37,4 0,49 0,32
2005 14,9 0,0 4,7 16,3 15,6 3,1 5,0 0,0 10,6 0,47 0,17 0,0 0,8 37,5 0,49 0,32
2006 13,4 15,7 4,1 21,4 18,6 3,3 7,9 0,0 13,9 0,52 0,16 0,0 12,4 29,8 0,55 0,39
2007 11,1 9,8 3,8 17,1 14,1 4,0 3,4 0,0 11,5 0,53 0,12 0,0 0,9 22,7 0,55 0,43
2005 21,0 21,0 19,6 35,9 28,5 3,1 - 0,0 18,9 29,57 11,58 0,0 - 39,2 31,18 19,60
2006 25,8 29,6 24,6 31,7 30,7 3,3 76,4 0,2 18,1 51,91 26,72 0,4 76,4 51,5 56,57 29,86
2007 26,7 28,1 25,6 28,8 28,4 4,0 34,4 0,4 17,0 53,07 52,69 0,5 3,0 99,3 76,15 23,46
1999 50,1 50,1 48,8 49,9 50,1 6,7 - 0,0 22,4 2,68 2,18 0,0 - 81,5 3,27 1,09
2000 46,1 40,9 40,3 51,3 48,7 6,8 -24,3 0,0 7,0 2,03 2,51 0,0 -24,3 123,7 2,74 0,24
2001 40,9 27,4 32,7 42,7 41,8 4,8 -17,1 0,0 6,1 1,79 1,98 0,0 -11,6 110,7 2,21 0,23
2002 39,1 33,1 28,3 44,0 41,5 3,2 -11,7 0,0 11,1 1,71 1,51 0,0 -4,7 88,2 1,91 0,41
2003 37,1 27,0 24,6 39,7 38,4 3,8 9,6 0,0 10,5 2,50 2,24 0,0 46,5 89,6 2,87 0,63
2004 32,2 28,2 22,8 39,3 35,8 3,4 11,3 0,0 18,2 2,87 1,69 0,0 15,0 58,9 3,12 1,42
2005 33,0 45,5 29,6 39,2 42,4 3,1 16,7 0,0 17,0 3,42 2,47 0,0 19,1 72,0 3,74 1,28
2006 34,2 33,8 30,6 35,8 35,0 3,3 9,5 0,0 14,2 3,01 2,14 0,0 -12,0 71,1 3,32 1,18
2007 33,2 27,6 28,8 34,8 34,0 4,0 11,2 0,0 16,6 3,35 2,12 0,0 11,2 63,2 3,71 1,60
2006 28,6 28,6 28,6 25,3 28,6 3,3 - 1,7 23,3 9,63 4,78 1,7 - 49,6 11,73 6,95
2007 20,9 20,6 20,2 20,6 20,7 4,0 0,3 0,7 15,4 9,66 4,47 0,0 0,3 46,3 11,40 6,93
2000 13,8 13,8 10,5 12,5 13,8 6,8 - 12,4 13,8 12,74 3,46 12,4 - 27,2 14,47 11,01
2001 23,3 24,0 20,3 n.a. 23,7 4,8 63,8 15,5 23,7 17,46 3,21 17,9 63,8 18,4 19,06 15,85
2002 29,2 34,5 26,8 33,3 33,9 3,2 60,7 15,4 33,9 23,69 4,69 15,3 58,5 19,8 26,03 21,34
2003 28,3 26,2 25,8 29,5 28,9 3,8 61,0 14,0 28,9 33,90 7,61 11,5 61,4 22,4 37,70 30,10
2004 28,9 31,0 26,9 29,4 30,2 3,4 44,9 13,2 30,2 35,24 6,27 11,5 16,9 17,8 38,37 32,10
2005 29,0 28,4 26,9 29,1 29,1 3,1 35,7 11,3 29,1 38,14 6,42 7,4 16,9 16,8 41,34 34,93
2006 30,6 32,0 27,6 29,9 31,3 3,3 10,6 9,2 31,3 23,39 5,28 6,3 -34,4 22,6 26,03 20,74
2007 28,6 25,0 26,0 29,9 29,3 4,0 3,9 8,6 29,3 21,37 12,38 8,8 1,7 57,9 27,56 15,18
1999 50,1 50,1 44,0 48,3 50,1 6,7 - 4,7 47,8 6,77 3,24 4,7 - 47,9 7,88 4,64
2000 38,1 19,5 26,5 28,5 33,3 6,8 -4,4 4,7 33,3 5,86 3,52 4,7 -4,4 60,0 7,86 4,35
2001 33,0 19,0 20,9 26,7 29,9 4,8 -0,3 5,0 29,9 5,12 3,87 5,5 2,9 75,6 7,79 3,92
2002 33,5 35,0 21,0 31,0 34,3 3,2 7,0 6,2 34,3 5,92 3,22 8,3 16,6 54,4 7,79 4,57
2003 30,6 14,3 17,2 25,3 28,0 3,8 21,6 6,4 28,0 7,27 3,56 6,8 46,8 49,0 10,16 6,60
2004 21,8 14,7 12,7 22,9 22,4 3,4 22,5 6,5 22,4 8,23 3,64 6,3 24,5 44,2 11,52 7,88
2005 21,8 19,3 13,8 24,7 23,2 3,1 30,5 6,5 23,2 11,31 3,08 5,9 40,4 27,3 14,32 11,24
2006 21,1 14,7 12,6 18,9 20,0 3,3 25,4 7,6 20,0 10,91 3,20 9,8 8,3 29,4 14,06 10,86
2007 16,7 19,8 13,5 20,1 20,0 4,0 29,3 5,1 20,0 15,05 3,67 0,0 35,4 24,4 18,71 15,04
1999 28,0 28,0 19,5 28,1 28,1 6,7 - 1,1 21,2 3,63 3,06 1,1 - 84,1 5,36 2,30
2000 22,0 13,4 12,2 20,0 21,0 6,8 -4,7 1,0 19,2 3,01 3,48 0,9 -4,7 115,5 5,34 1,86
2001 21,0 18,9 12,1 19,6 20,3 4,8 7,4 0,9 18,9 3,64 4,21 0,8 16,4 115,7 6,24 2,03
2002 22,4 26,1 12,1 21,0 24,3 3,2 5,7 1,8 23,7 3,78 3,90 3,2 3,6 103,2 6,04 2,14
2003 20,8 12,3 9,5 19,4 20,1 3,8 6,5 2,8 20,1 3,57 3,99 4,8 8,0 111,5 6,12 2,13
2004 16,8 6,8 6,5 17,8 17,3 3,4 11,9 3,2 17,3 4,34 4,88 3,8 22,9 112,5 7,23 2,35
2005 17,0 14,3 6,2 14,6 15,8 3,1 20,2 3,0 15,8 5,38 5,14 2,0 33,3 95,5 8,77 3,64
2006 16,2 15,0 5,4 16,1 16,1 3,3 21,9 3,1 16,1 6,21 5,37 2,7 24,6 86,5 10,14 4,77
2007 11,7 7,2 3,8 13,9 12,8 4,0 16,0 2,1 12,8 6,16 6,24 0,0 -0,4 101,3 10,54 4,31
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Table 2 - part 2
Company End ofyear
σE 
MA(5y)
σE 
MA(1y)
σE 
EWMA
σE  
GARCH
σ*E rf µ* δ* σV V F δ µ Leverage V´ Equity
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (bill. CZK) (bill. CZK) (%) (%) (%) (bill. CZK) (bill. CZK)
1999 27,2 27,2 24,1 28,4 27,8 6,7 - 0,0 11,9 0,72 0,58 0,0 - 80,4 0,88 0,30
2000 33,2 38,3 28,6 33,8 36,1 6,8 44,4 0,0 21,9 1,04 0,58 0,0 44,4 56,0 1,20 0,62
2001 30,0 22,2 22,3 29,5 29,8 4,8 5,4 0,0 25,8 0,79 0,13 0,0 -23,8 17,0 0,82 0,69
2002 28,4 22,5 19,5 30,2 29,3 3,2 3,5 0,0 25,1 0,80 0,13 0,0 0,9 16,9 0,82 0,68
2003 27,3 22,2 16,9 28,7 28,0 3,8 30,4 0,0 25,8 1,42 0,13 0,0 77,1 9,3 1,44 1,31
2004 24,4 0,0 10,3 n.a. 17,3 3,4 20,8 0,0 15,8 1,43 0,15 0,0 1,3 10,5 1,46 1,31
2005 17,4 0,0 5,3 n.a. 11,4 3,1 14,8 0,0 9,6 1,55 0,28 0,0 7,9 18,1 1,59 1,31
2006 14,2 0,0 2,8 n.a. 8,5 3,3 13,1 0,0 7,1 1,56 0,29 0,0 0,6 18,9 1,60 1,31
2007 10,1 3,0 1,4 n.a. 6,6 4,0 10,6 0,0 5,5 1,59 0,31 0,0 2,4 19,6 1,65 1,34
1999 38,9 38,9 34,0 39,5 39,2 6,7 - 0,5 36,5 3,47 0,46 0,5 - 13,3 3,60 3,14
2000 41,7 44,4 31,7 47,4 45,9 6,8 -33,6 0,2 39,1 2,30 0,52 0,0 -33,6 22,5 2,45 1,93
2001 36,9 24,6 25,8 38,8 37,8 4,8 -26,5 2,4 36,2 1,72 0,35 5,2 -21,2 20,2 1,80 1,45
2002 33,0 16,7 19,8 35,2 34,1 3,2 -15,6 1,5 33,2 1,70 0,20 0,0 -1,2 11,7 1,73 1,53
2003 30,2 14,6 15,3 32,9 31,6 3,8 16,7 22,2 31,6 1,73 0,25 64,6 72,6 14,5 1,86 1,61
2004 26,2 19,7 13,9 30,7 28,4 3,4 10,9 16,6 28,4 1,72 0,46 0,0 -1,0 26,7 1,95 1,49
2005 18,2 13,1 11,0 25,9 22,0 3,1 3,2 12,4 22,0 1,32 0,29 0,0 -23,1 21,8 1,46 1,18
2006 14,5 0,0 6,5 16,8 15,6 3,3 0,6 8,9 15,6 1,18 0,01 0,0 -10,4 1,0 1,19 1,18
2007 12,6 5,1 4,5 13,8 13,2 4,0 -1,1 6,7 13,2 1,12 0,00 0,0 -5,2 0,4 1,12 1,12
1999 37,7 37,7 29,3 37,7 37,7 6,7 - 0,0 18,7 1,41 1,49 0,0 - 105,6 1,82 0,33
2000 37,0 36,2 25,7 36,5 36,7 6,8 87,4 0,0 18,0 2,64 3,06 0,0 87,4 115,6 3,51 0,46
2001 33,2 23,7 23,2 33,7 33,4 4,8 44,4 0,0 14,7 2,96 3,38 0,0 12,1 114,2 3,68 0,30
2002 33,2 33,4 23,9 39,2 36,3 3,2 21,3 0,0 14,0 2,70 2,92 0,0 -9,0 108,4 3,12 0,20
2003 32,2 27,7 21,5 40,0 36,1 3,8 13,8 0,0 15,1 2,72 2,93 0,0 0,8 107,9 3,21 0,28
2004 28,4 15,5 17,5 41,2 34,8 3,4 12,1 0,0 17,2 2,95 2,91 0,0 8,6 98,5 3,39 0,48
2005 24,4 16,5 14,5 38,9 31,6 3,1 1,7 0,0 18,0 2,90 2,66 0,0 -1,6 91,7 3,27 0,61
2006 23,8 20,7 13,8 27,4 25,6 3,3 0,7 0,0 17,8 2,94 2,56 0,0 1,2 87,2 3,32 0,76
2007 19,0 9,5 9,7 28,0 23,5 4,0 10,7 0,0 16,0 3,78 3,63 0,0 28,8 95,9 4,43 0,80
1999 21,4 21,4 14,9 22,1 21,7 6,7 - 0,0 13,0 0,72 0,92 0,0 - 127,2 0,98 0,06
2000 16,9 10,6 8,4 18,7 17,8 6,8 -32,0 0,2 10,6 0,49 0,87 0,4 -32,0 179,0 0,92 0,05
2001 19,7 23,5 10,4 19,9 21,7 4,8 -16,1 0,4 16,2 0,46 0,62 0,6 -4,1 133,4 0,77 0,15
2002 22,5 29,5 14,7 30,8 30,2 3,2 8,5 0,5 18,5 0,65 0,65 0,5 40,8 100,0 0,92 0,27
2003 20,9 12,7 10,9 30,8 25,9 3,8 12,8 0,5 17,3 0,77 0,73 0,5 20,3 94,8 1,12 0,39
2004 19,6 12,8 9,2 28,1 23,9 3,4 5,7 0,4 16,3 0,70 0,73 0,1 -8,8 103,9 1,05 0,32
2005 20,8 19,6 10,9 n.a. 20,2 3,1 3,7 0,3 14,0 0,64 0,61 0,1 -9,4 96,1 0,94 0,33
2006 17,8 0,0 6,8 n.a. 12,3 3,3 3,2 0,2 12,0 0,64 0,61 0,1 0,4 96,4 0,94 0,33
2007 12,0 0,0 3,5 n.a. 7,7 4,0 2,7 0,1 7,7 0,71 0,75 0,0 10,6 106,3 1,08 0,33
1999 28,1 28,1 18,3 28,4 28,3 6,7 - 0,8 21,2 4,96 4,60 0,8 - 92,6 7,26 2,66
2000 22,2 13,9 12,3 21,0 21,6 6,8 6,7 0,3 15,8 5,30 5,12 0,0 6,7 96,6 7,86 2,74
2001 25,8 32,0 17,1 35,3 33,6 4,8 9,3 1,2 24,8 5,69 6,30 2,3 11,2 110,7 8,84 2,54
2002 26,4 28,0 17,0 36,2 32,1 3,2 22,1 0,7 20,8 7,90 5,75 0,0 38,8 72,7 10,09 4,34
2003 23,7 3,5 11,1 45,6 34,6 3,8 10,5 1,4 25,4 6,89 4,51 2,9 -9,6 65,4 8,70 4,20
2004 21,0 14,2 8,8 27,2 24,1 3,4 3,5 2,4 24,1 5,82 3,95 4,2 -10,8 67,8 7,80 3,85
2005 21,2 15,1 8,6 26,4 23,8 3,1 12,0 4,2 23,8 7,02 1,67 7,3 30,3 23,8 7,85 6,18
2006 17,5 17,6 8,2 24,8 21,2 3,3 11,6 5,8 21,2 7,08 1,62 8,7 10,6 22,9 7,89 6,27
2007 12,5 4,9 5,2 22,8 17,6 4,0 12,0 8,1 17,6 7,48 1,76 11,5 19,2 23,6 8,36 6,60
1999 47,3 47,3 44,4 46,6 47,3 6,7 - 0,0 9,7 1,43 1,63 0,0 - 114,6 1,88 0,25
2000 41,3 34,2 36,9 41,0 41,2 6,8 -18,1 0,0 6,1 1,17 1,42 0,0 -18,1 121,7 1,57 0,15
2001 41,5 41,5 38,0 41,4 41,5 4,8 -8,0 0,0 14,5 1,16 0,99 0,0 -0,4 85,5 1,37 0,37
2002 41,7 42,3 37,2 42,5 42,4 3,2 -2,4 0,0 14,8 1,22 0,96 0,0 5,0 78,8 1,35 0,39
2003 39,3 28,0 31,5 40,4 39,9 3,8 5,5 0,0 17,9 1,45 0,99 0,0 19,1 68,2 1,61 0,62
2004 35,7 30,1 28,3 40,9 38,3 3,4 23,6 0,0 14,5 2,34 1,76 0,0 60,8 75,1 2,59 0,83
2005 39,8 52,3 35,4 43,8 48,1 3,1 45,1 0,0 16,2 4,19 3,39 0,0 79,3 80,9 4,64 1,25
2006 39,1 37,8 35,5 46,4 42,7 3,3 34,8 0,0 12,8 4,31 3,67 0,0 2,8 85,2 4,84 1,16
2007 36,7 30,1 32,9 40,4 38,5 4,0 30,4 0,0 11,1 4,92 4,38 0,0 14,2 88,9 5,68 1,30
1999 44,0 44,0 39,4 44,4 44,2 6,7 - 0,0 18,4 5,29 6,79 0,0 - 128,5 7,20 0,40
2000 39,4 34,2 31,8 40,1 39,8 6,8 -0,7 0,0 19,0 5,25 6,59 0,0 -0,7 125,5 7,13 0,54
2001 40,2 41,7 34,2 40,5 41,1 4,8 -26,3 0,0 23,0 2,86 2,94 0,0 -45,5 102,6 3,48 0,54
2002 40,5 41,7 32,9 43,3 42,5 3,2 -13,8 0,0 19,8 2,94 3,05 0,0 2,7 103,7 3,37 0,33
2003 37,3 19,2 24,8 39,9 38,6 3,8 -4,5 0,0 21,7 3,28 3,26 0,0 11,4 99,4 3,82 0,56
2004 33,7 25,9 21,7 38,9 36,3 3,4 -5,8 0,0 22,2 3,00 2,82 0,0 -8,4 94,0 3,42 0,60
2005 37,8 50,9 29,7 51,7 51,3 3,1 1,6 0,0 18,3 3,54 2,80 0,0 18,0 79,2 3,91 1,11
2006 36,2 34,4 28,9 62,2 49,2 3,3 3,9 0,0 18,6 3,45 2,67 0,0 -2,5 77,3 3,83 1,16
2007 32,5 21,9 24,9 57,0 44,8 4,0 -0,5 0,0 18,7 3,11 2,29 0,0 -10,0 73,8 3,49 1,20
1999 31,9 31,9 28,7 32,0 32,0 6,7 - 0,0 26,8 221,55 49,96 0,0 - 22,6 235,65 185,68
2000 38,2 43,8 36,4 39,9 41,9 6,8 -10,4 0,7 36,2 196,08 45,58 1,2 -10,4 23,2 208,95 163,36
2001 43,2 51,8 42,9 44,4 48,1 4,8 -18,5 0,4 39,1 147,99 38,95 0,0 -24,5 26,3 155,71 116,76
2002 42,8 41,7 41,6 43,3 43,1 3,2 -18,0 6,2 32,5 103,75 34,19 16,4 -17,4 33,0 113,01 78,82
2003 41,8 37,6 39,1 42,3 42,0 3,8 0,5 5,4 28,1 132,06 55,46 3,7 32,6 42,0 149,28 93,82
2004 40,7 24,0 34,0 40,3 40,5 3,4 4,8 4,0 33,3 149,91 38,74 0,0 13,5 25,8 157,65 118,92
2005 36,6 17,8 26,6 n.a. 31,6 3,1 16,4 5,3 29,1 190,22 29,24 7,3 36,6 15,4 198,17 168,94
2006 30,1 22,0 22,8 n.a. 26,4 3,3 13,1 6,9 23,5 168,01 29,40 8,8 -3,2 17,5 182,71 153,31
2007 25,0 18,2 19,9 80,4 52,7 4,0 20,8 6,5 48,6 200,88 30,76 7,8 29,1 15,3 206,23 175,47
1999 28,1 28,1 22,7 27,6 28,1 6,7 - 0,0 20,1 0,22 0,20 0,0 - 94,9 0,27 0,07
2000 26,3 24,4 21,7 25,9 26,1 6,8 -21,1 0,0 19,5 0,17 0,16 0,0 -21,1 95,0 0,22 0,05
2001 32,1 41,4 28,9 31,7 36,8 4,8 2,9 0,0 16,2 0,21 0,15 0,0 20,9 72,8 0,24 0,09
2002 30,9 27,0 24,9 31,6 31,3 3,2 -13,3 0,0 25,8 0,13 0,03 0,0 -34,5 20,6 0,14 0,11
2003 29,1 20,0 20,5 29,9 29,5 3,8 24,4 0,0 27,3 0,26 0,02 0,0 89,7 8,9 0,26 0,24
2004 29,3 28,8 21,6 31,2 30,3 3,4 64,0 0,0 29,4 0,63 0,02 0,0 145,3 3,3 0,63 0,61
2005 29,6 26,4 20,8 32,8 31,2 3,1 54,4 0,0 25,8 0,72 0,15 0,0 14,4 20,3 0,74 0,59
2006 24,6 18,4 16,9 31,4 28,0 3,3 41,4 0,0 21,7 0,76 0,20 0,0 6,8 26,7 0,80 0,59
2007 22,9 18,4 16,3 25,8 24,4 4,0 48,6 0,0 16,1 1,11 0,46 0,0 45,5 41,6 1,20 0,73
1999 47,5 47,5 42,7 55,0 51,3 6,7 - 0,0 32,7 15,23 8,09 0,0 - 53,1 17,36 9,27
2000 41,4 34,1 36,6 44,1 42,7 6,8 23,2 0,0 26,5 18,76 10,32 0,0 23,2 55,0 21,59 11,27
2001 40,2 37,7 36,2 42,4 41,3 4,8 7,0 0,0 20,0 17,80 12,06 0,0 -5,1 67,8 20,23 8,17
2002 41,1 44,0 37,9 43,5 43,8 3,2 5,4 0,0 16,4 18,38 13,99 0,0 3,3 76,1 20,26 6,27
2003 38,5 25,2 32,9 40,7 39,6 3,8 14,1 0,0 20,9 23,73 13,88 0,0 29,1 58,5 25,93 12,05
2004 33,8 23,2 27,1 47,0 40,4 3,4 11,0 0,0 29,3 24,88 8,23 0,0 4,8 33,1 26,04 17,81
2005 38,6 53,7 33,8 47,9 50,8 3,1 71,9 0,0 30,4 74,49 36,75 0,0 199,4 49,3 78,91 42,16
2006 37,8 33,8 31,6 64,8 51,3 3,3 52,0 0,0 33,0 69,26 30,75 0,0 -7,0 44,4 73,23 42,49
2007 34,2 24,8 28,2 50,0 42,1 4,0 44,4 0,0 32,0 81,23 24,00 0,0 17,3 29,5 85,22 61,22
1999 25,3 25,3 21,5 23,8 25,3 6,7 - 2,7 25,3 1,97 2,42 2,7 - 122,4 3,61 1,20
2000 18,4 5,6 10,7 16,4 17,4 6,8 9,4 1,9 17,4 2,07 2,73 1,4 9,4 131,8 3,94 1,21
2001 20,9 25,1 11,8 19,2 23,0 4,8 15,6 4,0 18,0 2,35 3,44 6,7 20,1 146,1 4,51 1,08
2002 48,8 90,7 23,9 51,4 71,1 3,2 37,7 4,2 54,5 4,42 3,28 4,5 66,8 74,3 5,45 2,17
2003 44,2 15,7 18,1 48,4 46,3 3,8 23,4 4,9 42,7 4,00 3,44 6,3 -1,4 85,9 5,52 2,08
2004 42,8 6,9 12,2 43,2 43,0 3,4 18,1 5,6 43,0 3,96 2,84 6,5 7,2 71,8 5,13 2,29
2005 43,1 13,5 11,8 49,8 46,4 3,1 19,5 5,7 46,4 4,52 1,45 5,0 20,4 32,0 4,83 3,38
2006 42,0 11,7 9,1 59,1 50,5 3,3 20,1 5,5 50,5 5,20 1,30 5,3 21,4 24,9 5,42 4,13
2007 11,1 0,0 3,9 49,7 30,4 4,0 9,3 6,6 30,4 4,53 1,08 8,7 -1,6 23,8 5,20 4,13
2004 24,1 24,1 23,2 25,2 24,7 3,4 - 1,0 24,4 30,70 2,14 1,0 - 7,0 31,03 28,89
2005 27,7 29,4 25,6 28,0 28,7 3,1 68,2 0,8 25,2 51,28 9,29 0,7 68,2 18,1 52,61 43,32
2006 28,3 29,2 25,4 30,8 30,0 3,3 32,3 0,8 28,2 53,59 6,17 0,8 5,4 11,5 54,53 48,36
2007 29,6 32,4 9,7 29,8 31,1 4,0 21,0 0,5 21,0 56,84 24,97 0,0 6,1 43,9 62,04 37,07
Source: author's computation, Magnus (2008), Prague Stock Exchange
Estimates of equity's volatility Other used parametersParameters used for ELGD computation
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